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ABSTRACT
This thesis concerns approaches to solving the problem of paradoxical scepticalarguments from ignorance within contemporary epistemology. In chapter 1, Icritically discuss three frameworks for approaching the sceptical problem, and
argue that theoretical responses are unsatisfactory. In chapter 2, I critically examine
recent accounts of sceptical hypotheses, and argue against them on the grounds of gener-
ality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 3, I critically examine recent accounts
of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and argue
against them on the grounds of generality, and in favour of my own account. In chapter 4,
I critically evaluate the adequacy of resolutions to sceptical paradoxes suggested by three
prominent versions of epistemological contextualism. In chapter 5, I examine a central
objection to the error theories implied by contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes,
which focuses on the notion of semantic blindness. Two assessments of the objection
are set out, and contextualist responses to each. I argued that considerations of seman-
tic blindness count against contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in favour
of invariantists. In chapter 6, I assess the potential for an invariantist to provide an
adequate error-theory concerning, and resolving, sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess
approaches based on aspects of the heuristics and biases paradigm, and of dual-process
theories of mindreading. I propose, instead, a novel anti-sceptical error-theory in terms
of the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of judgement and reasoning,
together with my conclusions from chapters 2 and 3.
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INTRODUCTION.
Introduction.
Each concept means what it singly means, and nothing else; and if the
conceiver does not know whether he means this or means that, it shows that
his concept is imperfectly formed.
— William James, (James, 1911, 48-9)
This thesis is concerned with the problem of paradoxical sceptical arguments from
ignorance, and, subsequently, how it may be solved. I begin, in chapter 1, by setting the
stage for the rest of the thesis. I start with some important preliminaries, in which I
attempt to clarify precisely as possible the focus of the thesis: the problem of scepticism.
After setting out the problem in terms of sceptical arguments and their paradoxical
nature, I move on to critically discuss and compare three different frameworks for
thinking about how to solve the problem of sceptical paradoxes. In this discussion, I
identify the two cruxes of the subsequent thesis: what constraints a fully satisfactory
resolution of sceptical paradoxes must meet, and the diagnostic work necessary to begin
assessing whether they are met. I take on the latter in the diagnostic work comprising
chapters 2 and 3. In chapters 4 and 5 I take on the former in assessing a prominent
attempt to resolve sceptical paradoxes. Finally, in chapter 6, I draw the chapters together
to suggest a way to fully satisfactory resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
In majority of chapter 1, I focus on critically examining various characterisations of
approaches to the providing a solution the problem of sceptical paradoxes. I examine
three different ways of characterising solutions to sceptical problems: Pryor’s (2000)
distinction between ambitious and modest anti-sceptical projects, Schiffer’s (2004) dis-
tinction between happy-, and unhappy-face resolutions to sceptical paradoxes, Williams’
(1991) distinction between theoretical and therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical arguments.
I argue, ultimately, that Pryor’s distinction is not useful in seeking a solution to sceptical
problems, and that the distinctions drawn by Schiffer and Williams together provide a
more useful dimensions along which to find a solution to the sceptical problem. I develop
an argument that theoretical diagnosis of sceptical arguments face second-order prob-
lems to providing happy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. I apply the argument
to reject Pryor’s anti-sceptical project, and use this to motivate the subsequent search
for a happy-face resolution that is compatible with what I term a confusion-therapeutic
diagnosis of sceptical arguments.
In chapter 2, I focus on asking whether we really understand the role played by
sceptical hypotheses in sceptical arguments. I critically assess and argue against various
vii
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prominent accounts of sceptical hypotheses. The discussion is guided by the method-
ological assumption that a certain generality is required from an adequate account
of sceptical hypotheses. I introduce a novel example and draw on it to argue against
various prominent accounts of sceptical hypotheses. Instead, I propose my own account
of sceptical hypotheses, and argue that it is adequately general.
In chapter 3, I focus on asking whether we really understand what epistemic principle
actually underwrite sceptical arguments. I critically assess and argue against various
prominent proposals for this principle. Here, again, the discussion is guided by a method-
ological assumption that an account of the epistemic principle underwriting a sceptical
argument which generalises is preferable to one that does not. I argue, on this basis,
that that various accounts should be rejected. Instead, I consider a recently proposed
account of the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments that does generalise.
Nonetheless, I raise doubts about the explanatory adequacy of this proposal. Finally, I
make my own proposal for the principle underwriting sceptical arguments in terms of a
novel analysis of epistemic possibility, and defend this account as both the sufficiently
general, and adequately explanatory.
In chapter 4, I give a detailed critical discussion of the putative resolutions of scep-
tical paradoxes proffered by versions of epistemological contextualism in terms of the
constraints on a fully satisfactory resolutions identified in chapter 1. Next, in chapter 5 I
examine a central objection to the error theories of contextualist resolutions that focuses
on the notion of semantic blindness. I discuss two lines of along which the objection can
be interpreted, and the contextualist response to them. Here, I argue that considera-
tions of semantic blindness give reason to think that contextualism is at a significant
disadvantage to its competitor, invariantism, in terms of providing a fully satisfactory
resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
In chapter 6, I assess the potential for the epistemological view of invariantism
to provide an adequate error-theory concerning sceptical paradoxes. I critically assess
approaches to explaining our erroneous judgments in terms of recent developments in
cognitive psychology, including the heuristics and biases paradigm, and dual-process
theories of mindreading. I argue that some putative candidates for an anti-sceptical
invariantist error-theory given in terms of cognitive terms are inadequate. Instead, I put
forward a novel anti-sceptical error-theory given in terms of the default-interventionist
model of dual-process theory of judgement. I conclude that this provides a prima facie
fully satisfactory solution to the sceptical problem.
viii
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THE PROBLEM OF SCEPTICISM.
1.1 Scepticism.
This thesis concerns itself with scepticism and the problem which it poses within episte-
mology. When writing about scepticism, Craig (1990, 104) suggests that it is prudent to
begin by saying what exactly one is talking about. The task of describing what scepticism
is, and the problem it presents, within epistemology, is not a straightforward one. This is
because scepticism, as Stroud observes, “has been different things at different times in
the history of philosophy, and has been put to different uses” (Sosa and Stroud, 1994,
87). For this reason, it is widely accepted that the term ‘scepticism’ does not denote
a homogeneous set of issues. According to Williamson, for example, “[s]cepticism is a
disease individuated by its symptoms (such as immodest protestations of ignorance); we
should therefore not assume that it can be caused in only one way” (Williamson, 2000,
165). And, similarly, Wright advises caution in this respect:
Much literature on the topic of external world scepticism proceeds as if
there were a single general form of problem that has to be confronted. In
fact, however, arguments for epistemological scepticism come in a variety of
significantly different forms and, while generality is of course a merit in a
response, there is no reason to expect that they should succumb to a uniform
treatment. (Wright, 1991, 87)
Wright, here, illuminates two issues when considering how to go about discussing the
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problem of scepticism. The first is that ‘scepticism’ is best understood as being a thesis of
some description about knowledge or justification. The second is that a sceptical thesis
presents an epistemological problem in virtue of being argued for. In this chapter, I will
aim to unpack that laconic statement of the topic of this thesis.
I begin, in sections 1.1.1 and 1.1.2, by setting out the sceptical thesis, the type of
argument for it with which I am interested, and the problem posed by the paradoxical
natural of these arguments. In section 1.2, I outline and discuss three distinct approaches
to distinguishing ways on solving the problem of sceptical paradoxes. Here I examine
and critically reject Pryor’s distinction between ambitious and modest responses to
scepticism, and consider in detail both Schiffer’s distinction between happy-face and
unhappy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, as well as Williams’ distinction between
theoretical and therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical arguments. In section 1.3, I draw to-
gether considerations of Schiffer and Williams’ distinctions to argue against the potential
for theoretical solutions to provide the happy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. I
conclude that the most promising route to a happy-face resolution lies in the direction of a
diagnosis of sceptical arguments that explicates our error regarding sceptical paradoxes
in terms that are not purely epistemological.
1.1.1 Sceptical arguments and hypotheses.
In its most general sense, scepticism can be understood as the epistemological thesis
“that nobody knows anything, or that nobody has good reason to believe anything” at all
(Sosa and Stroud, 1994, 291). However, for my purposes here, I use the term scepticism
in a more restricted sense to refer to the idea that nobody knows, or has good reason
to believe any empirical proposition. So why is scepticism supposed to be interesting?
The above quote from Wright highlights an important point that, insofar as scepticism
presents a problem, it does so because there may be arguments put forward in support of
it.1 This thesis only concerns itself with sceptical arguments that share the following
single common ‘argument from ignorance’ form; where S refers to some epistemic subject,
p refers to some empirical proposition, and h refers to some ‘hypothesis’:
ARGUMENT FROM IGNORANCE.
(i) S doesn’t know that ¬h.
(ii) If S knows that p, then S knows that ¬h.
1 Cf. Williams (2013).
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So,
(iii) S doesn’t know that p.2
Hereafter ‘sceptical argument’ will refer only to those which have the argument from
ignorance, or AI, form. But not every instance of AI is sceptical. In order for an instance
of AI to be a sceptical argument in the sense meant here, the argument needs to apply to
a broad range of empirical propositions p. Whether it does this or not, will depend on
the specific hypothesis h involved. The hypothesis that my bicycle was just stolen, for
example, seems apt to be used in an AI argument to the effect that I do not know that
my bike is where I left it. Consider the following argument:
BICYCLE.
(1) I do not know that my bicycle was not just stolen.
(2) If I know that my bicycle is where I left it, then I know it was not just stolen.
So,
(3) I do not know that my bicycle is where I left it.
But whilst the hypothesis that my bicycle was just stolen seems apt to raise a challenge
to my claimed knowledge of my bicycle’s whereabouts, it is not apt to challenge an obvious
range of empirical propositions I might claim to know. However, this is precisely what the
hypothesis must do in a sceptical argument, and only those that do so will be referred to
as sceptical hypotheses. This can be illustrated by the following two examples of sceptical
hypotheses that have featured prominently in the literature on scepticism: the dreaming
hypothesis, and the brain in a vat hypothesis.
In its most basic form, the dreaming hypothesis is that one is currently dreaming. Its
origins lie in the work of Rene Descartes’s Meditations, where he writes:
How many times have I dreamt at night that I was in this place, dressed,
by the fire, although I was quite naked in my bed? it certainly seems to me at
the moment that I am not looking at this paper with my eyes closed; that this
head that I shake is not asleep; that I hold out this hand intentionally and
deliberately, and that I am aware of it. What happens in sleep does not seems
2 The argument form is well known, and often presented in superficially different ways. I follow
Brueckner (2011) in my presentation.
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as clear and distinct as all this. But in thinking about it carefully, I recall
having often been deceived in sleep by similar illusions, and, reflecting on
this circumstance more closely, I see so clearly that there are no conclusive
signs by which one can distinguish clearly between being awake and being
asleep, that I am quite astonished by it; and my astonishment is such that it
is almost capable of persuading me that I am asleep now. (Descartes, 1982,
96-7)
Here we have our first example of a sceptical hypothesis with Descartes’ introduction
of the possibility that he is dreaming. That is, a hypothesis which is apt to be used in a
sceptical argument. Where dr is the hypothesis that S is currently dreaming, it seems
that the following line of reasoning can be put forward, for every epistemic subject S and
any empirical proposition p:
DREAMING.
(4) S doesn’t know ¬dr.
(5) If S knows that p, then S knows that ¬dr.
So,
(6) S doesn’t know that p.
The second sceptical hypothesis to consider is the brain in a vat hypothesis, which
is, perhaps, the most commonly discussed example of a sceptical hypothesis.3 To get a
sense of what this involves, it is instructive to consider the following quote from Hilary
Putnam:
[I]magine that a human being (you can imagine this to be yourself) has
been subjected to an operation by an evil scientist. The person’s brain (your
brain) has been removed from the body and placed in a vat of nutrients which
keeps the brain alive. The nerve endings have been connected to a super-
scientific computer which causes the person whose brain it is to have the
illusion that everything is perfectly normal. There seem to be people, objects,
the sky, etc; but really all the person (you) is experiencing is the result of
electronic impulses traveling from the computer to the nerve endings. The
3 Its origins can be traced back to (Unger, 1975).
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computer is so clever that if the person tries to raise his hand, the feedback
from the computer will cause him to ‘see’ and ‘feel’ the hand being raised.
Moreover, by varying the program, the evil scientist can cause the victim to
‘experience’ (or hallucinate) any situation or environment the evil scientist
wishes. (Putnam, 1981, 5-6).
What sceptical import do these considerations have? To see this, first let S stand
for some human being. Next let ‘biv’ stand for the proposition that S is in exactly the
situation that Putnam asks you to imagine in the above passage—they are a brain in a
vat (or, a BIV for short). Finally, let ‘hands’ stand for the proposition that s has hands.
This gives us the second sceptical argument:
ENVATTED BRAIN.
(7) S does not know that ¬biv.
(8) If S knows that hands, then S knows that ¬biv.
So,
(9) S does not know that hands.
That concludes the set up with respect to the sorts of sceptical arguments with which
I will be interested in discussing. In the next section, I will set out the problematic nature
of these arguments.
1.1.2 Sceptical Paradoxes.
One way to characterise the problem of sceptical arguments is to argue that “sceptical
arguments present us with classical sceptical paradoxes, and the problem of scepticism
is the problem of solving those paradoxes” (Schiffer, 1996, 317). On taking this approach
it is first pointed out that a classical paradox is “set of mutually inconsistent propositions
each of which enjoys some plausibility when considered apart from the others” (Schiffer,
1996, 328). Next, it is argued that “[t]he premises of [a sceptical argument]... and the
negation of its conclusion comprise such a set” (Schiffer, 2004, 178). This is because, it
is argued, “each premise seems to some degree creditable when considered on its own,
but the two together entail a conclusion we are apt to feel has got to be false” (Schiffer,
2004, 165). This characterisation of the sceptical problem maintains that the premises of
arguments such as DREAMING and ENVATTED BRAIN strike us as prima facie pausible.
5
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So let us examine the case for saying that the first premises of these sceptical arguments
are plausible.
Many epistemologists do think that it is eminently plausible to deny both that we
know we are not currently dreaming, or that we are not brains in vats. We often find
descriptions of our epistemic position with respect to sceptical hypotheses in which these
are characterised in the following way:
the very sort of propositions which one seems unable, in principle, to know
are the denials of radical skeptical hypotheses, since these hypotheses concern
scenarios which are phenomenologically indistinguishable from everyday life.
(Pritchard, 2002, 217)
The idea here that sceptical arguments are paradoxical is in part due to the fact that
sceptical hypotheses are in principle unknowable by anyone. They are designed to be
such, so that anyone who might wonder whether or not they knew it to be false, would
have no way to tell, since there would be nothing in the course of their actual experience
that would be distinguishable from the hypothesis obtaining. Compare the situation with
the non-sceptical BICYCLE argument and its first premise. In contrast to the DREAMING
and ENVATTED BRAIN arguments, it is not in principle plausible to deny that I know
that the stolen hypothesis is false. Rather, the question of whether I know that my bike
has not been just stolen seems to be a contingent on the what I have done. It might
seem implausible, for example, if I have just this second seen it where I left it. It might
also be implausible to deny I know it has just been stolen if I have been able to see the
only possible access to it for the entire time since I left it, and not seen anyone go by. In
either case, the hypothesis that it has just been stolen would be distinguishable from my
actual course of experience; I would have just seen it, or I would have (presumably) seen
someone come by.
My interest, here, lies in those sceptical arguments from ignorance that are paradoxi-
cal in the sense I have described here. I now move on, to focus on considerations of how
the problem of these paradoxes could solved.
1.2 Characterisations of Responses to Scepticism.
In this section, I discuss how to solve the problem of scepticism by discussing various
characterisations of approaches to the providing a solution. I examine three different
ways of characterising solutions to sceptical problems. First, I discuss Pryor’s distinction
6
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between ambitious and modest anti-sceptical projects. I argue that this distinction
between ambitious and modest responses to scepticism is not useful in seeking a solution
to sceptical problems. Next, I outline then Schiffer’s distinction between happy-, and
unhappy-face solutions to sceptical problems. Lastly, I discuss Williams’ distinction
between theoretical and therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical problems. I suggest that the
distinctions drawn by Schiffer and Williams together provide a more useful dimensions
of assessment of putative solutions to the sceptical problem. In the final section, I discuss
some ways in which Schiffer and William’s distinctions relate to each other, apply these
considerations to Pryor’s work, and draw conclusions about how to best approach solving
the sceptical problem.
1.2.1 Pryor’s Anti-sceptical Projects.
There is a distinction concerning approaches to solving the problem posed by sceptical
arguments that has been drawn by Pryor (2000). This is the distinction between what he
terms ‘ambitious’ and ‘modest’ anti-sceptical projects. Firstly, I focus on setting out what
the two anti-sceptical projects are supposed to be, and the attitudes Pryor takes towards
their prospects for success. I offer a tentative critical assessment of the distinction before
moving on, in the subsequent sections, to discuss relevant distinctions described by
Schiffer (1996) and Williams (1991).
Pryor considers the possibility of responding to sceptical arguments, and, subse-
quently, solving the paradoxes which they present by way of what he calls an ambitious
anti-sceptical project. He explains what this involves in the following way:
The ambitious anti-skeptical project is to refute the skeptic on his own
terms, that is, to establish that we can justifiably believe and know such
things as that there is a hand, using only premises that the skeptic allows us
to use. (Pryor, 2000, 517)
The ambitious anti-sceptical project can be compared to what has been called the
‘convince-the-sceptic’ game. Our objective in this game is “to try to convince the sceptic
that we have knowledge of the external world, without ‘begging the question’ against her.
Specifically, we cannot appeal to any premise that is known on the basis of perceptual
experience, because the legitimacy of such premises is precisely what the sceptic doubts”
(Byrne, 2004, 301). In contrast to the ambitious anti-sceptical project of refuting sceptical
arguments, Pryor considers an alternative possibility of responding to sceptical problems
7
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by means of what he calls a modest anti-sceptical project. He explains what this involves
in the following way:
The modest anti-skeptical project is to establish to our satisfaction that we
can justifiably believe and know such things as that there is a hand, without
contradicting obvious facts about perception. (Pryor, 2000, 517)
The modest and the ambitious anti-sceptical projects both succeed, only if they
establish that the conclusion of sceptical arguments are false. This is because the
conclusions of sceptical arguments is that we are unable to know, or have good reason
to believe any empirical proposition—such as that I have hands, for example—, and
both anti-sceptical projects aim to establish that we are able to do so. The contrast, then,
between the ambitious and the modest anti-sceptical projects lies in that the ambitious
project involves demonstrating that the sceptic can’t have the premises they need for
their argument (since it has been refuted). The modest anti-skeptical project, on the
other hand, merely
attempts to diagnose and defuse those skeptical arguments; to show how
to retain as many of our pretheoretical beliefs about perception as possible,
without accepting the premises the skeptic needs for his argument. (Pryor,
2000, 517, my emphasis)
Pryor is not alone in distinguishing what he calls ambitious from modest ‘anti-
sceptical projects’, and it is well appreciated that
many of the most influential responses to scepticism deny that an ade-
quate response should answer sceptical doubts or use only principles which
the sceptic would accept... [Such] accounts do not attempt to resolve doubt
about whether one is a BIV or convince someone who doubts this that she has
knowledge. Rather, they attempt to use part of our conception of the world to
show how, despite the sceptical argument, we can have knowledge. (Brown,
2005, 7)
An approach to sceptical problems, for example, akin to what Pryor calls a modest
anti-sceptical project, can be found in the work of Robert Nozick (1981). He explains that,
regarding sceptical problems:
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Our task here is to explain how knowledge is possible... In doing this, we
need not convince the sceptic, and we may introduce explanatory hypotheses
that he would reject. What is important for our task of explanation and
understanding is that we find those hypotheses acceptable or plausible[.]
(Nozick, 1981, 197-8)
Pryor is pessimistic when he states that the “prospects for this ambitious anti-
skeptical project seem somewhat dim” (Pryor, 2000, 517). In fact, Pryor maintains that
the prospects for ambitious anti-sceptical projects are even worse than this; he says
“the ambitious anti-skeptical project is hopeless: we can’t demonstrate to the skeptic,
using only premises he’ll accept, that we have any perceptual knowledge [or justification]”
(Pryor, 2000, 520). In contrast, of course, Pryor is optimistic about the prospects of success
for a modest anti-sceptical project, since it only “aims to set our own minds at ease, it’s
not a condition for succeeding at it that we restrict ourselves to only making assumptions
that the skeptic would accept” (Pryor, 2000, 518). This leads me to raise some general
concerns about Pryor’s pattern of attitudes towards modest and ambitious anti-sceptical
projects. In I have in mind, specifically, his optimism concerning the prospects of success
for modest projects and his pessimism about those for ambitious anti-sceptical projects.
And I will set out this concern next.
1.2.2 Doubts about Pryor’s Projects.
My concern with respect to Pryor’s distinction between ambitious and modest responses
to sceptical arguments, can be articulated in what I take to be the following an uncontro-
versial point. If we are to be satisfied that we have established something, then we want
to have actually established it. When aiming to establish something, we do not just want
to do so using premises that we permit ourselves to use, but rather, we want to establish
it because we have used premises that we are in fact permitted to use.
Here it will be useful to consider another potential pattern of attitudes towards
modest and ambitious anti-sceptical projects. The pattern to consider here is that of
pessimism about a modest anti-sceptical project, and optimism about an ambitious
project. That is, maintaining that one can successfully establish that some contingent
proposition is known, using only premises that would be permitted by the sceptic, but not
permitted by ourselves. We have an immediate appreciation that someone holding these
attitudes would be rather odd, to say the least. After all, it is not at all clear that the
sceptic would permit a premise for the purposes of establishing that we have external
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world knowledge, which we would not. Someone who held that pattern of attitudes would
be very hard to understand at all. So much so, that it might be thought that there
would be little to be gained by considering the possibility of someone who did hold these
attitudes. To the contrary, I think that this strange possibility can help to illuminate
my general concern with Pryor’s divergent attitudes towards the prospects of success
for ambitious and modest anti-sceptical projects. What makes this potential pattern of
attitudes particularly useful to consider here is precisely why we are inclined to disregard
it in the first place. What explains this? I think that a reasonably natural explanation
might go as follows: there seems to be little reason for thinking that the sceptic could be
satisfied that we can know, when we ourselves are not!
I think this situation reveals what lies behind the suspicion of Pryor’s pattern of
attitudes. In the case considered above, the strangeness consisted in being optimistic
about ambitious responses to scepticism, and being pessimistic about modest ones. I
think this strangeness can be explained by appreciating that, were the sceptic satisfied
that we know some empirical proposition, then there would be good reasons for us to be
satisfied too. On the assumption that the sceptic will only be satisfied that it has been
established if in fact it has been, then we should be satisfied that it has too. And with that
explanation in place I think we are now in a position to give a better general statement
of our initial potential concern about Pryor’s optimism and pessimism concerning modest
and ambitious anti-sceptical projects, respectively. If the sceptic refuses to permit the
use of some premises for the purposes of establishing that we know, or have justification
for believing empirical propositions, then either they are correct to do so or not. If they
are correct to do so, it is hard to see what use a modest anti-sceptical project could be in
terms of solving the sceptical problem. There is little to be gained by pointing out that
we can derive the falsity of sceptical conclusions from certain premises when the use of
these premises for this purpose is correctly deemed to be inappropriate. But if, on the
other hand, the sceptic’s refusal to permit these considerations is not correct, then we
should be able to show that this is the case. But this would not be shown by pointing out
that we would permit the use of them, we would still need something more than what
the modest anti-sceptical project provides.
For these reasons, it is not clear that distinguishing between what we may avail
ourselves of in responding to scepticism will be helpful in understanding how the sceptical
problem can be solved. In the remainder of this chapter and thesis, I set aside the
distinction between ambitious and modest responses to scepticism, and move on to
explore two further characterisations of approaches to solving the sceptical problem.
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In contrast to the former distinction, both of these distinctions concern the aim of an
response to scepticism, rather than the means by which this aim is supposed to be
attained. I argue that when considered together, both of these provide a more useful
dimension along which to assess whether a putative solution to the sceptical problem is
successful.
1.2.3 Schiffer’s Happy and Unhappy Face Solutions.
It is widely accepted that sceptical arguments present us with classical paradoxes.
Schiffer has suggested that classical paradoxes, such as those which sceptical arguments
present, may admit of a what he terms a ‘happy-face’ solution. Here is the explanation of
what this sort of solution amounts to:
A happy-face solution to a paradox does two things, assuming that the
propositions comprising the set really are mutually incompatible: first, it
identifies the odd-guy-out, the member of the set that’s not true; and second,
it shows us why this spurious proposition deceived us, strips from it its patina
of truth, so that we’re not taken in by it again. (Schiffer, 2004, 178-9)
The point here is that there are two general adequacy constraints on providing a happy-
face solution to sceptical problems. These can be thought of as two necessary steps
for resolving the tension between the mutual inconsistency and apparent individual
plausibility of the premises of sceptical arguments, and our claims to know various
empirical propositions. These constraints, and question of whether they can be met,
forms the crux of this thesis.
The first constraint is to identify a false claim, and thereby address the inconsistency
partly constituting sceptical paradoxes. The second constraint is to provide an error-
theory, or explanation for why the false claim was judged to be plausible. A happy-face
solution to sceptical problems must meet both of these constraints. As Schiffer explains,
it is is necessary for a happy-face solution to
locate the false proposition in the set of mutually inconsistent propositions
that we get by combining... [a sceptical argument’s] premises with the denial
of its conclusion, and the error theory is needed to explain why the sentence
expressing the false proposition... deceptively appears to be stating a true
proposition. (Schiffer, 1996, 325)
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Schiffer maintains that some paradoxes do, in fact, have happy-face solutions. He points
out that
[t]he paradox of the barber who shaves all and only those who don’t shave
themselves has a happy-face solution, for all sense of paradox disappears once
we see that the existence of such a barber is logically impossible. (Schiffer,
2004, 179)
Schiffer has suggested that only happy-face solutions will be considered ‘fully satisfac-
tory’.4 When a ‘happy-face’ solution to a paradox is not possible, Schiffer claims, it is
because of a ‘glitch’ in the concept involved in the paradox. These ‘glitches’, and the
subsequent paradoxes, occur, he explains, when
[a]spects of the concept’s underived conceptual role—the conceptual role
the concept has regardless of whatever propositional attitudes one happens
to have—are in tension, pull us in different directions, and there is nothing
else in the concept or elsewhere to resolve that tension for us. (Schiffer, 2004,
179)
Schiffer suggests that the philosophical ‘problem of free will’ arises from a conceptual
glitch, and consequently has no happy-face solution. This is, he says, due to
[o]ne aspect of the concept inclines us to apply the concept to certain
paradigm cases, acts that are free if any are, whereas another aspect of the
concept disinclines us to apply the concept to an act when we learn that the
actor was caused to do what she did by factors over which she had no control.
Further, there is nothing in the concept or elsewhere—no conceptual court of
appeals—to resolve the tension by pronouncing one inclination legitimate,
the other illegitimate. (Schiffer, 2004, 180)
Paradoxes that lack happy-face solutions have only what he terms ‘unhappy-face’
solutions. Since only happy-face solutions are fully satisfactory, an unhappy-face solution
to a paradox will not be a fully satisfactory one. These less than fully satisfactory
4 See (Schiffer, 1996, 318). He suggests this, however, with a degree of ‘coyness’. This, it would
appear, is due to the fact that he does not think that sceptical paradoxes can have happy-face solutions.
Consequently, he seems to want to keep open the possibility that other solutions can be fully satisfactory. I
am unconvinced that solutions other than happy-face ones can be considered, in good faith, to be fully
satisfactory. I explicate the reasons for this below.
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solutions come in two sorts according to Schiffer. The first of these is what he terms a
‘weakly’ unhappy-face solution. Schiffer explains:
A weak unhappy-face solution is a mildly unhappy-face solution and says
that a glitch-free version of the concept is possible which does the work we
expected from the problematic concept[.] (Schiffer, 2004, 181)
What would a weakly unhappy-face solution to the problem of sceptical arguments
such as DREAMING and ENVATTED BRAIN do? It would maintain two things. Firstly, that
our inconsistent set of judgements arises from a genuine inherent incoherence, or ‘glitch’
in the concept of knowledge involved. Secondly, it would maintain that a ‘surrogate’
concept was available to replace knowledge, which would do the work we wanted from
knowledge but without generating a paradox. It is worth considering an example of a
paradox that Schiffer thinks does have a weakly unhappy-face solution. One would be
the semantic paradoxes, as the following comments reveal:
As Tarski recognized, the semantic paradoxes can have no happy-face
solution owing to features of our ordinary concept of truth in conjunction with
certain logical concepts. But work on truth such as Kripke’s suggests that
paradox-free alternative accounts of truth are possible, which don’t generate
the semantic paradoxes, thus showing that the semantic paradoxes have a
weak unhappy-face solution. (Schiffer, 2004, 181)
For those paradoxes that admit of neither a happy-face, nor a weak unhappy-face
solution, Schiffer thinks we can have only what he terms ‘strong’ unhappy-face solutions.
He qualifies this in the following way:
[A] strong unhappy-face solution is a very unhappy-face solution and says
that no such unparadoxical surrogate can be fashioned. (Schiffer, 2004, 181)
When a paradox has only a strong unhappy-face solution it is because it involves a
concept which is, in an important sense, inherently incoherent. An example of a paradox
that can only have a strong unhappy-face solution, according to Schiffer, is the sorites
paradox.5 It is worth noting that scepticism represents a strong unhappy-face solution
to sceptical paradoxes. That is, our concept of knowledge, or justification is inherently
incoherent. Schiffer is not a sceptic, however, and states that he thinks that sceptical
paradoxes can have weakly unhappy-face solutions.6 I will consider, in the following
5 See (Schiffer, 2000).
6 See (Schiffer, 2004, 181 ff.).
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sections, some reasons to think that anyone who does not wish to endorse scepticism
should not be satisfied with a weakly unhappy-face solution. For my purposes, here, I
will simply note that all things considered, a happy-face solution to sceptical paradoxes
is preferable to an unhappy-face solution, for anyone who wishes to avoid endorsing
scepticism. Crucially, then, Schiffer’s distinction reveals a significant point about how
to solve the sceptical problem. Ideally, solving the sceptical problem requires an error-
theory that adequately explains why we might erreonously think that certain premises
of sceptical arguments are plausible.
This concludes the discussion of Schiffer’s distinction between happy-, and weakly
or strongly unhappy-face solutions to sceptical problems. This distinction usefully dis-
tinguishes between three sorts of solution to the sceptical problem, and identifies the
constraints that a response to scepticism must meet in order to constitute one. A happy-
face solution would be, if attainable, obviously preferable to the alternatives. There are
two constraints on such a solution. First, it must identify either (at least) one premise, or
else the conclusion of sceptical arguments to be false, Second, it must provide an error-
theory that explains away the false claim’s apparent plausibility. In the next section, I
outline and briefly discuss another distinction that has been proposed concerning solu-
tions to the problem of sceptical arguments. This is the distinction between theoretical
and therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical arguments.
1.2.4 Williams’s Anti-sceptical Strategies
This brings us to the distinction concerning approaches to solving the sceptical problems
that has been proposed by Williams (1991). Later on, I suggest that the considerations
involved in this distinction have implications for how Schiffer’s constraints on a ‘fully
satisfactory’ happy-face solution to the sceptical paradoxes can be met. First, I outline the
distinction between what Williams has termed ‘theoretical’ and ‘therapeutic’ diagnoses of
sceptical problems, and then, subsequently, I describe what he terms the ‘epistemologist’s
dilemma’ confronting the latter.
Williams (1988; 1991; 2001) distinguishes between two approaches to solving the
sceptical problem. A solution will involve either a theoretical, or else therapeutic diagnosis
of the problem. In describing the former, theoretical, solutions, Williams explains:
I shall use ‘theoretical diagnosis’ to refer to the strategy of attempting to
uncover the sceptic’s essential epistemological presuppositions. I shall never
accuse the sceptic of incoherence. I shall not argue that his problems are
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pseudo-problems. On the contrary, I think they are fully genuine, but only
given certain theoretical ideas about knowledge and justification. (Williams,
1991, 37)
The aim of a theoretical solution to sceptical problems is to “tell us what theoretical
commitments the problem of the external world, and its attendant skepticism, are
grounded in” (Brady and Pritchard, 2005, 355). The anti-sceptical strategy involved in
theoretical solutions to the sceptical problem is to “show that sceptical arguments depend
essentially on theoretical commitments that are not forced on us by our ordinary ways of
thinking about knowledge, justification, and truth” (Williams, 1991, 31-2). An approach
to solving the sceptical problem by means of a theoretical diagnosis will maintain that
the epistemic principles which seem to underwrite the premises of sceptical arguments
are unnatural ones—which is to say, they are not forced on us by con-
siderations that any reasonable person would have to accept as compelling.
Instead, they only arise if one has already taken on board a variety of con-
troversial theoretical commitments...[i.e.] a set of—on examination, highly
dubious—philosophical theories. If we reject those presuppositions, we can
with a good conscience simply reject the [sceptical argument.] (Rudd, 2008,
305)
Here, Williams regards it as a major advantage of a theoretical diagnosis of scepti-
cal problems, that it circumvents any concerns we might have about whether we can
demonstrate that a sceptical argument is not sound, or, refute it. He explains this in the
following way:
[I]f we hand the sceptic his... presuppositions, there is no refuting him:
this is what the conditional correctness of scepticism consists in. And if
we miss the way seeming platitudes can be used to smuggle in the crucial
epistemological ideas, the conditional correctness of scepticism will make
scepticism seem inevitable. But if we keep these ideas clearly in view the
situation is changed: there is no danger in conceding that the sceptic cannot
be refuted on his own terms if those terms are not ones we are bound to
accept. (Williams, 1988, 417)
Williams contrasts theoretical diagnoses of sceptical problems with what he terms
‘therapeutic’ diagnoses. Central to the distinction is Williams’ observation that “argu-
ments that appeal to something deep in our nature contrast with arguments that turn on
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special theoretical presuppositions” and that “to appeal to something deep in our nature,
an argument for scepticism need not be completely presuppositionless. It must, however,
exploit only the most deeply embedded features of our ordinary conception of knowledge”
(Williams, 1991, 18).
Theoretical diagnoses maintain that sceptical arguments depend upon, or ‘turn on’
special theoretical presuppositions. They hold that the premises of these arguments
are motivated by principles which are extraneous of our ordinary ways of thinking
about knowledge or justification. A solution to the sceptical problem need not do so.
Instead, a solution may hold that sceptical arguments are motivated only by ‘natural’
ways of thinking about knowledge. Solutions that do this involve what Williams terms
therapeutic diagnoses. It is characteristic of them, he explains, to maintain that
sceptical arguments as highly ‘natural’ or ‘intuitive’ in the sense of mini-
mally dependent on contentious theoretical ideas. Thus Stroud claims that
‘when we first encounter... sceptical reasoning... we find it immediately grip-
ping’, which he takes to indicate that such reasoning ‘appeals to something
deep in our nature’. (Williams, 1988, 416)
The distinction between theoretical and therapeutic solutions to sceptical problems
consists in the fact that theoretical maintain “that the sceptic depends essentially on
distinctive theoretical commitments not clearly implicit in our ordinary handling of
epistemic concepts” (Williams, 1991, 32). Since therapeutic solutions, by definition, deny
that sceptical arguments are based on contentious theoretical considerations, therapeutic
solutions involve arguing that sceptical problems are
dissolved by showing that the sceptic doesn’t or can’t mean what he seems
to mean, perhaps even that he does not succeed in meaning anything at all.
It is not enough to show that the case for scepticism is less than compelling:
he has to show that no coherent problem was ever presented. (Williams, 1991,
32)
Any therapeutic diagnosis, on Williams’ view, “treats sceptical problems as pseudo-
problems generated by misuses or misunderstandings of language. On this approach,
sceptical claims and arguments do not really make sense” (Williams, 2001, 146). The
characteristic aim of a therapeutic solution to sceptical problems is that of “exposing
epistemological problems as illusory, thus making them disappear without theoretical
residue” (Williams, 2001, 253).
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Williams maintains that any response to scepticism that is not a theoretical diagnosis
of scepticism, is unable to avoid what he terms the ‘epistemologist’s dilemma’.7 On
his view, there is a choice of unpalatable alternatives for any diagnosis of the problem
according to which sceptical arguments are based on epistemic principles that are part
of our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge. This is because Williams thinks that
any therapeutic diagnosis of the problem can avoid embracing scepticism only by either
maintaining that we do not really understand scepticism, or else by giving up on the
epistemic principle that we otherwise ordinarily accept. I think it will be instructive to
distinguish these two sorts of therapeutic diagnoses. Let’s call those that maintain that
we do not really understand sceptical arguments confusion-therapeutic, and those that
involve abandoning a platitudinous epistemic principle concessive-therapeutic.
Adopting either a confusion-therapeutic or concessive-therapeutic diagnosis of scep-
ticism represents, according to Williams, an unattractive option for an anti-sceptical
epistemologist. To see why, let’s consider the latter option first. A concessive-therapeutic
response to scepticism involves accepting that sceptical arguments are ‘natural’, in the
sense outlined above, and avoiding accepting sceptical conclusions by abandoning those
platitudes about knowledge on which it relies. Yet, Williams argues, it is hard to see how
this amounts to anything other than conceding the very point of sceptical arguments. He
explains the problem facing any concessive-therapeutic response in the following way:
Clearly, the sceptic triumphs if the platitudes he makes use of turn out to
be impossible to deny. But even if we do manage to deny them, the sceptic can
argue that to abandon [a platitude]... is to indicate our willingness to settle for
something less than knowledge of the world, as we have always understood
it; and this is to concede that knowledge as we have always understood it is
indeed beyond us. So the sceptic triumphs either way. (Williams, 1988, 417,
my emphasis.)
Here, Williams is describing what he takes to be the first horn of the ‘epistemologist’s
dilemma’ facing therapeutic solutions to scepticism. If sceptical conclusions do follow
from premises that are motivated by deeply held epistemic principles, and the sceptical
conclusion is to be rejected, then these principles must be extricated from our concept of
knowledge. This amounts to a concession of the sceptical position—it is to concede that
we do not know any empirical propositions, in the sense that we thought we did. I think
7 For critiques of Williams’ optimism concerning theoretical solutions to sceptical problems, see
(Hetherington, 1994), and (Rudd, 2008).
17
CHAPTER 1. THE PROBLEM OF SCEPTICISM.
that this aspect of the dilemma facing therapeutic responses to sceptical arguments
has important implications for happy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. And so
it is worth stressing the point. The following comments, for example, neatly captures
the inherent problem in trying to find a happy-face solution in terms of a concessive-
therapeutic diagnosis:
For we can no longer plausibly argue that the skeptic is enforcing some
arcane, remarkable, or implausible requirement on perceptual knowledge.
Instead, one is faced with arguing against an epistemic principle which one,
along with most, if not all us, adhere to in otherwise normal circumstances.
The dialectical advantage thus goes to the skeptic rather than us. (Pritchard
and Ranalli, 2013, 353-4, my emphasis.)
To avoid the first horn of the dilemma—conceding previously endorsed epistemic prin-
ciples, and, subsequently, precluding a happy-face solution— a non-theoretical solution
will need to be confusion-therapeutic one. This involves attempting to avoid endorsing
sceptical conclusions by maintaining that the use of platitudinous principles in sceptical
arguments is somehow incoherent, or unintelligible. Even these approaches, Williams
argues, face problems of their own. If we want a happy-face anti-sceptical solution to
sceptical paradoxes that is not a theoretical diagnosis, then it seems we will need to
maintain that sceptical arguments are ‘less than fully intelligible’. Williams explains
what he takes to be the problem with such a confusion-therapeutic diagnosis in the
following way:
The trouble is... [that sceptical arguments] do not seem defective in point
of intelligibility, particularly not to those who find them strikingly intuitive.
In fact, it is not clear that one could hold that such arguments invoke only
platitudes and still find them less than fully intelligible. Would they not have
to inherit their lack of intelligibility from the platitudes they make use of?
So... the evident intelligibility of what the sceptic claims counts against any
theory... that calls its intelligibility in question. (Williams, 1988, 421-2)
This gives us the second horn of the epistemologists dilemma facing any non-
theoretical solution to sceptical problems—specifically, confusion-therapeutic ones. If
sceptical conclusions do follow from premises that are motivated by deeply held epistemic
principles, and the sceptical conclusion is to be rejected, then, it seems, we do not really
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understand sceptical arguments at all. Yet, Williams argues, this just seems to be an
implausible position to maintain. As he explains:
Our sense that we do understand the sceptic—well enough, for example,
to understand how we might argue against him— will eventually wear down
the credibility of theories that imply that we don’t. (Williams, 1991, 18)
The epistemologist’s dilemma, then, can be characterised in the following way:
[I]f scepticism is really based upon ordinary platitudes, then the claim
that we really don’t understand the sceptic, or a solution that requires a
revision of an ordinary platitude, will, in the end, be a round about way of
agreeing with the sceptic that, as Williams puts it, “knowledge of the world”
as we ordinarily (though tacitly) understand it, is impossible. (Buchanan,
2002, 77)
The supposed upshot of the epistemologist’s dilemma, then, is that both confusion-,
and concessive-therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical arguments cannot represent happy-
face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. I agree that a concessive-therapeutic solution
is unable to represent a happy-face resolution, for the reasons considered. In virtue of
conceding the platitudinous epistemic principle, such a solution will necessarily be a
weakly unhappy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
I do not think, however, that a confusion-therapeutic diagnosis is unable to be part of
a happy-face solution. This is because I do not think, as Williams’ does, that maintaining
that sceptical arguments are ‘less than fully intelligible’ implies that our ordinary ways
of thinking about knowledge are too. If it did, then confusion-therapeutic diagnoses
would, ultimately, amount to either weakly or strongly unhappy-face resolutions. But
it need not. This is, then, the second crux of this chapter and thesis: that is possible to
both maintain that sceptical arguments rely on platitudinous epistemic principles, and
to explain the source of our error (or confusion) with respect to sceptical arguments in
other terms. And I will return to explore these point in depth in the second half of this
thesis. In chapters 4 and 5, for example, I investigate the whether an anti-sceptical error
theory for sceptical paradoxes can be given in semantic terms. In chapter 6, I consider
whether a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes can be had by means of an error
theory given in cognitive terms.
That concludes the discussion of both Williams’ distinction between theoretical and
therapeutic solutions to sceptical problems, and what he terms the epistemologist’s
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dilemma confronting the latter. In the next section, set out some ways in which I think
the distinctions drawn by Schiffer and Williams can be brought together. I suggest that
this reveals some significant implications for the prospects of providing an anti-sceptical
happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
1.3 Theoretical and Therapeutic responses:
Happy-face Solutions?
In the previous section, I argued that confusion-therapeutic diagnoses of sceptical ar-
guments are not inherently incapable of providing happy-face resolutions of sceptical
paradoxes. Now, in this section, I aim to pave the way for the ensuing chapters of the
thesis by suggesting that theoretical diagnoses face significant obstacles to providing
happy-face resolutions.
1.3.1 Second order constraints on theoretical responses.
The primary crux of this chapter and thesis is that in order to be a happy-face solution
to sceptical paradoxes, and subsequently, a fully satisfactory solution to the sceptical
problem, a response to scepticism must fulfill two conditions. First, it must identify
the false claim within the apparently inconsistent and plausible claims presented by
sceptical arguments. Second, it must provide an error-theory, i.e. an account of why it is
that we might mistakenly judge this false claim to be plausible. Theoretical anti-sceptical
solutions will, in general, attempt to meet the first condition by identifying either of
a sceptical argument’s premises as false. Subsequently, they will attempt to meet the
second condition, in general, by giving an account of an epistemic principle underwriting
the premise that is identified as false.
I think, however, that the considerations pertaining to concessive-therapeutic solu-
tions involved in the epistemologist’s dilemma, provide good reasons to think that a theo-
retical solution will not obviously provide happy-face solutions. Recall that concessive-
therapeutic solutions are revisionary, in the sense of replacing one way of thinking about
knowledge in favour of another, and for which paradoxes will not arise. As such, these are
clearly weakly unhappy solutions. But can a theoretical response to scepticism constitute
a happy-face solution to the sceptical problem? It can only if it is able to adequately
explain why it is that we get confused by sceptical arguments in terms of a principle
that is not a part of ordinary way of thinking about knowledge. If no explanation of this
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sort is forthcoming from a theoretical anti-sceptical solution, then it will not obviously
provide a happy-face solution to sceptical paradoxes. Yet, given what I take to be a
plausible assumption about what providing this explanation would involve, I suggest
that theoretical responses face a significant obstacle to constituting a fully satisfactory
solution to the sceptical problem.
How might a theoretical solution explain why we were misled, by a contentious
epistemic principle, into erroneously finding a sceptical argument’s false premise to be
plausible? I assume that an explanation of this sort will involve making one of at least
two sorts of claim:
TE1 We mistakenly thought that the principle was platitudinous, i.e. a principle that
we ordinarily adhere to in our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge.
TE2 The principle, whilst not actually a platitude, is sufficiently similar to one that is,
such that we mistakenly thought sceptical arguments relied on the latter rather
than the former.
A theoretical solution might constitute a happy-face solution by maintaining either
that we thought an epistemic principle was a platitude, when it was not, or that we
thought that an actual epistemic platitude motivated sceptical arguments, when it
did not. I suggest, however, that there are certain second-order considerations which
cast doubt on the potential to provide a theoretical happy-face resolution of sceptical
paradoxes in terms of either TE1 or TE2. Can an explanation, given in terms of either of
these claims, be distinguished, in principle, from a concessive-therapeutic solution? If
not, then I think there will remain a second-order obstacle to thinking that a theoretical
anti-sceptical project constitutes a happy-face solution. This is because, as noted above,
concessive-therapeutic solutions involve revising our ordinary ways of thinking about
knowledge, which precludes their constituting fully-satisfactory happy-face solutions.
So, is there a way to distinguish, in principle, a theoretical explanation for our propen-
sity to erroneously find sceptical premises plausible, from a concessive-therapeutic
diagnosis of sceptical arguments? I think that there would be only if there were good
reasons to think, independently of sceptical paradoxes, that the epistemic principle un-
derwriting sceptical arguments never really was a platitude. Yet, if we had good reasons
to think that, then presumably we would already have available facts which showed,
independently of scepticism, that these principles were appreciably not platitudinous.
But, in this case, any attempt to explain why we got confused by sceptical arguments, in
terms of claims such as TE1 or TE2, will be significantly undermined. This is because it
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will remain unclear why we would either think it was a platitude, or confuse it with a
principle that is, if the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments is apprecia-
bly not platitudinous independently of consideration of sceptical arguments. In either
case, since our confusion when considering sceptical argument remains unexplained by
such a theoretical diagnosis, it will be unclear whether it provides a happy-face resolution
of sceptical paradoxes.
In order to be considered a happy-face solution, a theoretical solution to scepticism
must explain our error with respect to sceptical paradoxes, and distinguish this so-
lution from in fact providing only a therapeutic solution. I have suggested, however,
that a theoretical—in other words, epistemological—error theory might only be distin-
guishable from a concessive-therapeutic solution in a way which could undermine the
very credibility of error theory itself. In this way, I think that theoretical diagnoses of
sceptical arguments face significant obstacles constituting fully satisfactory, happy-face
resolutions to sceptical paradoxes.
In the remainder of this chapter, I focus on applying the preceding considerations
concerning theoretical diagnoses to Pryor’s own attempt to provide a solution to sceptical
problems. In sections 1.3.2 and 1.3.3, I examine the details of Pryor’s proposed solution
to scepticism in terms of the two conditions on happy-face resoltuions. Finally, in section
1.3.4, I suggest—in line with the foregoing reasoning—that Pryor’s proposal does not
obviously constitute a happy-face resolution to sceptical paradoxes.
1.3.2 Pryor’s anti-sceptical project.
I turn now to explicate how Pryor’s own proposed anti-sceptical project attempts to satisfy
the first condition on happy-face solutions. This is the requirement that the solution
identifies the false claim within the set of claims comprising the paradox. Here, I set out
some features of Pryor’s proposal that are relevant to meeting the second condition on a
happy-face solution with respect to DREAMING and ENVATTED BRAIN: an explanation for
the apparent plausibility of the false claim.
Which of the premises of sceptical arguments, such as DREAMING, or ENVATTED
BRAIN might Pryor maintain is false? Pryor, I take it, maintains that it is premises (4)
and (7), respectively, that are false. To see how Pryor might could account for the falsity
of these premises, it will be instructive to first look at how he maintains that we can
have justification for believing, and potentially know, some empirical proposition.
Pryor distinguishes between two sorts of justification to believe a proposition, which
he terms ‘mediate’ and ‘immediate’ justification. These he explains these in the following
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way:
Say that you are “mediately justified” in believing p iff you’re justified in
believing p, and this justification rests in part on the justification you have
for believing other supporting propositions. Say that you are “immediately
justified” in believing p, on the other hand, iff you’re justified in believing p,
and this justification doesn’t rest on any evidence or justification you have
for believing other propositions. (Pryor, 2000, 532)
Pryor’s anti-sceptical project establishes that we can justifiably believe and know var-
ious empirical propositions in terms of an account of ‘immediate’ perceptual justification.
This account holds that
whenever you have an experience as of p, you thereby have immediate
prima facie justification for believing p... Your experiences do not, in the same
way, give you immediate prima facie justification for believing that you are
dreaming, or being deceived by an evil demon, or that any of the skeptic’s
other hypotheses obtain. (Pryor, 2000, 536)
On Pryor’s view, if S has an experience ‘as of p’, for some empirical proposition p, then S
has a sort of perceptual justification to believe that p, and can thereby count as knowing
that p. Pryor admits that, in presenting this account of perceptual justification, he does
not attempt to explain in detail
how we’d go about ruling out a skeptical hypothesis, either in the case
where we have positive evidence that it obtains, or in the ordinary case,
where we have no evidence in favor of it but we’re just curious whether or
not it obtains. But a few brief remarks may help clarify my position. (Pryor,
2000, 546)
My purpose here is to assess whether Pryor’s anti-sceptical proposal, understood as a
theoretical diagnosis, constitutes a happy-face solution to sceptical paradoxes, such as
ENVATTED BRAIN and DREAMING. To do so, it identifies premises (4) and (7), for example,
as the false claims partly comprising the paradoxes. It is important, then, to understand
what sort of explanation Pryor could give for the falsity of these premises. How might
we, on Pryor’s view, have justification to believe, or know, that sceptical hypotheses are
false? In order to see how, it will be instructive to consider the following comments, in
which Pryor frames his answer to that question:
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Suppose U is some hypothesis such that the only reasons you have for
believing U to be false presuppose the truth of p, but if you were to acquire
evidence for U, that would defeat or undermine your justification for believing
p. (For example, let p be some body of perceptual beliefs, and let U be a belief
like I am a brain in a vat or My senses are unreliable. (Pryor, 2000, 546)
Pryor’s key consideration here is what he takes to be the pertinent relation between our
‘immediately’ prima facie justified beliefs concerning various empirical propositions, and
our beliefs that sceptical hypotheses are false. Namely, that the only reasons we have for
believing that sceptical hypotheses, such as the biv or dreaming hypotheses, are false
‘presuppose’ some empirical propositions. How, on his account, do our beliefs with respect
to sceptical hypotheses then amount to knowledge?
Before considering the account Pryor gives of the false claim involved in sceptical
arguments such as ENVATTED BRAIN, or DREAMING, it will be instructive to consider
what he means by the term ‘bad’ with respect to sceptical hypotheses. His explanation of
this term begins as follows:
Say that an alternative to p is a “bad” alternative just in case it has the
special features that characterize the skeptic’s scenarios—whatever those
features turn out to be. Different skeptical arguments will rely on different
accounts of what makes an alternative “bad”. (Pryor, 2000, 527)
There are, Pryor thinks, two main accounts one might give of the ‘special features’
characterising sceptical hypotheses. He explains the first of these as follows;
Say that some grounds E you have “allow” a possibility q iff the following
counterfactual is true: if q obtained, you would still possess the same grounds
E.... So we might want to count a hypothesis as “bad” for the purpose of a
skeptical argument just in case it is (and is recognized to be) incompatible
with what you purport to know, but it is nonetheless “allowed” by your
grounds E, in the sense I described. (Pryor, 2000, 527)
The biv hypothesis, for example, could be characterised as ‘bad’ in this way. It is
incompatible with many empirical propositions that one might purport to know (that you
have hands, for example). On the assumption that your perceptual experiences comprise
your grounds E for believing that you have hands, it seems that if the biv hypothesis
were true with respect to you, then you would still possess the same grounds E. So, biv is
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‘allowed’ by your grounds, and ‘bad’ with respect to any proposition that is incompatible
with it, for example, that you have hands.
The dreaming hypothesis, however, is not ‘bad’ in this way with respect to practically
any proposition you might purport to know. This is because very few propositions are
incompatible with it being true. Pryor is aware of this, and explains the second account
of a ‘bad’ possibility as follows:
[It] does however introduce a non-standard explanation of your experi-
ences. And this explanation would undermine the support your experiences
give you for your perceptual beliefs—in the sense that, if you were to learn
that you are dreaming, then you would have reason to doubt that your ex-
periences were a trustworthy basis for beliefs about the external world. So
we might want to count a hypothesis as “bad” for the purposes of a skeptical
argument if it could undermine your experiences, in this sense. (Pryor, 2000,
527)
Which of the three claims, then, of comprising sceptical paradoxes would Pryor’s anti-
sceptical project identify as false? Above it was noted that, with respect to ENVATTED
BRAIN and DREAMING, Pryor seems to be inclined to regard the first premise of each
argument to be false. So what could explain, on Pryor’s account, our knowledge that we
are neither brains in vats, nor currently dreaming? On his view, I take it, where U refers
to a sceptical hypothesis, these premises are false for the following reasons:
[Y]our justification for believing p does give you justification for believing
not-U. However, because U is a potential defeater or underminer of your
justification for believing p, any evidence you acquired in favor of U would
defeat (or at least contribute towards the defeat of) your justification for
believing p. (Pryor, 2000, 546)
If someone has immediate prima facie justification to believe that p, then they thereby
have mediate justification to believe that they are not dreaming, or a brain in a vat, so
long as they do not acquire evidence in favour of either these hypotheses. On Pryor’s
view, since almost every subject has immediate prima facie for believing some empirical
proposition, they also have mediate justification for believing both that the brain in a vat,
and that dreaming hypothesis is false. Consequently, almost every subject can be said to
know that, with respect to themselves, these hypotheses are false. And this, on Pryor’s
view, is what allows us to identify both the sceptical premises, (4) and (7), as false.
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1.3.3 Sceptical Principle.
In this section, I consider in detail Pryor’s account of the epistemic principle that moti-
vates the false sceptical premises (4) and (7), which deny that we know that sceptical
hypotheses are false. Above I suggested that a theoretical anti-sceptical project must
identify the epistemic principle motivating sceptical premises in order to be a happy-face
resolution of sceptical paradoxes. It will be instructive then, for the purposes of assessing
whether Pryor’s response to scepticism could be a happy-face one, to examine how he
identifies this principle. Pryor’s approach to identifying the principle which motivates
these problematic premises involves undertaking a reconstruction of a typical sceptical
argument. The first premise that Pryor attributes to the sceptic in his reconstruction of
their reasoning is the following:
(P1) Either you don’t know you’re not being deceived by an evil demon; or, if you
do know you’re not being deceived, it’s because that knowledge rests in part on
things you know by perception.8
In this reconstruction of the sceptical argument, Pryor uses the hypothesis that
one is being deceived by an ‘evil’ demon.9 This hypothesis has the same function, in
Pryor’s reconstructed sceptical argument, as the biv and dreaming hypotheses have in
the arguments ENVATTED BRAIN and DREAMING, respectively. The sceptic might argue,
along the lines of (P1), that either S knows that they are not a brain in a vat; or, if they do,
then it is because that knowledge rests in part on things S knows by means of perception.
The next premise that Pryor attributes to the sceptic in his reconstruction of their
argument is the following:
SPK If you’re to know a proposition p on the basis of certain experiences or
grounds E, then for every q which is “bad” relative to E and p, you have to be in a
position to know q to be false in a non-question-begging way—i.e., you have to be
in a position to know q to be false antecedently to knowing p on the basis of E.10
For Pryor, SPK encapsulates a significant sceptical idea. This is, according to him,
that “in order for us to know anything on the basis of perception, we first have to know
we’re not being deceived” (Pryor, 2000, 524). Pryor is careful, however, to clarify what
8 (Pryor, 2000, 527).
9 See (Descartes, 1982).
10 (Pryor, 2000, 528).
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he means by both ‘antecedently’ and ‘first’ here; the sense of priority he has in mind is
epistemic. He goes on to explain this as follows:
Your justification for believing p1 is antecedent to your justification for
believing p2 just in case your reasons for believing p1 do not presuppose or
rest on your reasons for believing p2. Your reasons for believing p1 can not
beg the question whether p2.11
Next, Pryor attributes the following premise to the sceptic:
(P2) The hypothesis that you’re being deceived by an evil demon is “bad” relative
to any course of experience E and perceptual belief p. (Pryor, 2000, 528).
This premise encapsulates the apparently uncontroversial idea that sceptical hypotheses,
such as the brain in a vat, and dreaming hypotheses, are ‘bad’, in the sense discussed
above, with respect to all our perceptually based beliefs in empirical propositions. In
his reconstruction of the sceptical argument, Pryor puts (P2) and SPK together to put
forward the following premise:
(P3) If you’re ever to know anything about the external world on the basis of
your perceptual experiences, then you have to be in a position to antecedently know
you’re not then being deceived by an evil demon.12
With these premises in place, Pryor argues, the sceptic could derive their premise that
we do not know that sceptical hypotheses are false, by reductio. Suppose, for example,
that S knows that a sceptical hypothesis, sh, is false. The considerations involved in (P1)
imply that S’s knowledge that not-sh rests in part on knowledge they have by means of
perception. Call this piece of perceptual knowledge p*, as Pryor does. The considerations
involved in (P3) imply that S knows that p* only if S is in a position to ‘antecedently’
know that not-sh; or, S’s reasons for believing that p* do not ‘presuppose or rest on’ their
reasons for believing that not-sh.
Since p* is a piece of perceptual knowledge—by (P1) and the assumption that S knows
that not-sh,—it follows from SPK and the considerations involved in (P2), that S’s reasons
for believing that not-sh do not presuppose or rest on S’s reasons for believing that p*.
So, the assumption that S knows that not-sh implies that this piece of knowledge both
11 (Pryor, 2000, 525).
12 (Pryor, 2000, 528).
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does and does not rest in part on things S knows by means of perception. On this basis,
Pryor maintains, we can infer that the assumption that S knows that not-sh is false, and
arrive at the following sceptical premise:
(P4) You do not know that you are not being deceived.13
This completes Pryor’s reconstruction of the considerations involved in the sceptic’s
reasoning. On this account, the sceptical premise (P4) is motivated by the epistemic
principle SPK. This sceptical premise differs only from (4) and (7) in that it involves the
hypothesis that one is being deceived. This hypothesis is functionally equivalent to the
sceptical hypotheses involved in both ENVATTED BRAIN and DREAMING. Consequently,
we can infer that the apparent plausibility of (4) and (7) is explained, on Pryor’s view, by
the epistemic principle SPK. He is explicit, for example, in claiming that “if you look at
informal presentations of the skeptic’s reasoning, you’ll find that these do often rely on
some principle like SPK” (Pryor, 2000, 529). In the next section, I suggest that Pryor’s
proposed solution, understood as a theoretical diagnosis of sceptical arguments, does not
obviously provide us with a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
1.3.4 The Inadequacy of Pryor’s Project.
Pryor’s solution attempts to meet the first condition on a happy-face resolution by identi-
fying the minor premises (4) and (7) of sceptical arguments DREAMING and ENVATTED
BRAIN, respectively, as false. It does so in terms of his account of our having immediate
perceptual justification for believing that various empirical propositions, and, subse-
quently, our having mediate justification for believing that sceptical hypotheses are false.
His solution attempts to meet the second condition, by giving an account of the apparent
plausibility of minor sceptical premises in terms the epistemic principle SPK.
Pryor’s response can plausibly be interpreted as an attempt to provide a theoretical
diagnosis of sceptical arguments. It would only be therapeutic if it held that SPK is a
principle that we adhere to in our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge. And I
do not think that is what Pryor intends to. But if Pryor’s theoretical solution is to be a
happy-face one it will need to have the following two features. First, it will maintain that
the epistemic principle SPK is not one that we adhere to in our ordinary ways of thinking
about knowledge. Second, it will explain why SPK misled us into erroneously finding it
plausible to deny that we know sceptical hypotheses are false.
13 cf. (Pryor, 2000, 528).
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Can Pryor adequately explain why SPK misleads us, in this way, if this principle is
not a part of ordinary way of thinking about knowledge? I argue that he cannot, given
the only plausible assumption that this will involve making one of either two claims
corresponding to TE1 or TE2. The first is that, we mistakenly thought that we ordinarily
do adhere to SPK in our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge. The second is
that, whilst we do not actually adhere to SPK in our ordinary ways of thinking about
knowledge, it is sufficiently similar to a principle that we do, and we mistook SPK for
this latter principle. Suppose that Pryor’s solution puts forward an explanation in terms
of either one of these claims. Can this explanation be distinguished, in principle, from
in fact rejecting the ordinarily adhered to SPK, and, subsequently, revising our concept
of knowledge? If not, then it will remain an open question whether Pryor’s solution
constitutes a happy-, or weakly unhappy-face solution to sceptical problems.
Is there a way to distinguish an explanation for why SPK misled us with respect
to sceptical arguments, in terms such as TE1 or TE2, from actually abandoning the
otherwise platitudinous SPK? I suggest that there is only if we have good reasons to
think, independently of sceptical paradoxes, that SPK never really was adhered to in
our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge. In other words, Pryor’s theoretical
solution can be distinguished from a concessive-therapeutic—and subsequently, a weakly
unhappy-face one—only if we can avail ourselves of facts which showed, independently
of considerations of scepticism, that SPK was not platitudinous to begin with. Yet, if SPK
were appreciably not platitudinous, independently of sceptical arguments, then Pryor’s
solutions potential explanation for our confusion in terms such as TE1 or TE2 would be
undermined. Such explanations would either involve claiming that we mistook SPK for
a platitude, or that confused it with one that is a platitude. And neither explanation,
however, has much plausibility when it is maintained that SPK is appreciably not
platitudinous independently of sceptical arguments. In each case it remains unexplained
why we would either think that SPK was a platitude, or confuse SPK with another
principle that is. Consequently, the explanation provided by Pryor’s theoretical anti-
sceptical project for why we erroneously judge sceptical premises such as (4) and (7) to
be plausible will be significantly undermined.
I have suggested that Pryor’s theoretical solution must do two things in order to be
considered a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes. It must explain the erroneous
plausibility of denying that we know sceptical hypotheses are false, in terms of the
non-platitudinous epistemic principle SPK. And it must distinguish this from a rejection
of the otherwise platitudinous SPK. Yet, I have suggested, Pryor’s solution is seemingly
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only able meet the latter condition in a way that will undermine its attempt to meet
the former condition. I conclude that there are serious obstacles to thinking that his
theoretical response to scepticism will provide us with a happy-face resolution of sceptical
paradoxes.
1.4 Concluding remarks.
It remains here to draw together the preceding discussion to appraise the situation
concerning the sceptical problem. The problem of scepticism is that sceptical arguments
represent paradoxes, and, subsequently, threaten to reveal that our ways of thinking
about knowledge, or justification are incoherent. A satisfactory solution to this problem
is required to do two things: identify the false claim amongst a sceptical argument’s
premises and the negation of its conclusion, and adequately explain why this false claim
was judged to be plausible.
What can be said about the prospects of achieving this? In this chapter, I have argued
that various attempts to distinguish approaches to solving the problem do not provide
a way to satisfactorily solve the sceptical problem. In particular, it was argued both
that concessive-therapeutic responses are unable to constitute happy-face solutions
in principle, and that theoretical responses face significant second-order obstacles to
providing an adequate error-theory. Is there a way to overcome these obstacles, and
provide an adequate error-theory concerning sceptical paradoxes?
The rest of this thesis is concerned with providing a framework for providing a
positive answer to this question by drawing upon the points raised in this chapter.
Specifically, that an adequate error-theory concerning sceptical paradoxes will need to
be given in terms that are not purely epistemological. Instead, it will be argued, that
a fully satisfactory, happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes can be had when an
error-theory concerning sceptical paradoxes is given in cognitive terms.
The thesis subsequently breaks in two subsequent parts. The first of these, comprised
of chapters 2 and 3, consists in providing diagnostic discussion of sceptical arguments
in terms of sceptical hypotheses, and the epistemic principles underwriting them, res-
pectively. The second part, comprised of chapters 4, 5 and 6 consists in assessing the
potential to find happy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes in rival epistemological
views of contextualism, and non-sceptical invariantism.
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SCEPTICAL HYPOTHESES.
2.1 Introduction.
In the previous chapter, I outlined the central issue with which I am concerned in this
thesis: the problem of sceptical paradoxes. This is the problem that arguments can be
put forward to challenge our putative knowledge of any external world proposition at all.
These arguments result in paradoxes; they are apparently sound, but their conclusions
are unacceptable. My aim in this thesis is to explore the potential for providing a ‘happy-
face’ solution to sceptical paradoxes. I argued, in chapter 1, that the most promising
route to a happy-face solution lies in a therapeutic, rather than a theoretical diagnosis, of
how sceptical arguments present us with paradoxes. As we saw, in order to be happy-face
resolution, a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes must provide an error-theory
that accounts for our confusion regarding sceptical arguments. I set out, in chapter 6,
my proposal for an anti-sceptical error-theory for sceptical paradoxes that is compatible
with a therapeutic approach. But before either setting out this error-theory, or critically
assessing existing proposals (see chapters 4 and 5), I think it will be instructive to
delve deeper, and provide some diagnoses of what sceptical arguments involve. To this
end, in both this chapter and chapter 3, I explore further the diagnostic approach
to sceptical arguments from ignorance, by analysing them in terms of two elements:
sceptical hypotheses, and epistemic principles.
In this chapter, I am concerned specifically with an attempt to understand sceptical
hypotheses. My discussion addresses the following question: what are the conditions
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that a hypothesis must satisfy in order to be an effective sceptical hypothesis? I begin,
in section 2.2 by looking at an account of sceptical hypotheses that has informed the
debate proposed by DeRose (1995), which attempts to account for sceptical hypotheses in
terms of a supposed sensitivity condition on knowledge. After outlining the sensitivity
account of sceptical hypotheses, I move on, in section 2.3, to outline a proposed account
of necessary conditions on sceptical hypotheses put forward by Beebe (2010): the experi-
ential constraints. In section 2.4, I introduce a novel case, and argue that it represents a
counter-example to the sensitivity account, and experiential constraints. In section 2.5, I
outline and argue against the necessity of a further condition proposed by Beebe: the
indication constraint. In sections 2.6 and 2.7, I draw upon the considerations involved
in the indication constraint, and related accounts of sceptical hypotheses put forward
by Pryor (2000) and Williamson (2000), to develop a positive account of a necessary
condition on effective sceptical hypotheses in terms of a subject’s basis for belief.
2.2 Sceptical Hypotheses and Sensitivity.
Before discussing DeRose’s proposal, it is important to clarify a couple of aspects of
what is meant by an ‘effective sceptical hypothesis’. On the one hand, a hypothesis is
sceptical if it can be used to challenge our epistemic position with respect a whole range
of propositions. In this sense, the hypothesis that my bicycle has just been stolen is
not a sceptical hypothesis. Yet, as we saw in chapter 1, a hypothesis need not call into
question every empirical proposition in order to count as sceptical. The hypothesis that the
world came into existence five minutes ago, for example, does not challenge my putative
knowledge of having hands. It does, however, seem to be a sceptical hypothesis insofar
as it calls into question my epistemic position with respect to a range of propositions
(for example, any proposition about the existence of dinosaurs). In this way, being
a sceptical hypothesis would appear to be a matter of degree, and some, like those
involving considerations of brains in vats, are maximally sceptical while others might be
just challenges a specific range of propositions.
The second important aspect of what is meant by an effective sceptical hypothesis
concerns our epistemic position with respect to it. An effective sceptical hypothesis is
one that can be used to challenge a range of propositions effectively. To explain this, it
is useful to consider again the BICYCLE example. Whether or not the hypothesis that
my bicycle has just been stolen is effective at challenging my putative knowledge that
my bicycle is where I left it depends on the plausibility of denying that I know that it is
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false. In some situations, it will be plausible that I do know that my bicycle has not just
been stolen—if I have just seen it, for example. In other situations, however, it might be
plausible that I do not know that this hypothesis is false. This hypothesis is effective at
challenging my putative knowledge in the latter, but not the former case. This point will
be relevant and discussed again later on in this chapter.
DeRose (1995, 18) has argued that sensitivity considerations can best explain why
certain sceptical hypotheses are plausibly not known to be false. DeRose expresses
reservations about what can be called the ‘standard’ view. The standard view holds that
it is plausible to deny that anyone knows that sceptical hypotheses are false, because the
scenarios they describe are in principle subjectively indistinguishable by anyone from
any other scenario that might obtain. The problem with the standard view according to
DeRose, is that:
there are plenty of other phrases that can be used plausibly to describe
our apparently limited epistemic position with regard to effective skeptical
hypotheses. All of the following descriptions... have some initial plausibility:
I cannot rule it out, I do not know that it does not obtain (and do not know
whether it obtains), I can’t discern that it does not obtain... and I can’t
distinguish its obtaining from its not obtaining, and so on, and so forth. But
citing one of these to explain the plausibility of another does not occasion
even the slightest advance in our understanding. (DeRose, 1995, 16)
DeRose’s point here is, I think relatively simple. Whether one thinks that S’s failure
to know that ¬sh is explained by S’s inability to distinguish between actuality and sh,
or vice versa, would suggest that one does not really seem to have explained much at
all. In order to break the apparent explanatory “circle of all-too-closely related terms of
epistemic appraisal” when accounting for the intuitive denial that S knows that a given
sceptical hypothesis is false, DeRose (1995) appeals to the notion of sensitivity. DeRose
observes that a familiar feature of many sceptical hypotheses, such as the hypothesis
that one is a brain in a vat, is that if the scenarios described by the hypotheses obtained,
then S would still continue to believe that the hypothesis is false. In this way, for example,
my beliefs about whether I am a brain in vat are not plausibly thought to match up to
the facts; I would continue to believe that I am not a brain in a vat even if I was one.
Likewise, my belief that I am not the victim of a malignant demon who is subjecting
me to a complete deception is similarly not sensitive; I would continue to believe this
even if it was false. Beliefs that would continue to be held even in the closest possible
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world in which they are false are insensitive, and do not intuitively count as knowledge
according to DeRose.1 The idea that sensitivity is a condition on knowledge could then
be expressed in the following way:
Sensitivity. For all S, p, if S knows that p, then S does not believe that p in the
nearest possible world or worlds where ¬p.2
DeRose’s sensitivity based account, points to the truth of certain subjunctive con-
ditionals to explain the intuitive plausibility of denials that sceptical hypotheses are
known to be false. According to DeRose, it is intuitively plausible that S does not know
that ¬sh because for virtually all effective sceptical hypotheses sh, it is true that if it
were the case that sh, then S would believe that ¬sh. DeRose clarifies this when he
states:
[This] explanation, in terms of subjunctive conditionals, can explain the
plausibility of the other ways we feel inclined to describe our seemingly
limited epistemic situation vis-a-vis effective skeptical hypotheses... Because
we would still believe they weren’t [true] even if they were. (DeRose, 1995,
19)
DeRose then loosely proposes that a necessary condition on effective sceptical hypotheses
is that they be the sorts of proposition that we do not sensitively believe to be false. In the
next section, before critically evaluating the sensitivity account of sceptical hypotheses, I
outline the first two of three conditions on sceptical hypotheses argued to be necessary
by Beebe: the experiential constraints. In section 2.6, I then present a case which I
argue represents a counter-example to the necessity of the sensitivity condition, and
the experiential constraints on sceptical hypotheses. On the basis of the same case, in
section 2.6, I outline and argue against the necessity of a third constraint proposed by
Beebe: the indication constraint.3
1 (DeRose, 1995, 18).
2 Adapted from (Pritchard, 2005, 48). The history of sensitivity considerations goes back to (Nozick,
1981).
3 The discussion focuses on the issue of the effectiveness of sceptical hypotheses—what makes them
apparently capable of challenging our empirical knowledge. The issue of what distinguishes sceptical
hypotheses from their counter-parts such as the stolen bicycle hypothesis is discussed subsequently to this.
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2.3 Experiential constraint.
In this section, I outline Beebe’s experiential constraints. The first of these is the following,
which Beebe takes to represent a necessary condition on being a sceptical hypothesis:
Experiential Constraint 1 (EC1): For a sceptical hypotheses sh to raise a significant
sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p, it must be experientially
possible for sh to be true. (Beebe, 2010, 466)
Beebe explains the notion of ‘experiential possibility’ in terms of Lewis’s notion of
centred worlds in the following way:
w is a[n experiential] possibility for S iff in w S’s experiences and memories
match S’s experiences and memories in actuality[.] (Beebe, 2010, 466)
Beebe claims that “experientially possible worlds for S will be subjectively indistin-
guishable from the world S actually inhabits” (ibid). Beebe takes it to underpin the “heart
of the challenge... [which] is that: the sceptic alleges that my evidence is insufficient
to tell me whether I am in a Y-world or a Z-world” (Beebe, 2010, 468). This constraint
appears to be well suited to the sceptic’s purposes of challenging our claims to know
anything about the external world. In particular, it highlights that sceptical challenges
usually involve calling into question whether our sensory experiences allow us to know
external world propositions. For example, something akin to the subjective indistinguish-
ablility of sceptical possibilities from everyday possibilities is central to Barry Stroud’s
assessment of sceptical challenges:
There have been many versions of that fundamental idea. But whether
it is expressed in terms of “ideas” or “experiences” or “sense data” or “ap-
pearances”... or whatever it might be, the basic idea could be put by saying...
whatever it is that we get through that source of knowledge... whatever they
might be that serve as the sensory “basis” of our knowledge, it does not follow
that something we believe about the world is true. (Stroud, 1984, 549)
This assessment is echoed by Michael Williams, who concedes that this is:
a perfectly representative account of the main obstacle to knowledge of
the world: ...it seems very hard to deny. At least, if typical sceptical counter-
possibilities —I am dreaming right now (or have always been dreaming), I
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am a brain in a vat, etc. — are even coherent, they seem to establish... the
simple logical point that our experience could be just what it is and all our
beliefs about the world could be false. (Williams, 1991, 74)
In addition Beebe proposes the following similar constraint on sceptical hypotheses:
Experiential Constraint 2 (EC2): For a sceptical hypotheses SK to raise a significant
sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p, it must be experientially
possible for p to be false. (Beebe, 2010, 466)
(EC2) differs from (EC1) in that the former says that the falsity of various external
world propositions must be experientially possible for us, whilst the latter holds that
the hypothesis itself must be experientially possible for us, in order for it to raise
a significant sceptical challenge. According to (EC1), it is a necessary condition on a
sceptical hypothesis sh that, if sh were true, our memories and experiences would be
the same as they actually are. According to (EC2), it is also a necessary condition on
a sceptical hypothesis sh that our memories and experiences can be the same as they
actually are, and external world propositions be false. For my purposes here it will not
be important whether there is more to be said about how (EC1) and (EC2) are similar, or
differ. It will suffice to note that Beebe maintains each to be a necessary condition on
sceptical hypotheses, and that this view is argued against below.4
With respect to (EC1), it is generally recognised that if it were the case that either the
dreaming hypothesis or the brain in a vat hypothesis were true, then S’s experiences and
memories would match S’s experiences and memories in actuality. For example, speaking
of sceptical hypotheses such as the ‘Evil Deceiver’ and a version of the brain in a vat
hypothesis, Michael Williams stresses that these sceptical hypotheses “are designed
to accommodate any experiential data that we might cite in support of our ordinary”
knowledge about the external world.5 Whilst Ernest Sosa makes a point of recognising
that if “while dreaming we have real beliefs based on real phenomenal experiences, then a
normal perceptual judgement could always be matched by a subjectively similar, similarly
based judgement, made while one dreams” (Sosa, 2009, 2). Both sorts of hypotheses
satisfy this constraint on being an effective sceptical hypothesis.
Let’s call the two constraints (EC1) and (EC2) the experiential constraints. I take it
that the experiential constraints are supposed to help provide some account of what
4 See (Beebe, 2010, 466, 470) for his position.
5 (Williams, 1991, 79).
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constitutes a sceptical hypothesis. To investigate whether or not they do, it will be
instructive to ask the following question. What does sh’s being experientially possible
for S explain about why sh is capable of raising a challenge to knowledge of a empirical
propositions? The idea, here, might be that when sh is experientially possible for S, there
will be nothing in how the world appears to S that they can bring to bear on the question
of whether sh is true or false. Pritchard explains the connection in following way:
The problem that a sceptical hypothesis... poses is that it is subjectively
indistinguishable to the agent... And given this subjective indistinguishability,
it seems that there will be nothing cognitively available to the agent which
will suffice to indicate to her that she is in the non-sceptical scenario as
opposed to the sceptical scenario. So... sceptical error-possibilities pose an in
principle difficulty for the epistemic status of one’s beliefs. (Pritchard, 2005,
24)
There is an apparent explanatory link here between the experiential constraints and
the plausibility of denying that S knows that ¬sh. The idea here is that, we can explain
why it is plausible to deny that S knows that ¬sh by pointing out that it is experientially
possible for S that sh (and subsequently— that ¬p). The problem with this explanation is
that a hypothesis that it not experientially possible for S may still generate an intuitively
plausible denial that S knows the hypothesis to be false; at least, this is what I argue for
in the following section.
2.4 The case against the experiential, and sensitivity
constraints.
I argue that neither the experiential constraints, nor the sensitivity condition are nec-
essary conditions on a hypothesis raising a significant challenge to our external world
knowledge. I think that the following case provides an example of a hypothesis that is
used to raise a significant challenge to a subject’s putative knowledge, but which neither
meets the experiential constraints, nor satisfies the sensitivity condition. I argue that,
insofar as this hypothesis is an analogue of any sceptical hypothesis, it represents a
counter-example to the claim that in order to raise a sceptical challenge, it is necessary
for a hypothesis to meet either the experiential constraints, or the sensitivity condition.
Before presenting the case, it will be helpful to comment briefly on what I do not
take the case to show. In particular, I do not think that the case motivates any sceptical
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conclusions about knowledge. The case is constructed so as to describe a situation in
which various moves are made which correspond to those involved in standard sceptical
arguments. However, the apparent cogency of the sceptical moves within the case do not
demonstrate a sceptical conclusion about the case; no more so than that the apparent
cogency of sceptical arguments demonstrates the truth of scepticism. The case is supposed
to be a model of sceptical challenges. The purpose of the model is to make it easier to
diagnose what is, and is not, going on within these challenges. For my purposes here, I
maintain simply that what is going on is an analogue of a sceptical challenge involving
some hypothesis. I contend, however, that neither the the experiential constraints, or
sensitivity condition are met in this example.
Ellie is a new visitor at Jurassic Park, where she is in the Park’s emer-
gency bunker with the park’s proprietor, Hammond, and his associate, Mal-
colm. Ellie is trying to find out where her colleague Alan is within the park.
Within the bunker there is a single monitor for a CCTV surveillance system
that shows the entire paddock. Due to frequent and violent storms at the
park, there are constant faults in the surveillance system. Nonetheless, the
surveillance system (including the monitor) has a special new feature called
‘Doxasafe’: the monitor shows a solid bright red screen if and only if there is
any fault—for whatever reason—anywhere in the system. In fact, it was a
legal condition of the Park that Doxasafe monitors were installed: if the sys-
tem had not had Doxasafe, there would have been no Jurassic Park. However,
Ellie is completely unaware of either the fact that there are regular faults,
or that the system has Doxasafe. At this point, the system is not faulty and
the monitor shows a live picture of the paddock, with Alan nowhere in sight.
On the basis of looking at the monitor Ellie forms both the beliefs that the
surveillance system is not faulty, and that Alan is not in the paddock. In fact,
both of Ellie’s beliefs are true. Whilst observing Ellie do this, Hammond says
to Malcolm “She doesn’t know that the monitor isn’t faulty.” Malcolm then
responds, after reflecting for a moment, by saying “So, she doesn’t know that
Alan’s not in the paddock either!”
Notice that both of Ellie’s beliefs in this case are sensitive in the sense that the
following relevant subjunctive conditionals are false. If the system were faulty, then Ellie
would believe it was not, and, if Alan was in the paddock, then Ellie would believe that
he was not.
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In order for Ellie’s belief that the monitor is not faulty to be sensitive, she must not
believe that the monitor is not faulty in the closest possible world in which it is faulty.
And in the closest possible world in which the monitor is faulty, it is clear that Ellie will
not believe that the monitor is not faulty. The closest world in which the monitor is faulty
is one in which the monitor shows a solid bright red screen, and it is plausible to think
that Ellie will not, by looking at it, believe that the monitor is not faulty. Her belief that
the monitor is not faulty, then, is sensitive. Likewise, Ellie’s belief that Alan is not in
the paddock is sensitive only if she does not believe that Alan is not in the paddock in
the closest possible world in which he is there. In the closest possible world in which
Alan is in the paddock, it is clear that Ellie will not believe that he is not in the paddock.
The closest world in which Alan is in the paddock is one in which the picture on the
monitor screen will show him there. So, I think it is plausible to say that were Alan in the
paddock, then Ellie would not form a belief that he is not there on the basis of looking at
this screen. Her belief that Alan is not in the paddock, then, is sensitive.
Imagine that Hammond is aware of both the facts that the monitors have this special
feature and that Ellie is unaware of this feature, neither of which is implausible. Now, it
is my contention that Hammond has said something that has a great deal of intuitive
plausibility when he says to Malcolm that Ellie does not know that the monitor is not
faulty. What Hammond would be doing by uttering that sentence is—at least on the face
of it— denying that Ellie knows some proposition to be false, or situation not to obtain,
etc.6 In so much as Ellie has a sensitive belief that the monitor is not faulty, the apparent
fact that the faulty-monitor hypothesis can be used to raise a significant challenge to
her putative knowledge that Alan is not in the paddock shows that it is not a necessary
condition on doing so that Ellie insensitively believe that the hypothesis is false.
This case provides reason to think that a hypothesis can be capable of raising a
significant sceptical challenge even when a belief that this hypothesis is false is a
sensitive belief. Before outlining how the case provides a counter-example to Beebe’s
experiential constraints, it will be worth anticipating some potential objections to my
argument here. It might be objected that the hypothesis that the monitor is faulty is not
really a sceptical hypothesis. Perhaps for the reason that it seems too innocuous to pose a
threat to Ellie’s knowledge; for example, it does not entail the falsity of what she believes
about Alan’s whereabouts. I think that this is unconvincing. To see why, imagine again
that Hammond tells Malcolm that Ellie does not know that the monitor is not faulty,
6 There is no obvious reason not to think this is exactly what Hammond is doing and intends to do by
uttering this sentence. I think we should take Hammond’s intentions at face value here.
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and further points out to Malcolm that if Ellie knows that Alan is not in the paddock
then she knows that the monitor is not faulty. Malcolm can then infer that Ellie does not
know that Alan is not in the paddock. After all, the only basis on which Ellie believes
Alan is not there is having looked at the monitor; so if Malcolm is not prepared to judge
that Ellie even knows whether the monitor is accurately showing the paddock, then he
is in a position to judge that she does not know he is not there.
It might also be objected that the faulty-monitor hypothesis is not really an effective
sceptical hypothesis, for the reason that it is not capable of raising a challenge to
Ellie’s (or anyone else’s) knowledge of a range of empirical propositions. In this way,
the faulty-monitor hypothesis could be regarded as akin to the non-sceptical hypothesis
that my bicycle has just been stolen. As such, it could be objected that the case does
not provide a counter-example to the necessity of meeting the experiential constraints,
or sensitivity condition on being an effective sceptical hypothesis. This is because the
imagined hypothesis is not, ‘strictly speaking’, sceptical at all. I argue, however, that this
objection fails; the faulty-monitor hypothesis is clearly effective in the sense identified
above. It seems to pose a threat to an obvious range of propositions—namely, those
that might be believed on the basis of looking at the monitor. The range of beliefs
that the faulty-monitor hypothesis is capable of raising an epistemic challenge to is
clearly narrower than a full-blown sceptical hypothesis. What I take away from this
point, however, is that effective sceptical challenges come in degrees. Insofar as the
faulty-monitor hypothesis calls into question a belief forming process, it is similar to
the sceptical brain in a vat, and dreaming hypotheses, but not the non-sceptical stolen
bicycle hypothesis.7 Moreover, the faulty-monitor hypothesis is arguably an effective
sceptical hypothesis in the sense that it limits our epistemic position with respect to the
challenged range of propositions. It is my contention that this is intuitively the case with
respect to Hammond’s imagined challenge to Ellie’s epistemic position with respect to
any proposition she believes on the evidential basis of looking at the monitor screen.
Finally, one last anticipatory point. One might worry that the case, if taken to be a
genuine analogue of sceptical challenges, places too strong a requirement on perceptual
knowledge, and subsequently would motivate sceptical conclusions. It is important to
stress that I do not take the case to show that Ellie does not in fact know that faulty-
monitor hypothesis is false, or that she does not in fact know that Alan is not in the
7 My view is that the stolen bicycle hypothesis has a maximally narrow scope, and does not obviously
challenge a range of beliefs. Compare, for example, Dretske’s (1970) cleverly disguised mule hypothesis.
This differs from the stolen bicycle hypothesis in that the former is likely to raise broader sceptical doubts
about one’s evidential situation, in a way that the latter is not.
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paddock. In just the same way that I do not take sceptical arguments to show that I do
not know sceptical hypotheses are false, or know external world propositions. The fact
that sceptical arguments are paradoxical is not, on my view, evidence for the incoherence
of our concept of knowledge. Rather, it is a sort of evidence that sceptical arguments
mislead us in ways that are not readily apparent.8 On my view, Hammond’s denial that
Ellie knows that monitor is not faulty, and Malcolm’s denial that Ellie knows Alan is not
in the paddock are both erroneous in the same sense, respectively, as the claims that ‘I
do not know that I am not dreaming’, and that ‘I do not know that I have hands’ are also
erroneous. And my contention is simply that the role played by the hypothesis is not
fundamentally different between the case of paradoxical sceptical arguments, and the
case of Ellie.
Consideration of the Ellie case provides a counterexample to Beebe’s claim that (EC2)
and (EC1) are necessary conditions on effective sceptical hypotheses. In this way, I think
the case also allows us to provide a more in-depth explanation of DeRose’s charge of
explanatory circularity levelled against the account of sceptical hypotheses in terms of
experiential possibility, or the subjective indistinguishability. Central to Hammond’s
imagined challenge to Ellie’s putative knowledge that Alan is not in the paddock is
the possibility that the monitor Ellie has looked at is faulty. It is this possibility that
Hammond denies Ellie knows not to obtain, and so it can be thought to play the same
role in Hammond’s challenge as a sceptical hypothesis plays in a sceptical argument. It
has been argued that the faulty-monitor hypothesis is indeed an effective hypothesis,
since where S names Ellie, sh= that the monitor is faulty and p= that Alan is not in the
paddock, the following two claims are intuitively plausible:
(i) S does not know that not-sh.
(ii) If S knows that p on the basis of looking at the monitor, then S knows that
not-sh.
The hypothesis in this case, however, is not obviously experientially possible for S in
either scenario. If it were the case that the monitor was faulty, then Ellie’s experiences
and memories would not match her experiences and memories in actuality. If the monitor
was faulty, then, so long as she looks at the monitor, Ellie would have visual experiences of
a solid bright red screen. This experience does not match anything that Ellie experiences
8 See, for example, chapter 6, where I propose an account of the erroneous plausibility of sceptical
denials as a sort of ‘cognitive illusion’. Compare 4 and 5, where I discuss and critique approaches to
resolving sceptical paradoxes in terms of semantic context-sensitivity.
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in the actuality of the case. This demonstrates that it is not experientially possible for
Ellie that the monitor is faulty is true. So, the plausibility of a denial that Ellie knows
that this faulty-monitor hypothesis is false cannot be explained by its being experientially
possible for Ellie. It might be objected on behalf of the experiential constraints and their
explanatory role vis-a-vis sceptical denials, that it is not plausible that in this case it is
experientially possible for Ellie that Alan is not in the paddock is false. Subsequently,
by (EC2), the hypothesis that the monitor is faulty is not a genuine sceptical hypothesis
capable of raising a significant challenge to Ellie’s putative knowledge of that fact.
It does seem as though Ellie’s experiences and memories would not match those in
actuality were it the case that Alan was in the paddock; some representation of him would
appear on the screen she is looking at, for example. Therefore, it is not experientially
possible for Ellie that her belief concerning Alan’s whereabouts is false. But this is no
objection. The idea, here, is that the two following claims about the case have a great
deal of intuitive plausibility:
(i*) Ellie does not know that the monitor is not faulty on the basis of looking at it.
(ii*) If Ellie knows that Alan is not in the paddock on the basis of looking at the
monitor, then Ellie knows that the monitor is not faulty on the basis of looking at
it.
And this is all that one needs, on my view, in order to effectively challenge Ellie’s
putative knowledge that Alan is not in the paddock. The hypothesis that the monitor is
faulty is, then, effective at raising a significant challenge, in this case, with respect to
Ellie and the putatively known proposition that Alan is not in the paddock. However,
it is neither experientially possible for Ellie that the hypothesis is true, nor that the
proposition is false. So, the faulty-monitor hypothesis does not satisfy either (EC1), or
(EC2). Yet I argued that the faulty-monitor hypothesis is effective, in the sense of raising a
significant challenge to Ellie’s putative knowledge of some external world proposition. So,
I conclude, (EC2) and (EC1) are not necessary conditions on being an effective sceptical
hypothesis.
The case presented here reveals that a significant challenge to S’s putative knowledge
of some external world proposition p can be raised by means of a hypothesis that: does
not entail the falsity of p, is sensitively believed to be false by S, and is subjectively
distinguishable from actuality by S. In the next section, I critically assess a further
potential necessary constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses, also endorsed by Beebe.
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2.5 Indication constraint.
In the previous section, I argued that the presented case provided a counter-example to
the claim that the sensitivity condition, and the experiential constraints are necessary
conditions on being a sceptical hypothesis. In this section, I outline and critically examine
a third constraint put forward by Beebe as a necessary condition on sceptical hypotheses:
the indication constraint. I argue that it too can be rejected on the basis of the case above.
Consider the following constraint on sceptical hypotheses proposed by Beebe:
Indication Constraint (IC): In order for a sceptical hypothesis SK to raise a signifi-
cant sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p, SK must indicate how S
could believe that p on the basis of S’s evidence and yet not know that p.9
Beebe provides some brief considerations in support of the indication constraint. The
argument begins by noting that only the third but not the first two of the following
hypotheses can raise a significant sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that the
animal in the pen is a zebra:10
(B1) The animal in the pen is a lion.
(B2) The animal in the pen is not a zebra.
(B3) The animal in the pen is a mule cleverly disguised to look like a zebra.
This seems correct. Next Beebe points out that a significant difference between (B3) and
(B1)-(B2) is that, when used to challenge some subject S’s putative knowledge that the
animal in the pen is a zebra, only the former indicates how it is that S can believe what
they do (i.e. that it’s a zebra) on the basis of their evidence and yet not know this. Beebe
concludes on this basis that (IC) is correct. This consideration appears to be compelling.
There are other aspects, however, which Beebe does not comment on not; ones that
I think, ultimately, undermine his point. For example, there are a number of other
finer-grained differences between (B1), (B2) and (B3) that are not explicitly mentioned
in this argument. Before discussing these differences, however, an important similarity
should also be highlighted. The similarity consists in the fact that it seems plausible
to say that S not knowing any one of these supposed sceptical hypotheses to be false is
incompatible with S knowing that the animal in the pen is a zebra. In other words, each
9 (Beebe, 2010, 453).
10 (Beebe, 2010, 452); cf. (Dretske, 1970).
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satisfies one aspect of being an effective hypothesis in the sense identified here: viz. that
it is intuitively plausible that someone knows the hypothesis to be false, when they know
that the animal in the pen is a zebra. This indicates, I think, that the relevant aspect
of ‘raising a significant sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p’ is here, on
Beebe’s view, the intuitive plausibility of denying that the hypothesis is known to be
false.
Let’s turn now to the differences. Firstly, it is possible to recognise that (B1) differs
from both (B2) and (B3) in one important respect: experiential possibility. That is, (B1)
will already count as an ineffective sceptical hypothesis on Beebe’s account in virtue of
failing to satisfy (EC1). Beebe argues that (B3) is, but (B2) is not an effective sceptical
hypothesis. The former effective hypothesis satisfies the indication constraint: it indicates
how S could believe that p on the same basis as in actuality and yet not know that p.11
So, Beebe concludes, the indication constraint is a necessary constraint on raising an
effective sceptical challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p.
To draw out the point here, it is instructive to briefly compare the indication constraint
with the sensitivity account of effective sceptical hypotheses discussed above. There are,
it seems, plenty of hypotheses which we think both are known to be false, and should
be if we know some external world proposition, but which we also recognise can only
be insensitively believed to be false. Claims of the form of (i)—‘S does not know that
not-sh’—are unlikely to be intuitively plausible, for example, when sh is the hypothesis
that S is ‘an intelligent dog who is always incorrectly believing’ that they have hands.12
The reason this hypothesis fails to be effective, according to DeRose, is that it does not
explain or indicate why S holds the false belief that is attributed to them in the scenario
it describes.13
In order to assess whether the indication constraint helps us to understand effective
sceptical hypotheses, it will be instructive to check whether this constraint is satisfied in
the case that I introduced in section 2.6. It is not immediately obvious that the hypothesis
in this case (that the monitor is faulty) does satisfy the indication constraint. In order to
do so, the faulty-monitor hypothesis would have to indicate to us how it is that Ellie could
believe on the basis of her evidence that Alan is not in the paddock, and yet not know
11 For Beebe, the basis of S’s belief that p is S’s evidence: I will simply refer more generally to S’s basis
for belief.
12 (DeRose, 1995, 22). One might also say, as DeRose does, that it seems to us—to the contrary—as
though S does in fact know this sort of hypothesis to be false. I do not disagree with DeRose on this
point, although for present purposes it is only important that the denial of that this is known is itself not
plausible.
13 (DeRose, 1995, 23).
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that he is not. However, I do not think that the hypothesis that the monitor is faulty does
this. The hypothesis does not, for example, tell us that were the monitor faulty then Ellie
would believe what she does about Alan’s whereabouts, and yet not know the same thing.
To see this, let us recall what I take to be the point of Hammond’s challenge involving
this hypothesis. This is that, in virtue of it not being a normal monitor, if the monitor
had been faulty then Ellie would not believe what she does about Alan’s whereabouts at
all. In this way, it does not seem as though the hypothesis indicates anything over and
above a literal falsehood about the monitor: that it is faulty.
Perhaps this is not the best way to understand how the indication constraint might
apply to this hypothesis. Crucial to Hammond’s challenge is the collateral information
that Ellie’s beliefs about what the monitor would be like if it had been faulty are them-
selves erroneous. Without this information it is not clear how one could go about judging
whether she knows. It is within the context of this information that the hypothesis seems,
at most, to indirectly convey to us how it is that Ellie could believe, but not know that
Alan is not in the paddock, on the basis of her evidence. It seems to reveal little more to
us than that Ellie actually does believe that Alan is not in the paddock on the basis of
having looked at the monitor, and yet may not actually know that he is not there.
I think there are further explanatory issues with the indication constraint, irrespec-
tive of whether the hypothesis that the monitor is faulty plausibly satisfies this constraint
directly, or indirectly. It is not clear that the plausibility of Hammond’s denial that Ellie
knows that the monitor is not faulty relies in any way on considerations of Ellie’s belief
about Alan’s whereabouts. The plausibility of this denial would not be diminished if
(ceteris paribus) Alan was in the bunker too and nobody there was wondering where he
was! Ellie is plausibly ignorant of the fact that the monitor is not faulty independently
of any other beliefs that she arrives at by means of the monitor. This suggests, pace
Beebe and DeRose, that whether or not it is plausible that S does not know that ¬sh is
independent of whether sh indicates (either directly or indirectly) how S could believe
that p on the same basis as in actuality, and yet not know that p.
There may be more to an effective sceptical hypothesis sh being capable of raising
a significant challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p than simply S plausibly not
knowing that ¬sh. It must also be plausible that if S knows that p then S knows that
¬sh. It is in this aspect of being an effective sceptical hypothesis then that we find a
definite link between considerations of S’s belief that p and sh, which is something that
the indication constraint attempts to capture. So, perhaps an examination of what the
indication constraint contributes to explaining the plausibility of claims of the form of
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the second sceptical premise (i.e. ‘if S knows that p, then S knows that not-sh’) will reveal
more. I explore this next.
2.6 Bad possibilities.
The foregoing argument has been that neither the experiential, nor the indication
constraints put forward by Beebe should be considered necessary conditions on being
a sceptical hypothesis. I now aim to put forward a positive proposal about what could
be said to be necessary for being an effective sceptical hypothesis. In developing this
proposal, I will draw again on considerations already highlighted in chapter 1, concerning
the notion of ‘bad’ possibilities, or scenarios. In this section, I set out the parallels between
the indication constraint and characterisations of effective sceptical hypotheses as ‘bad’
possibilities. After pointing towards the limitations of understanding effective sceptical
hypotheses in these terms, I use them, in section 2.7, as a springboard for proposing an
alternative account.
I think that consideration of the indication constraint could help to explain why
claims of the form ‘if S knows that p, then S knows that ¬sh’ are plausible for effective
sceptical hypotheses. The indication constraint says that it is a necessary condition on
any sceptical hypothesis sh being effective at challenging S’s putative knowledge that
p, that sh be a scenario in which S believes, but does not know that p on the basis of
their evidence. It is not surprising that virtually all paradigmatic effective sceptical
hypotheses fit this pattern: a brain in a vat does not know it has hands, an individual
looking at a cleverly disguised mule does not know it is a zebra, and the victim of a
complete perceptual deception knows nothing about the world—at least, not on the
basis of perception. This might be thought to be obvious given the closure principle, the
factivity of knowledge, and the fact that, in each of the aforementioned examples of
sceptical hypotheses, these hypotheses entail the falsity of external world propositions.
This, however, is not the case with respect to many other well-recognised hypotheses
capable of raising a significant challenge to our putative knowledge. The dreaming
hypothesis, for example, does not entail the falsity of many external world propositions,
but is capable of raising a sceptical challenge to my putative knowledge of them. Likewise,
the hypothesis that half of the animals in the pen are cleverly disguised mules, does not
entail that this animal in the pen is a zebra is false, but it is capable of raising a sceptical
challenge to my putative knowledge that this animal in the pen is a zebra.14
14 See (McGrath, 2013) for discussion of this hypothesis.
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I take it then that an explanatory advantage of the indication constraint, even though
it does not quite deal well with my example of the faulty-monitor effective hypothesis, is
that it goes some way towards providing a more general account of sceptical hypotheses.
It applies in equal measure to hypotheses that are not compatible with the targeted
proposition p, such as the brain in a vat hypothesis, as it does to those that are compatible
with p, such as the dreaming hypothesis. Insofar as the indication constraint is to be
rejected on the grounds that it fails to apply to the case of Ellie, this unifying aspect of it
will nonetheless be a desirable feature in any alternative account.
In seeking an account of effective sceptical hypotheses, I have suggested that more
generality is preferable to less. Speicfically, I take it that it is a desirable feature of
an account that it both apply equally to compatible and incompatible hypotheses, in
the sense outlined above, and apply to my Ellie case. In seeking an account like this, I
think it will be instructive to reconsider some influential characterisations of effective
sceptical hypotheses that fall short of having the desired generality. I think that there
may be some valuable lessons to be gained from these characterisations, despite their
limitations, that can help to shed more light on what an effective sceptical hypothesis
must do.
The first account I am interested in considering has been offered by Williamson (2000),
who characterises effective sceptical hypotheses as ‘bad’ possibilities in the following
way:
In the good case, things appear generally as they ordinarily do, and are
that way; one believes one proposition p (for example, that one has hands),
and p is true; by ordinary standards, one knows p. In the bad case, things
still appear generally as they ordinarily do, but are some other way; one still
believes p, but p is false; by any standards, one fails to know p, for only true
propositions are known. (Williamson, 2000, 165, my emphasis.)
In the bad scenarios, described by effective sceptical hypotheses, S still believes that p
on the basis of it seeming to them that p, but S does not know that p because p is false.
But what is it about these scenarios that is supposed to be epistemically bad? If there
can be knowledge of contingent propositions at all, then surely there will be possibilities
in which these propositions are false, and thereby not known. Moreover, it has been
continuously stressed here that in order to be effective—at raising a significant challenge
to S’s putative knowledge of some external world proposition p—it is not necessary
for a hypothesis to entail the falsity of p. It appears that the list of effective sceptical
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hypotheses with respect to p is not exhausted by the list of bad possibilities with respect
to p as recognised by Williamson. Specifically, effective sceptical hypotheses such as the
dreaming hypothesis, and the weaker half-fakes hypothesis, are not obviously examples
of Williamson’s bad possibilities. I submit then that an account of effective sceptical
hypotheses in terms of Williamson’s notion of bad possibilities does not provide us with
the general account we are seeking.
In contrast to Williamson, Pryor (2000) recognises that not all effective sceptical
hypotheses entail the falsity of putatively known external world propositions. And it
is from Pryor’s recognition of this fact, and other considerations concerning effective
sceptical hypotheses that I now take my cue in pursuing an alternative account. In
particular, I take Pryor’s useful insight, with respect to sceptical hypotheses, to be that
certain possibilities are not bad simpliciter but only relative to the propositional content
and grounds for—or experiential basis of —a perceptual belief that p.15 In line with
the recognition that effective sceptical hypotheses may either entail the falsity of the
putatively known proposition or not, Pryor outlines two distinct ways in which a sceptical
hypothesis sh may describe a bad possibility q with respect to a perceptual belief that p:
Say that some grounds E you have [for a belief that p] “allow” a possibility
q iff the following counterfactual is true: if q obtained, you would still possess
the same grounds E... So, we might want to count a hypothesis as “bad” for
the purposes of a skeptical argument just in case it is (and is recognized to
be) incompatible with what you purport to know [p], but it is nonetheless
“allowed” by your grounds E..., [or], if it could undermine your experiences.
(Pryor, 2000, 527)
On this view, a hypothesis sh will be effective at raising a significant sceptical
challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p only when it describes a bad possibility with
respect to p and S’s grounds, E, for believing that p. A ‘bad’ possibility, in this sense, is
one in which S believes that p on the same grounds E as they do in actuality, but where
either p is false, or else E no longer provides any justificatory support for S’s belief that
p.16 Since S does not know that p if either p is false, or S’s belief that p lacks justificatory
15 (Pryor, 2000, 528).
16 See (Willenken, 2011, pp.6-7) for an explanation of the function of an ‘underminer’—Pryor’s term for
a hypothesis that could undermine your experiences. Pryor maintains certain perceptual beliefs about
the world are based on grounds or experience, which are what justify these beliefs. Others maintain that
beliefs are based upon and justified by evidence, either propositional or non-propositional. For present
purposes I remain neutral on whether beliefs are best described as being based on or justified by evidence,
experience, grounds, or reasons; requiring only that beliefs are based in some way.
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grounds, it is clear that a common feature of bad possibilities with respect to p and E is
that, in these possibilities, S does not know that p on the basis of E.
In this way, Beebe’s indication constraint has clear parallels with this characterisation
of sceptical hypotheses in terms of bad possibilities. Bad possibilities are those in which
a subject could believe, but not know, a proposition p on some evidential basis, on which
they would ordinary base a belief that p. The close connection between the indication
constraint and Pryor’s characterisation of sceptical hypotheses as ‘bad’ possibilities
should not be surprising. After all, Pyror explicitly states that he considers a possibility
to be bad “just in case it has the special features that characterize the skeptic’s scenarios—
whatever those features turn out to be” (Pryor, 2000, 527). If being a sceptical hypothesis
simply amounted to describing a ‘bad’ possibility, where a ‘bad’ possibility is just one that
has those features that allow it to serve the requisite role in a potentially threatening
sceptical argument, then it remains unclear whether the notion of ‘badness’ can help us
meaningfully distinguish between sceptical hypotheses that are effective from those that
are not.
Presumably, then, the ‘badness’ of a possibility consists in it satisfying the necessary
conditions on being an effective sceptical hypothesis. I think this is a plausible way to
interpret Pryor’s view of bad possibilities and effective sceptical hypotheses. So, perhaps
the indication constraint is a necessary condition in the following sense: a hypothesis
sh is effective with respect to S’s putative knowledge that p when it describes a bad
possibility, where this notion is explicated in the following way:
a possibility is bad, with respect to an experience and a proposition, iff it
is a possibility in which one would have the experience and ordinarily rely
on it in believing the proposition but in which one would not thereby gain
perceptual knowledge of the proposition. (McGrath, 2013, 535)
This latter-most characterisation of a ‘bad’ possibility, together with the closely related
indication constraint, seem to provide some insights into what features of effective
sceptical hypotheses are doing the necessary work in challenging our putative knowledge
of empirical propositions. I argue, however, that neither provide a satisfactory account of
the necessary conditions on effective sceptical hypotheses; neither, I have argued, applies
to the example of the effective hypothesis involved in the Ellie case. In what follows, I
suggest a weaker alternative constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses, which I argue
succeeds where the others have failed in applying to the Ellie case.
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Consider again the novel Ellie case I introduced in section 2.4. I have argued that
the case involves an effective epistemic challenge, which is an analogue of sceptical
challenges. In this case, however, the hypothesis utilised in the raising of a significant
challenge to the protagonist’s putative knowledge of some proposition does not describe
a possibility which fits with the above definition of a bad possibility. In any possibility
in which the monitor is faulty, Ellie neither has the monitor-related experiences she
actually does have, nor does she believe the relevant proposition. But it is obvious
that there is some aspect of this hypothesis that is ‘bad’ in the sense that Hammond
is able to utilise it effectively in raising an epistemic challenge to Ellie’s belief that
Alan is not in the paddock. This case is, however, importantly dissimilar to the various
examples of sceptical challenges contained within the cases from recent epistemology
which involve extraordinary possibilities (brains in vats, dreaming, or malignant demons).
The difference is, as I have noted in chapter 1 and section 2.2, one of scope. I think that
this difference in scope is an aspect of effective epistemic challenges that requires
explanation. But I think we will be in the best position to give this explanation once
we have a general account of the constraints on being an effective sceptical hypothesis,
which applies no matter how narrow or wide the range of its epistemic challenge.
Within the next section, I develop an alternative explanation of ‘bad’ possibilities,
in terms of the basis for a belief, and then go on to propose an account of the necessary
conditions on an effective sceptical hypothesis capable of raising a significant challenge
to knowledge of external world propositions. I argue that this constraint captures the
common core shared by effective hypotheses, and can accommodate the differences
between them in terms of scope.
I noted above that it is an advantage of the indication constraint that it accounted
for both those effective sceptical hypotheses that entail the falsity of everyday empirical
propositions, and those that do not. I think that this generality is desirable in an
account, and should be sought. The indication constraint, however, is not satisfied by
the faulty-monitor hypothesis. Instead, I argue that this hypothesis satisfies another
necessary condition on effective sceptical hypotheses, and one that also generalises in
the desired way. On my view, what makes the faulty-monitor hypothesis an effective
sceptical hypothesis is that were it true, then it would be consistent with Ellie believing
that Alan was not in the paddock on the same evidential basis as she actually does that
this belief is false. After setting out my constraint, and applying it to various examples,
I go on to argue that it is preferable to the rejected necessary conditions on effective
sceptical hypotheses.
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2.7 Proposed condition on sceptical hypotheses.
My aim now is to draw upon the above considerations to sketch a positive account of the
necessary conditions on being an effective sceptical hypothesis—one capable of raising a
significant challenge to our putative knowledge of a range of propositions. To draw this
out, I think it will be instructive to explore the pertinent question here as to why it is
that Ellie would not know that if that hypothesis were true. So, what explains Ellie’s
lack of knowledge in that scenario?
The explanation is not that the putatively known proposition would be false, since it
could be true that Alan is not in the paddock even if the monitor is faulty. Neither would
it be because Ellie’s belief may now too easily have been false, even though the believed
proposition may be true. This is a popular explanation of S’s inability to know that p
when the possibility described by sh obtains. Yet, this remains an entirely implausible
explanation for the case being considered. Ellie does not form the belief that Alan is not
in the paddock in any nearby world in which the monitor is faulty, and subsequently,
does not have an unsafe belief that this is the case. What, then, is going on with the
faulty-monitor hypothesis in the Ellie case? What is it that makes it epistemically bad in
regards to her believing that Alan is not in the paddock? The basis for Ellie’s actual belief
about Alan’s whereabouts is having looked at the monitor.17 It is undeniable that were
the faulty-monitor hypothesis true, then it would be epistemically bad for Ellie to believe
that Alan is not in the paddock on that basis. Looking at a faulty monitor is no way to
know where someone might be. Ellie stands to acquire as much knowledge about Alan’s
whereabouts by looking at a faulty surveillance monitor as she does by simply guessing.
Ellie does not know that Alan is not in the paddock, if she believes this proposition on
the basis of either these two methods.
Let us say that a basis B for belief that p is ‘bad’ when forming a belief that p on
the basis of B precludes knowing that p. But a basis B that is bad for a belief in one
proposition will not by itself be bad for belief in another. Ellie’s counting of visible
tables, for example, would be a bad basis on which to believe something about Alan’s
whereabouts, but not a bad basis on which to form a belief about how many tables she
can see. The badness of a basis B for belief is then relative to the propositional content of
the belief. Since looking at the monitor is not obviously a bad basis for Hammond, for
example, to believe that Alan is not in the paddock, the badness of a basis B for belief
that p is then also relative to the background knowledge of the agent forming the belief
17 I take it this is uncontroversial. Put another way: if Ellie had not looked at the monitor, it seems as
though Ellie would have no reason to believe what she does.
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that p. So, S’s basis B for a belief that p is bad when S’s believing that p on the basis of B
precludes S knowing that p.
On the basis of the above considerations, I propose then the following putative
constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses:
Belief basis Constraint: A hypothesis sh is capable of raising a significant epistemic
challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p, only if were sh true, then not-p would
be consistent with S believing that p on the same evidential basis as they actually
do.
Before running through the advantages of my proposed constraint by applying it to
the various examples of sceptical hypotheses above, it is worth comparing my proposal
from Pryor’s account of sceptical hypotheses. My proposed constraint is similar to the
characterisation of ‘bad’ possibilities Pryor gives in the sense that it centers around the
notion of a subject’s evidential basis for believing a proposition. The difference consists
in that my account, but not Pryor’s, remains neutral on whether S forms a belief that p
at all in the scenarios described by sceptical hypotheses. On Pryor’s view, I take it, the
idea is that if an effective sceptical hypothesis sh is true, then a subject S will believe
that p on the same grounds E that they would ordinarily do if sh were false (e.g. their
experiences). Furthermore, if an effective sceptical hypothesis is true, then in that case S
would not know that p because either, depending on the hypothesis, p is false, or E does
not provide any epistemic support for p. My constraint, in contrast, is not committed
to the idea that if an effective sceptical hypothesis is true, then a subject S will believe
that p on the same grounds as they would do if the hypothesis were false. Instead, it is
committed only to the weaker idea that if an effective sceptical hypothesis sh is true,
then it is possible for S to falsely believe that p on the same evidential basis that they
would otherwise do if sh were false.
In the remainder of this section, I will discuss how this constraint applies both to
the various examples of recognised effective sceptical hypotheses considered above (i.e.
the brain in a vat, dreaming, cleverly disguised mules, and half-fakes hypotheses), as
well as to the novel example of the effective sceptical hypothesis presented in the Ellie
case. Lastly, I suggest some ways in which the proposed necessary condition on sceptical
hypotheses helps to explain the variable effectiveness of the non-sceptical stolen bicycle
hypothesis.
With respect to the Ellie case and the faulty-monitor hypothesis, I argued that this
was an example of an effective sceptical hypothesis. On my view, the faulty-monitor
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hypothesis does satisfy the belief basis constraint. It satisfies this constraint only if it
is the case that were the faulty-monitor hypothesis true, then it would be consistent
with Ellie believing that Alan is not in the paddock on the same basis as she actually
does that Alan is in the paddock. And this, I submit, is intuitively the case. Ellie’s actual
basis for believing that Alan is not in the paddock is looking at the monitor. Were the
faulty-monitor hypothesis true, then the screen would show a solid red screen. In that
case, if Ellie formed a belief that Alan is not in the paddock on the same basis as in the
actual case, her belief would be formed on the basis of looking at the monitor which has
a red screen. In which case, it would be consistent with Ellie believing that Alan is not
in the paddock on that basis, that her belief is false (i.e. Alan is in the paddock). In this
way, the faulty-monitor hypothesis satisfies my proposed constraint on effective sceptical
hypotheses.
The brain in a vat and cleverly disguised mules hypotheses are obvious examples of
effective sceptical hypotheses, albeit different in terms of their scope, and both satisfy
the belief basis constraint. Each satisfies this constraint only if it is the case that were
the hypotheses true, then it would be consistent with me, for example, believing the
target propositions, respectively, that I have hands, and that the animal in the pen is a
zebra, on the same basis as I actually do. And this, on my view, is plausibly the case. My
actual evidential basis for believing that I have hands is plausibly that I have perceptual
experiences as of hands. Were the brain in a vat hypothesis true, then plausibly my
perceptual experiences would be indistinguishable from how they actually are, but it
would be false that I have hands. As such, in that case, it would be consistent with
me believing that I have hands on the same evidential basis as I otherwise would, and
this belief be false. In this way, the brain in a vat hypothesis satisfies the belief basis
constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses. Likewise, my actual evidential basis in
Dretske-style cases might plausibly be my looking at the animal in the pen. And were the
cleverly disguised mules true, then the animal would plausibly appear indistinguishable
to me from a zebra, but it would be false that the animal in the pen is a zebra. It would
then, in that case, be consistent with me forming a belief that the animal in the pen
is a zebra on the same evidential basis as I actually do that this belief is false. So, the
cleverly disguised mules hypothesis also satisfies the belief basis constraint.
The dreaming and half-mules hypotheses are plausible examples of effective sceptical
hypotheses that differ in their scope, and both differ from the brain in a vat and cleverly
disguised mules hypotheses insofar as they are not compatible, respectively, with the
propositions that I have hands and that the animals in the pen is a zebra. In each case,
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the effective sceptical hypothesis too satisfies the belief basis constraint. In the former
case, there would be no inconsistency between me believing the proposition that I have
hands on the same evidential basis as I actually do and this proposition being false, were
it the case that the dreaming hypothesis is true. Likewise, in the latter case, there would
be no inconsistency between me believing the proposition that the animal in the pen is
a zebra on the same evidential basis as I actually do and this proposition being false,
were it the case that the half-mules hypothesis is true. So, again, both hypotheses satisfy
my proposed constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses. One last point to consider is
how my constraint applies to the examples of supposedly ineffective sceptical hypotheses
considered in section 2.5: (B1) and (B2). These cases are interesting, and there are a
couple of points worth making about them. Firstly, these hypotheses do seem to satisfy
the belief basis constraint. If it were true either that the animal in the pen is a lion or
that the animal in the pen is not a zebra, then it would be possible for me to falsely believe
that it is a zebra on the basis of looking at the animal.18 My belief basis constraint is, in
that sense, very weak. On my view, insofar as neither (B1) nor (B2) are plausibly thought
of as being effective sceptical hypotheses, I think it is likely that they both fail to satisfy
some further necessary condition.19
To contrast, let’s consider the stolen bicycle hypothesis, which is not an example of a
sceptical hypothesis. Whether or not it is effective at raising an epistemic challenge to my
putative knowledge that my bicycle is where I left it can depend on the context. Insofar
as this hypothesis is not sceptical, it is not a necessary constraint on it being effective
that it satisfies the belief basis constraint. Nonetheless, I submit that consideration of
this constraint can help to account for why it may be effective in some circumstances,
but not others. The stolen bicycle hypothesis might plausibly be effective, for example, if
the only evidential basis I actually have for my belief that my bicycle is where I left it is
my memory of simply leaving it there 4 days ago. In this case, I submit that were the
hypothesis true, it would be consistent with my believing that my bicycle is where I left it
on the same evidential basis as I actually do that my belief is false. When my bicycle has
been stolen, it is consistent with me believing on the evidential basis of remembering
18 This would be possible, strictly speaking, even if I had visual experiences as of looking at a lion, or a
gazelle, etc. Of course, extra information would be required to explain why I would believe that an animal
that was a zebra. But that does not mean that the indication constraint was correct. The argument that
these fail to be effective sceptical hypotheses because they do not satisfy the indication constraint begs the
question. The faulty-monitor hypothesis is plausibly effective, but likewise does not satisfy the indication
constraint,as I showed in 2.6.
19 On my view, these hypotheses fail to be effective at raising a sceptical challenge to my putative
knowledge that the animal in the pen is a zebra because they are not plausibly epistemically possible for
me. I develop this line of thought further in chapter 3.
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leaving it there 4 days ago that it is not there. Compare this to the example of the cleverly
disguised mule hypothesis. This hypothesis is effective at raising a sceptical challenge
because it calls into question my actual basis for believing that this animal in the pen
is a zebra, namely, my background assumptions about the zoo, and it seeming to me
perceptually as though the animal is a zebra.
Yet, the stolen bicycle hypothesis might plausibly not be effective, for example, if
the evidential basis I actually have for my belief that my bicycle is where I left it is
having just looked at it in the same place I left it. I propose that we might, now, plausibly
explain this along the following lines. In these circumstances, it is not the case that
were the stolen bicycle hypothesis true, it would not be consistent with my believing
that my bicycle is where I left it on the same evidential basis as I actually do that this
belief is false. In the closest world in which my bicycle has been stolen, it is difficult to
understand how it could be the case both that I form a belief that it is where I left it
on the basis of having just seen it there, and this belief be false. In order for the stolen
bicycle hypothesis to be effective at raising an epistemic challenge something more needs
to be going on. What would seem to be required is some further sceptical hypothesis that
would support a sceptical attitude towards my actual basis for believing that my bicycle
is where I left it.
That concludes the discussion of how the proposed belief basis constraint on effective
sceptical hypotheses applies to the recognised examples of the such hypotheses, as well
as the faulty-monitor example introduced in this chapter. In the next section, I put
forward some brief comments by way of an anticipatory defence of the proposed account
of effective sceptical hypotheses.
2.8 Concluding remarks.
In this chapter, I have been concerned with assessing accounts of effective sceptical
hypotheses, namely, those capable of raising significant challenges to our putative
knowledge of a range of external world propositions. I have assumed that a hypothesis sh
is capable of ‘raising of a significant challenge to putative knowledge’ of some empirical
proposition p if claims of the form (i) and (ii) are plausible. I argued that the Ellie
case reveals that accounts of effective sceptical hypotheses in terms of the sensitivity
condition, experiential constraints, and the indication constraint do not provide us with
the desired understanding of what a hypothesis must to in order to effectively raise a
sceptical challenge. While these accounts may offer some explanation in specific cases,
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they do not present, as I have shown, any necessary condition on effective sceptical
hypotheses. In particular, I argued that the case of Ellie reveals that these are not
necessary conditions on sceptical hypotheses; an effective sceptical challenge can be
raised without these conditions being met.
Instead, I drew on the following two considerations to motivate the novel belief basis
constraint on effective sceptical hypotheses. First, in order to be effective at raising a
significant challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p, a sceptical hypothesis sh must
describe a scenario in which S’s actual basis B for their belief that p is bad. Second, a
basis B for a belief that p formed by S is bad just in case ¬p is consistent with S believing
that p on the basis of B. On this basis, I argued that it is a plausible that effective
sceptical hypotheses must be such that, if they were true, then it would be consistent
with a subject’s believing the targeted propositions, on the same evidential basis as they
actually do, that these propositions are false.
On my view, the belief basis constraint captures a necessary condition on sceptical
hypotheses, and one that I think has considerable advantages over existing accounts.
There is a strong case to be made for the constraint over those argued against, owing
to its comparative success with respect to providing a more general account of effective
sceptical hypotheses. This success was highlighted in the previous section, where I
argued that the proposed constraint could be applied to give a unifying account of both
p-compatible and p-incompatible examples of both maximally-wide scope, and limited-
scope effective sceptical hypotheses, and the novel faulty-monitor example. Describing
a scenario in which S has a bad basis for a belief that p is a necessary part of what it
takes to raise a significant challenge to S’s putative knowledge that p. I take it that my
proposed account is at no disadvantage to the competitors considered here, given its
comparative success in accounting for various recognised examples of effective sceptical
hypotheses, and the novel example of the faulty-monitor hypothesis.
In the next chapter, I explore further the diagnostic work on sceptical arguments, and
focus there on the epistemic principles underwriting their premises. This is a natural
next step given the discussion of sceptical hypotheses given here. The following, for
example, remains a pertinent question: why is it that Hammond’s denial that Ellie
knows that the monitor is not faulty is so plausible? The following are what I take to
be some plausible explanations: she hasn’t ruled out, or eliminated that the monitor is
faulty; for all she knows, the monitor is faulty. Recall, however, the worry I highlighted
in section 2.2, about the apparent explanatory vacuity of these responses. I discuss and
develop these issues further, in the next chapter, to propose and defend a promising
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account of the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance.
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EPISTEMIC PRINCIPLES.
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, as in the previous chapters, I am concerned with examples of various
sceptical arguments from ignorance. These arguments are at the heart of the problem
of sceptical paradoxes, and providing a satisfactory account of how they work is an
important part of seeking happy-face resolution to this problem. This chapter focuses on
the following question: what epistemic principle underwrites sceptical arguments from
ignorance? In chapter 2, I was concerned with give a general account of the effective
sceptical hypotheses that feature in sceptical arguments from ignorance. So too, in this
chapter, I am concerned with the prospect of providing a general account of the epistemic
principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance.
I begin, in section 3.2, by setting out some preliminary points clarifying what is
involved in the general account of sceptical arguments sought here. Next, in section 3.3,
I consider some existing proposals for the principles underwriting sceptical arguments
from ignorance: Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibility. I consider each in turn,
looking at how the principle applies to some paradigm sceptical arguments. In section
3.4, I go on to critically assess the adequacy of these principles as accounts of sceptical
arguments from ignorance, and consider another proposed principle, INFALLIBILITY+,
that avoids these adequacy issues. Finally, in section 3.5, I raise an issue with Infallibil-
ity+, and forward my own proposal for the principle underwriting sceptical arguments
from ignorance. I argue that my principle is preferable to the alternatives by showing
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how it applies to various examples, and addresses the explanatory issue I raised.
3.2 Preliminaries.
In what sense will an account of the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments
from ignorance count as a general one?1 Both straightforward challenges to specific
knowledge claims (e.g. BICYCLE) and those sceptical challenges (e.g. ENVATTED BRAIN
and DREAMING) which target virtually all knowledge claims at once can be expressed
in terms of AI. The latter sort of arguments give rise to paradoxes, and so, I think it
is desirable to seek a general account of these arguments’ common core to develop our
understanding of how to solve these paradoxes.
Compare these arguments with the following argument:2
ZOO.
(7) S does not know that the animals in the pen are not cleverly disguised mules.
(8) If S knows that this animal in the pen is a zebra, then S knows that the
animals in the pen are not cleverly disguised mules.
So,
(9) S does not know that this animal in the pen is a zebra.
ZOO is similar to ENVATTED BRAIN, and differs from DREAMING in that the sceptical
hypothesis involved (that the animals in the pen are cleverly disguised mules)—as I noted
in the previous chapter—entails that the targeted proposition (i.e. this animal in the pen
is a zebra) is false. Nonetheless, as we have seen, the sceptical hypothesis in the ZOO
argument can be changed so as to not entail the falsity of the target proposition. The
hypothesis that half of the animals in the pen are cleverly disguised mules, for example,
does not entail that this animal in the pen is a zebra. Moreover, ZOO differs from
ENVATTED BRAIN and DREAMING in two important ways. The first of these concerns
the scope of the sceptical challenge involved. This, as has been noted, is narrower
than the latter two sceptical arguments; ZOO does not threaten to challenge all our
1 Compare (Wright, 2005), where a distinction between ‘Cartesian’ and ‘Humean’ sceptical arguments
is made. I am here concerned only with the former.
2 This argument is based on considerations drawn from (Dretske, 1970). Similar considerations feature
predominantly in the discussions of scepticism. See, for example, (Wright, 2002).
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knowledge claims at once. The second way in which ZOO differs is that, unlike the latter
two examples of sceptical challenges, this argument is not necessarily paradoxical. To
illustrate this, suppose S is a geneticist who is standing at the zebra pen having just
completed an on-site DNA analysis of all the zoo’s mammals. Suppose further that S
is aware that the result of analysing the DNA from the animal that they are looking
at means that the animal is not a mule. It seems now that the first premise of ZOO
lacks plausibility, and the argument, subsequently, does not present us with a paradox.
Importantly, it seems that in this case there is a satisfactory way to counter the argument.
In this case, for example, it seems perfectly legitimate to respond to ZOO by saying “But
S knows that this animal is not a mule!”.
I think that a satisfactory account of the epistemic principles underwriting sceptical
arguments such as ENVATTED BRAIN and DREAMING should also apply to examples
such as ZOO. In the latter, but not the former cases, these arguments can be poten-
tially countered, and are not paradoxical. Moreover, some AI arguments can be used
to challenge a claim that ‘S knows that p’ irrespective of whether sh entails the falsity
of p (e.g. ENVATTED BRAIN, ZOO) or not (e.g. DREAMING). I propose that any adequate
account of the principles underlying sceptical arguments from ignorance should at least
accommodate, if not explain, each of these facts. In the next section, I outline some
candidates for the epistemic principles underwriting the sceptical arguments from the
previous section, and breifly comment on how they might apply to ENVATTED BRAIN,
DREAMING, and ZOO.
3.3 Candidate epistemic principles.
3.3.1 Closure.
The first candidate for the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments can
be called epistemic closure. Simply put, the idea behind this principle is this. Someone
knows those propositions that they come to believe on the basis of deducing them from
other propositions that they know. We can express the principle more formally in the
following way:
Closure
For all S, p, q, if S knows that p and competently deduces q from p, thereby coming
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to believe q, while retaining their knowledge that p, then S comes to know that q.3
The principle basically says that whenever someone knows some proposition which
entails another proposition, and this person forms a belief in the latter because they
recognised that it was entailed by the former, then that person also knows the latter
so long as they continue to know the former. So, what bearing does Closure have on
explaining how arguments of the AI form really work? To see how, we now look at
how this principle is thought to explain two of our sceptical argument examples from
above; ENVATTED BRAIN and ZOO. First, it is noted that the first premises just seem
to be plausible. This can be supported by an appeal to what appear to be relatively
uncontroversial assumptions. One example would be the following claim: no one is able
to tell whether they are a brain in a vat or not. Hence the plausibility of ENVATTED
BRAIN’s first premise. Likewise, it just seems uncontroversial that most people would be
unable to tell the difference between a cleverly disguised mule and a zebra. Hence the
plausibility of ZOO’s first premise.
Both argument’s second premises can then be motivated by appeal to Closure. To do
this, we start by noting that we can come by means of rational reflection to grasp the
following relevant entailments. First, that S has hands entails that S is not a handless
brain in a vat. Second, that this animal in the pen is a zebra entails that the animals in
the pen are not cleverly disguised mules. Next, we note that through rational reflection
we could come to believe the entailed proposition on the basis of deducing it from, and
without ceasing to know (if they already did), the former proposition. Now, Closure tells
us that in every case where S knows that they have hands, S also knows that they are not
a handless brain in a vat. And whenever S knows that this animal in the pen is a zebra,
they also know that the animals in the pen are not cleverly disguised mules. Hence the
plausibility of the second premises of ENVATTED BRAIN and ZOO.
Does the Closure principle provide an adequate account of how sceptical arguments
from ignorance work? I think that it does not. I think that it fails in this respect for the
reason that it fails to apply to a large proportion of sceptical arguments from ignorance.
I explain why later on, but first I briefly outline two other candidates for the epistemic
principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance.
3 Cf. (Almeida, 2012, 199), (Brueckner, 2005, 388), (Brueckner, 1994, 827), and (Cohen, 1998, 144). For
formulations in terms of justification see (Heller, 1999, 196), (McCain, 2013, 291), and (Pritchard, 2005,
107). For a comprehensive discussions of epistemic closure see (Hawthorne, 2004).
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3.3.2 Underdetermination.
Our second candidate for the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments can
be called epistemic underdetermination. Put simply, the idea behind this principle goes
something like this: someone knows a proposition p only if the basis on which they
believe that proposition tells against the truth of propositions whose falsity is entailed
by p. We can express the principle more formally in the following way:
Underdetermination
For all S, p, q, if S’s evidence for believing p does not favour p over some q which S
knows to be incompatible with p, then S’s evidence does not justify S in believing
p.4
The principle basically says that whenever someone knows some proposition then they
possess evidence which favours this proposition over any proposition which entails that p
is false. So, what bearing does Underdetermination have on explaining how arguments of
the AI form really work? To see how, we will do what we did with the previous candidate
principle, and examine how Underdetermination is thought to explain ENVATTED BRAIN
and ZOO.
Let us take ENVATTED BRAIN first. Its first premise may be motivated by the following
instance of Underdetermination, and a relatively uncontroversial sceptical assumption:
(U1) If S’s evidence for believing that S is not a brain in a vat does not favour that
proposition over the proposition that S is a brain in a vat, then S’s evidence does
not justify S in believing that S is not a brain in a vat.
(U2) No one’s evidence for believing that they are not a brain in a vat favours the
proposition that they are not a brain in a vat over the proposition that they are a
brain in a vat.
From (U1) and (U2) it follows that no one has evidence that justifies them in believing
that they are not a brain in a vat. Given only the relatively uncontroversial assumption
that knowing a proposition requires having evidence that justifies you in believing that
proposition, it follows that no one knows that they are not a brain in a vat. In this way it
is suggested we can explain the first premise of ENVATTED BRAIN; that S does not know
4 Adapted from (Boult, 2013, 1127). See also (Cohen, 1998, 144-5), (Pritchard, 2005, 108), and
(Williamson, 2000).
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that they are not a brain in a vat. Similar considerations apply to ZOO; the plausibility
of ZOO’s first premise falls out of the following instance of Underdetermination and a
relatively uncontroversial sceptical assumption:
(U3) If S’s evidence for believing that ¬disguised mule does not favour the
proposition that ¬disguised mule over the proposition that disguised mule, then
S’s evidence does not justify S in believing that ¬disguised mule.
(U4) Practically no person’s evidence for believing that the animal in the pen is
not a cleverly disguised mule favours that proposition over the proposition that the
animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule.
The second premise of ENVATTED BRAIN may be motivated in terms of the same
principle. First, we note that, the proposition that S is a brain in a vat entails that
it is false that S has hands. So, the two propositions are incompatible. Next, we note
that, this incompatibility is knowable by virtually everyone. And so, we can see that the
antecedent of ENVATTED BRAIN’s second premise will be true just in case S’s evidence
for believing that S has hands favours that proposition over the proposition that S is
a brain in a vat. In which case S would be in a position to know that they are not a
brain in a vat. After all, their true belief that they are not will be justified in virtue of
their evidence which favours it over its negation. Hence the plausibility of ENVATTED
BRAIN’s second premise. Similar considerations apply to ZOO; the incompatibility of the
hypothesis that the animals in the pen are cleverly disguised mules, and the proposition
that this animal in the pen is a zebra is easily knowable through rational reflection by
anyone. According to the underdetermination principle, S can have evidence justifying
their belief that the animal is a zebra only if they have evidence for this proposition that
favours it over the proposition that the animals in the pen are cleverly disguised mules.
Hence the plausibility ZOO’s second premise.
Does the Underdetermination principle provide an adequate account of how sceptical
arguments from ignorance work? I think that it does not, and that it fails in this respect
for the same reason as Closure. We will see why shortly, but first let’s briefly look at
one final candidate for the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments from
ignorance.
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3.3.3 Infallibility.
Our third candidate for the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments can be
called epistemic infallibility. Put simply, the idea behind this principle goes something
like this. Someone knows a proposition only if they have eliminated all those propositions
whose falsity is entailed by p. We can express the principle more formally in the following
way:
Infallibility.
For all S, p, q, S knows that p only if S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in
which p is false.5
The principle says that whenever someone knows some proposition then their evi-
dence eliminates every possibility in which this proposition is false. To illustrate, the
infallibility principle holds that if I know that I have hands, for example, then my evi-
dence eliminates every possibility in which I do not have hands. So, what bearing does
Infallibility have on our understanding of how arguments of the AI form really work?
To explore this question, let’s again follow the same procedure as we did with Closure
and Underdetermination. Here, then, we want to apply the Infallibility principle to the
examples of ENVATTED BRAIN and ZOO. What we are interested in exploring is how, if
at all, the candidate epistemic principle serves to motivate the various premises of AI
arguments.
Starting again with ENVATTED BRAIN. Its first premise is motivated by the following
instance of Infallibility and a relatively uncontroversial sceptical assumption:
(I1) S knows that they are not a brain in a vat only if S’s evidence eliminates
every possibility in which the proposition that S is not a brain in a vat is false.
(I2) No one can eliminate the possibility that they are a brain in a vat.
The possibility in which S is a brain in a vat is one in which the proposition that S is
not a brain in a vat is false. So, from (I1) and (I2), it follows that S does not know that
they are not a brain in a vat. Hence the plausibility of ENVATTED BRAIN’s first premise.
And similar considerations apply to ZOO’s first premise. The possibility in which the
animal in front of S at the zoo is cleverly disguised mule is one in which it is false that the
animal in the pen is not a cleverly disguised mule. So, in order to know that the animal
5 Adapted from (Lewis, 1996, 551).
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in the pen is not a disguised mule, S must eliminate the possibility that proposition is
false. Yet it is a further relatively uncontroversial assumption that most people in S’s
position at the zoo would be unable to eliminate this possibility, hence the plausibility of
ZOO’s first premise.
The second premise of ENVATTED BRAIN can also be seen to be motivated by the
Infallibility principle. To see how, we need to first note that the proposition S has hands
will be false whenever S is a brain in a vat. And so, the antecedent of ENVATTED BRAIN’s
second premise will be true just in case S has eliminated that S is a brain in a vat. In
which case, S would be in a position to know that they are not a brain in a vat. After
all, they have eliminated the very possibility of it being false. Hence the plausibility of
ENVATTED BRAIN’s second premise. Similar considerations apply to ZOO. Any possibility
in which the animal that S thinks is a zebra is in fact a cleverly disguised mule is one
in which it is false that the animal S thinks is a zebra is, in fact, a zebra. So, according
to Infallibility, the antecedent of ZOO’s second premise will be true just in case S has
eliminated the proposition that the animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule. In
which case, S will be in a position to know that the animals in the pen is not a cleverly
disguised mule; they’ll have eliminated every possibility in which it is false. Hence the
plausibility ZOO’s second premise.
Does the Infallibility principle provide an adequate account of how sceptical argu-
ments from ignorance work? I think that it does not, and that it also fails in this respect
for the same reason as Closure and Underdetermination. I discuss this failure next.
3.4 Principle of Ignorance Possibilities.
In this section, I critically assess the relative merits of Closure, Underdetermination,
and Infallibility as candidates for the epistemic principle underwriting the core sceptical
argument form AI.
The case against the principles considered above as accounts of those underwriting
the premises of AI can be stated straight-forwardly. First, an adequate account of the
principle underwriting AI should apply to each of the instances presented in the pre-
vious section. Second, neither Closure, Underdetermination, nor Infallibility apply to
the second premise of the DREAMING argument. To see why, let p be the proposition
that S has hands. The second premise of the DREAMING argument, then, says that if
S knows that they have hands, then they know that they are not currently dreaming.
Neither Closure, Underdetermination, nor Infallibility can underwrite this premise, as
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they do the corresponding premise of ENVATTED BRAIN. This is because the hypothesis
that S is dreaming is not incompatible with the proposition that S has hands. After all,
anyone can be currently dreaming and have hands. I assume that an adequate account
of the principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance should apply to as
many recognised instances as possible. So, on my view, neither Closure, Underdetermina-
tion, nor Infallibility provides an adequately general account of the epistemic principle
underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance.
The argument is simple, and has support in recent literature on the topic. For example,
Kraft (2013) argues in a similar way against these principles, and uses this to motivate
an alternative. For Kraft it is clear that AI cannot be adequately explained in terms
which only apply to those instances where the sceptical hypothesis entails that p is false.
This is evident from the following comment:
[T]he most charitable interpretation of sceptical scenarios understands
them as illustrating the possibility of global (empirical) ignorance, the pos-
sibility of not knowing anything... A sceptical scenario is not defective just
because it does not illustrate the possibility of global error. To be successful
it has to illustrate the possibility of global (empirical) ignorance, i.e. the
possibility that all of my (empirical) beliefs fall short of knowledge’ (Kraft,
2013, 66)
Before commenting further, it is worth noting that Kraft takes a more restrictive view
of what counts as a sceptical hypothesis than I do. On my view, as outlined in chapter 2,
sceptical hypotheses are those that illustrate the possibility of ignorance with respect
to a range of propositions. I think that Kraft’s comments, however, are informative in
the sense that he emphasises that sceptical hypotheses need not be possibilities of error.
The idea, here, is that a possibility of error is one in which a proposition that is claimed
to be known is false; in other words, a possibility that is incompatible with a putatively
known proposition p. In this way, I take it that Kraft agrees with my argument for the
inadequacy of those accounts of sceptical arguments in terms of epistemic principles
which do not apply to examples where the sceptical hypothesis and targeted proposition
p are compatible. Accounts in terms of Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibility
are all found wanting on this view.
Kraft, however, thinks that an adequate account of the epistemic principle underwrit-
ing sceptical arguments can be given. His strategy for doing so is simply to adapt the
infallibility principle to accommodate those sceptical arguments to which Infallibility
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failed to apply. Kraft’s approach is to substitute Infallibility with what he terms “the
principle of excluded ignorance-possibilities. According to this principle, S knows that P
only if S can rule out all possibilities in which S does not know that P” (Kraft, 2013, 67).
In support of this principle, Kraft points out that the same considerations that appear
to motivate Infallibility also motivate the principle of excluded ignorance-possibilities.
Kraft notes that the Infallibility principle, or what he calls the “the principle of ex-
cluded error-possibilities [which says]... one knows that P only if one can eliminate all
possibilities in which P is false” (Kraft, 2013, nt. 14) is well motivated. He explains that:
Lewis defends the principle of excluded error-possibilities by pointing out
that a concessive knowledge attribution like “S knows that P, but she has not
ruled out the possibility that P is false” “just sounds contradictory”. (Kraft,
2013, 68)
And the same considerations also motivate ‘the principle of excluded ignorance-possibilities’,
or what I term Infallibility+:
Infallibility+.
For all S, p, S knows that p only if S eliminates every possibility in which S does
not know that p.
For example, each of the following claims sound no less strange and contradictory; ‘S
knows that they have hands, but does not know that they are not currently dreaming’,
‘S knows that the Bank is open, but does not know that the Bank has not changed its
opening hours since they last checked’. So, the considerations that motivated Infallibility
also seem to motivate Infallibility+. In fact, as Kraft notes, the latter principle implies
the former:
On my account, ignorance is lack of knowledge, i.e. S is ignorant that P if
it is not the case that S knows that P. A useful side-effect of this stipulation is
that on my account all error possibilities are ipso facto ignorance-possibilities
(but not vice versa). (Kraft, 2013, nt. 13)
The point here is significant. This is because it seems that Infallibility+ does not face
the problems which I argued beset Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibility. This
was the problem of failing to account for sceptical arguments from ignorance generally, in
the sense that they failed to apply to examples, such as DREAMING, in which the sceptical
68
3.4. PRINCIPLE OF IGNORANCE POSSIBILITIES.
hypothesis does not entail the falsity of the targeted proposition. In the remainder of the
this section, I will set out how Infallibility+ applies generally to the various examples
of sceptical argument we are considering. In the next section, I move on to suggest a
potential reason to be dissatisfied with Infallibility+, and draw on this point to propose
my own alterantive account of the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments
from ignorance.
How does Infallibility+ apply to the examples of sceptical arguments that we have
been considering? The principle says that whenever someone knows some proposition
then they have eliminated every possibility in which they do not know this proposition. To
illustrate, Infallibility+ holds that if I know that I have hands, for example, then I have
eliminated every possibility in which I do not know that I have hands. Let’s follow the
same basis procedure as we did with Closure, Underdetermination, and INFALLIBILITY.
I will, again, apply Infallibility+ to the examples of ENVATTED BRAIN, DREAMING, and
ZOO.
Starting with ENVATTED BRAIN. Its first premise is motivated by the following
instance of Infallibility+ and a relatively uncontroversial sceptical assumption:
(I+1) S knows that they are not a brain in a vat only if S eliminates every
possibility in which S does not know that they are not a brain in a vat.
(I+2) No one can eliminate the possibility that they are a brain in a vat.
The possibility in which S is a brain in a vat is one in which S does not know that they
are not a brain in a vat—because that very proposition is false. So, from (I+1) and (I+2),
it follows that S does not know that they are not a brain in a vat. Hence the plausibility
of ENVATTED BRAIN’s first premise. Similar considerations apply to ZOO’s first premise.
The possibility in which the animal in front of S at the zoo is trivially one in which it
is false that the animal in the pen is not a cleverly disguised mule. Consequently, this
possibility is trivially one in which S does not know that the animal in the pen is not a
cleverly disguised mule. So, in order to know that the animal in the pen is not a disguised
mule, S must eliminate the possibility that the animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised
mule. The plausibility of ZOO’s first premise—that S does not know that the animal in
the pen is not a cleverly disguised mule can be accounted for, then, by Infallibility+ and
a sceptical assumption corresponding to (I+2)—that most people in S’s position at the
zoo would not eliminate this possibility.
The second premise of ENVATTED BRAIN can also be seen to be motivated by the
Infallibility+ principle. To see how, we need to first note that S will not know that S has
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hands whenever S is a brain in a vat.6 And so, the antecedent of ENVATTED BRAIN’s
second premise will be true just in case S has eliminated that S is a brain in a vat.
In which case, presumably, S would also be in a position to eliminate any possibility
in which they do not know that they are not a brain in a vat on the basis of having
eliminated know that they are not a brain in a vat—after all, they have eliminated any
possibility in which they are one. And this could, then, help to account for the plausibility
of ENVATTED BRAIN’s second premise. Similar considerations apply to ZOO’s second
premise. Any possibility in which the animal that S thinks is a zebra is, in fact, a cleverly
disguised mule is one in which S does not know that the animal is a zebra. So, according
to Infallibility+, the antecedent of ZOO’s second premise will be true just in case S has
eliminated the proposition that the animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule. In
which case S will be in a position to know that the animal in the pen is not a cleverly
disguised mule. They will have eliminated every possibility in which it is false, and
thereby be able to eliminate any possibility in which they do not know that the animal
in the pen is not a cleverly disguised mule.
So far, then, it seems that Infallibility+ fares no worse than either Closure, Under-
determination, or Infallibility in terms of providing some account of the premises of
sceptical arguments from ignorance such as ENVATTED BRAIN and ZOO. I suggested
above that it is an advantage of Infallibility+ over those alternative principles that it also
provides a more general account of sceptical arguments in virtue of applying to examples
that involve sceptical hypotheses that do not entail the falsity of the targeted proposition
p. This can now been seen by applying this principle to the example of DREAMING.
With respect to DREAMING’s first premise, Infallibility+ states that S knows that S is
not dreaming only if they have eliminated the corresponding ignorance possibility that
they do not know that are not dreaming. The premise that S does not know that they
are not dreaming can be motivated, then, given only the further sceptical assumption
that no one is in a position to eliminate the possibility that they are dreaming. This is
because any possibility in which S is dreaming is also one in which S does not know
that they are not dreaming. If S has not eliminated that they are dreaming, then they
have not eliminated the possibility that they do not know that they are not dreaming,
and so, consequently, by Infallibility+, S will not know that they are not dreaming. And
similar considerations to those discussed seem to help account for the second premise
of DREAMING. We begin by noting that any possibility in which the S is dreaming is
one in which S does not know that they have hands. So, according to Infallibility+, the
6 On my view, this is because nothing is known by any S who is a brain a vat. Cf. chapter 2.
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antecedent of DREAMING’s second premise will be true just in case S has eliminated
the possibility that they are dreaming. In which case, S will be in a position to know
that they are not dreaming for similar reasons to those I noted above. They will be in
a position to eliminate every possibility in which they do not know that they are not
dreaming on the basis of having eliminated any possibility that they are dreaming.
It seems, then, that Infallibility+ can provide an account of sceptical argument in a
way that the other candidate principles could not. It does so in a way that applies regard-
less of whether sh entails that a targeted proposition p is false or not. I think, however,
that there is a distinct issue facing an attempt to account for sceptical arguments from
ignorance in terms of Infallibility+, which I discuss in the next section.
3.5 Principle of Epistemic Possibility.
In this section, I suggest some issues surrounding an Infallibility+ based account of
the epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance, and use this
critique to motivate my own proposal in terms of a novel analysis of epistemic possibility.
First, I outline what I take to be an issue surrounding the explanatory adequacy of this
account by drawing on a critical point from DeRose that was already noted in chapter
2. Next, I use this issue as a springboard to propose an alternative epistemic principle
based on an analysis of epistemic possibility. I argue that my proposal represents a more
attractive account than its competitors of the principle underwriting sceptical arguments
from ignorance, by showing how it both applies generally to the examples we have been
considering, and addresses the explanatory issue facing Infallibility+.
Consider again, as we did in section 2.2, the following critical insight from DeRose:
[A] treatment of AI must tell us what it is about skeptical hypotheses that
makes it difficult to claim to know that they don’t obtain. The key feature of
skeptical hypotheses... is clearly this: we can’t rule them out... It is indeed
plausible to suppose that we can’t rule out skeptical hypotheses. And it’s
plausible that we don’t know that they don’t obtain. But it doesn’t seem
to advance our understanding much to explain the plausibility of either by
that of the other... we need an explanation that reaches outside this circle of
all-too-closely related terms of epistemic appraisal. (DeRose, 1995, 16-7)
DeRose’s point here is, I think, significant. All things being equal, it would be preferable
to find a way of explicating the notion of eliminating a possibility which is informative in
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the sense that DeRose describes. That is, it would be more informative to explain what
we mean when we say that S has not eliminated a possibility which goes beyond simply
saying that S does not know that possibility to be false. Consider the following comment:
One natural way of understanding what is involved in ‘ruling out’ an
error-possibility is that of the agent knowing that error-possibility to be false.
Indeed, we often treat these two notions as equivalent. (Pritchard, 2005, 25)
Whilst Pritchard’s comment, here, explicitly mentions error-possibilities, I think we
can develop the point to apply to ignorance-possibilities. That is, a natural way of
understanding what is involved in S eliminating or ‘ruling out’ an ignorance-possibility,
is that of S knowing that ignorance-possibility to be false. DeRose’s point in the preceding
quoted passage is, I take it, that treating these notions as equivalent is uninformative as
far as explaining the principled plausibility of the sceptical arguments’ first premises.
And, all things being equal, we should prefer that our explanation is more informative
than that. I think that we can give an explanation that is more informative in this sense,
and that it can be found in an analysis of the notion of epistemic possibility. Before
setting out my proposal, it remains to briefly run through the reasons why I think that
considerations of the DeRose and Pritchard points present an issue with the Infallibility+
account of sceptical arguments.
Suppose, given our interest in understanding the premises of sceptical arguments
we ask, for example, ‘Why is it that I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat?’ If
the answer were that ‘because you cannot eliminate the possibility that you are a brain
in a vat’, I think we would have reason to be dissatisfied by this explanation. And this
is because we could, then, naturally inquire further and ask ‘but why am I not able to
eliminate that possibility?’. The point to be drawn from the comments of DeRose and
Pritchard, here, is that knowing something is normally understood as equivalent to
eliminating that it is false. As such, the standard answer to this second question might
well be ‘because you do not know that it does not obtain’. And that, it seems, does not help
us understand very much at all. Moreover, I think that similar considerations will lead
to our dissatisfaction with an account of sceptical arguments in terms of Infallibility+.
To illustrate this, let us imagine what sort of answers to the proceeding line of inquiry
that we could expect from an Infallibilty+ account. Consider, then, the following:
Q1. Why don’t I know that I am not a brain in a vat?
A1. Because you haven’t eliminated that you don’t know that you are a brain in vat.
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Q2. Why haven’t I eliminated that I don’t know that I am not a brain in a vat?
A2. Because you don’t know that you haven’t eliminated that you don’t know that you
are one.
On the standard understanding of what is involved in ‘eliminating’ a possibility, noted
above, I take it that the answer A2 is a legitimate response to Q2. But it is not, to my
mind, a particularly explanatory, and subsequently, satisfactory answer to the question.
And the situation becomes worse, in this respect, if we seek to understand and naturally
inquire further. To illustrate, consider the following development of the preceding line of
questioning:
Q3. Why don’t I know that I haven’t eliminated that I don’t know that I am one?
A3. Because you haven’t eliminated that you don’t know that you haven’t eliminated
that you don’t know that you are a brain in vat.
Here, again, the answer A3 would seem to be a legitimate response to Q3, licenced
by an analysis that treats ‘eliminating’ a possibility as equivalent to knowing it to be
false. The Infallibilty+ account explains our lack of knowledge in terms of our failing
to eliminate the corresponding ignorance possibilities. But if eliminating is treated as
equivalent to knowing to be false, it seems that our natural line of inquiry will only take
us further from any satisfactory answer or understanding. If A3 was not already obscure
enough, it does not take long before our natural questions lead to bizarre and confusing
iterations:
Q4. Why haven’t I eliminated that I don’t know that I haven’t eliminated that I don’t
know that I am not a brain in vat?
A4. Because you don’t know that you haven’t eliminated that you don’t know that you
haven’t eliminated... etc.
A vicious regress, of sorts, seems threatens so long as the questions remain, and
the answers are given in terms of Infallibility+ and the standard analysis of eliminat-
ing a possibility. At very least, I do not think that any particularly satisfying level of
understanding of sceptical premises will be forthcoming. I do not intend to argue that
these considerations represent an insurmountable objection to an Infallibility+ account.
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Rather, I think an alternative account can be had that addresses these concerns, and
which applies no less generally to sceptical arguments from ignorance.
Drawing on the preceding discussion, I now set out my preferred account of the
principle underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance. I propose the following as a
plausible constraint on knowledge:
Epistemic Possibility.
For all S, p, S knows that p only if it is not epistemically possible for S that ¬p.
The principle says that whenever someone knows some proposition then the falsity
of that proposition is not epistemically possible for that person. To illustrate, Epistemic
Possibility holds that if I know that I have hands, for example, then it is not the case that
it is epistemically possible for me that I do not have hands. Below, I will run through how
Epistemic Possibility applies to the examples of ENVATTED BRAIN, DREAMING, and ZOO.
Before doing this, however, it is important to comment on what analysis of epistemic
possibility I am adopting here. As I will explain shortly, this has a significant bearing
on how I think we can address the sort of explanatory concern I have attributed to
DeRose above. There does not appear to be an universally accepted analysis of epistemic
possibility, but, for my purposes here, I adopt the following analysis:7
A proposition p is epistemically possible for a subject S iff p is consistent with S
knowing what they do.
In this way, the Epistemic Possibility principle can be understood as saying that
whenever someone knows a proposition, then that proposition cannot be false given
the facts about what that person knows.8 With this analysis in place, let’s look at
how Epistemic Possibility applies to our various examples of sceptical arguments. The
first premise of ENVATTED BRAIN could be motivated by the following instance of this
principle, and a corresponding sceptical assumption:
(EP1) S knows that they are not a brain in a vat only if it is not epistemically
possible for S that they are a brain in a vat.
7 For various interesting discussions of epistemic possibility, see (Anderson, 2014), (Dougherty and
Rysiew, 2009), (Huemer, 2007), (Przyjemski, 2017), (Reed, 2013), and (Wright, 2007).
8 I do attempt to provide an in-depth defence of this analysis here. For my present purposes, I think it
is enough to note that this is not obviously wrong. I focus, instead, on how I think this analysis can help us
to better understanding how sceptical arguments from ignorance work.
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(EP2) For anyone, it is epistemically possible that they are a brain in a vat.
The plausibility of ENVATTED BRAIN’s first premise—that S does not know that they
are not a brain in a vat—is motivated straight-forwardly on this account, given only
(EP1) and the sceptical assumption (EP2). Moreover, this assumption itself is, I think,
representative of the natural things we might say about our epistemic position with
respect to various sceptical hypotheses: that, for all we know, they do obtain.9 Likewise
for the first premises of both ZOO and DREAMING. In either case, I take it that a natural
way of explaining why I might not know the relevant sceptical hypothesis to be false
will involve pointing out that for all I know, these hypotheses are true, or, that they
are epistemically possible for me. On my analysis of epistemic possibility, this amounts
to saying that it is consistent with me knowing everything I do that I am currently
dreaming, for example, or that the animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule.
The second premises of each sceptical argument we have been considering can also
be seen to be motivated by considerations involved in the Epistemic Possibility principle.
The reasons for this are related, as I shall explain, to the considerations of sceptical
hypotheses set out in chapter 2. On my view, every effective sceptical hypothesis describes
a possibility in which the falsity of some targeted empirical proposition p is consistent
with S knowing what they do in that scenario. This is trivially true in the case of the
dreaming and brain in a vat hypotheses; if either were true of S, then S would not
know any empirical proposition at all. Consequently, the brain in a vat and dreaming
hypotheses describe scenarios in which it is consistent with S knowing what they do, that
¬p, for any empirical proposition p—viz. every empirical proposition p is epistemically
possible for S.
How do these points relate to how the second premises of sceptical arguments are
underwritten by Epistemic Possibility? My central idea here is, put coarsely, that the
Epistemic Possibility principle, on my analysis, can be brought together with the insight
that sceptical hypotheses are possibilities of epistemic possibility. And I think that
doing so can help to develop a more explanatory account of how the major premises of
sceptical arguments are underwritten. In order to explicate this, I think it is instructive
to consider the point that “anything compatible with something that is compatible with
p is compatible with something that leaves the possibility of p open” (Brandom, 2008,
129). This point bears importantly on the analysis of epistemic possibility that I am
adopting, and brings into view an idea about how our epistemic positions with respect to
various propositions and corresponding sceptical hypotheses are related. The idea, here,
9 Cf. (DeRose, 1995, 2).
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is that the following seems prima facie plausible: if ¬p is inconsistent with S knowing
what they do, and q entails that ¬p is consistent with S knowing what they do, then Q
is inconsistent with S knowing what they do. Translating this into terms of epistemic
possibility, we get the following:
If it is not epistemically possible for S that ¬p, and q entails that it is epistemically
possible for S that ¬p, then it is not epistemically possible for S that q.
What bearing does this have on explaining how the major premises of sceptical
arguments are underwritten? The brain in a vat hypothesis entails that it is epistemically
possible for me that I do not have hands. As such, if it is not epistemically possible for
me that I do not have hands, then it is not epistemically possible for me that the brain in
a vat hypothesis is true. Now, Epistemic possibility says that I know that I have hands
only if it is not epistemically possible for me that I do not have hands. So, if I know I
have hands, then it is not epistemically possible for me that the brain in a vat hypothesis
is true. Given only the further assumption that we will be prepared to say I know a
proposition if I believe it, and it is not epistemically possible for me that it is false, I
take it that Epistemic Possibility tells us that if I know I have hands, then I am in a
position to know that I am not a brain in a vat. The same sort of explanation applies to
the second premise of DREAMING; the dreaming hypothesis entails that every empirical
proposition is epistemically possible for S, and so, given the same considerations just
outlined, it seems that S is in a position to know that the dreaming hypothesis is false if
they know any given empirical proposition.
What about the second premise of ZOO? We can recognise that hypothesis that the
animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule entails that it is epistemically possible
for S that the animal in the pen is not a zebra. We can also recognise that if it is not
epistemically possible for S that the animal in the pen is not a zebra, then it is also not
epistemically possible for S that the animal in the pen is a cleverly disguised mule. Again,
Epistemic Possibility holds that S knows that the animal in the pen is a zebra only if it is
not epistemically possible for S that the animal in the pen is not a zebra. So, if S knows
that the animal is a zebra, then it is not epistemically possible for S that the cleverly
disguised mule hypothesis is true. On the assumption that we will be prepared to say
someone knows a proposition if they believe it, and it is not epistemically possible for
them that it is false, I take it that this helps to explain our inclination to judge that if S
knows that the animal in the pen is a zebra, then S also knows that the animal is not a
cleverly disguised mule.
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It remains to set out how I think my proposed principle Epistemic Possibility ad-
dresses the explanatory concerns I raised above for the Infallibility+ account. On my
view, there is no obvious sense in which my account of how sceptical premises are under-
written is beset by the sort of explanatory circularity or regress highlighted above. To
the contrary, I think that my proposed principle and my analysis of epistemic possibility
together can help to provide us with a deeper understanding of sceptical arguments. To
illustrate this, consider, then, the following:
Q5. Why don’t I know that I am not a brain in a vat?
A5. Because it is epistemically possible for you that you are a brain in vat.
Q6. Why is it epistemically possible for met that I am a brain in a vat?
A6. Because it is consistent with you knowing what you do, that you are a brain in a
vat.
On my view, A5 and A6 are legitimate answers to questions Q5 and Q6, but are
they satisfactorily explanatory? There are a couple of things to say here. First, I am
not convinced that there any further obvious questions to ask in response to A6. The
answer does not seem to require further explanation, at least not in terms of the notions
involved. We can naturally understand what A6 says at face value. It says, ultimately,
that there is no empirical proposition that I know, which I would not if I was a brain in a
vat. And that is tantamount to saying that I do not know any empirical proposition at
all.10 Now, this explanation of sceptical premises might seem to beg the question, and
perhaps, consequently, it might prompt us to ask for further explanation. I address this
shortly in my second point, but before I do I want to note that there is an important
sense in which my analysis of epistemic possibility allows us to ‘break out of the circle of
all too closely related terms’. It does so in virtue of understanding epistemic possibility
as a function of our knowing what we do; we can assess claims of epistemic possibility
easily, provided we can identify what we do and don’t know, and recognise what can and
cannot, subsequently, be the case. This leads on to my second point. A6 might appear to
be unsatisfactorily explanatory in the context of understanding sceptical arguments; it
may strike us as question begging. We might still want to inquire further in response to
A6, and the following is what I take to be a natural example of how we might do this:
10 See section 6.8. Compare this Williamson’s reconstruction of the sceptic’s reasoning, and his response
to it, in chapter 8 of (Williamson, 2000). In particular, his observation that the claim of ID discriminability
“is tantamount to the sceptic’s conclusion. The sceptic cannot use it as a premise without begging the
question” (Williamson, 2000, 168).
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Q7. Why is that though; why don’t I know, for example, that I have hands?
A7. Because it is consistent with you knowing what you do that you don’t have hands.
Again, on my view, A7 is a legitimate response to Q7, but is it satisfactorily explana-
tory in terms of how sceptical premises are underwritten? For my part, I think both that
it is, and that it can help to illuminate the perplexing nature of sceptical arguments.
To see this, it is worth noting that in responding to A6, we could naturally substitute
any empirical proposition q for the proposition that I have hands to the same effect.
Importantly, on my view, an answer corresponding to A7 involving q will be a legitimate
response on behalf of the sceptic. In the final analysis, the sceptic seems to rely on the
claim that for any empirical proposition q epistemically possible for you that q is false,
or in other words, that we know no empirical propositions at all. Is this satisfactorily
explanatory? I conclude this section by noting that, for my purposes, my account of the
epistemic principle underwriting sceptical arguments is not obviously less explanatory
than Infallibility+ in this respect. Indeed, I aim to show in chapter 6 that it can contribute
to an understanding of how to satisfactorily resolve sceptical paradoxes.
3.6 Concluding remarks.
In this chapter, I outlined and briefly commented on various examples of sceptical argu-
ments that feature prominently in the literature. I began, in section 3.2, by suggesting
that a general account of sceptical arguments is desirable, and setting out what such
an should apply to ENVATTED BRAIN, DREAMING, and ZOO. In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I
critically examined Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibility, and considered how
the alternative Infallibility+ performed better with respect to my desiderata. Finally, in
section 3.5, I argued that Infallibility+ faced a potential issue in terms of its explanatory
adequacy. I introduced my own principle Epistemic Possibility, and argued that it was
represented the best candidate of those considered for a general account of the principle
underwriting sceptical arguments from ignorance.
Looking ahead, my over-arching aim in this thesis, as set out in chapter 1, is to
provide a framework for thinking about how to provide a happy-face solution to sceptical
paradoxes can be found. In chapter 1, I suggested the way forward lay in pursuing two
distinct, but related enterprises. The first was that of providing a diagnosis of sceptical
arguments that explains how they work in terms of both sceptical hypotheses they in-
volve, and the epistemic principles underwriting them. The second was that of providing
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an error theory that explains our confusion with respect to sceptical arguments in terms
that are not purely epistemological. I have undertaken the first of these enterprises
between both chapter 2 and the present one. The result of chapter 2 was essentially that
sceptical hypotheses can be best understood as possibilities in which it is consistent with
subject believing some relevant proposition, that this proposition is false. The result of
this chapter is essentially that sceptical arguments are best understood as underwritten
by the principle that a subject knows a proposition only if its falsity is not consistent
with them knowing what they do.
In the remainder of this thesis, I undertake the second enterprise. In chapter 6, I
aim to show, ultimately, how the results of chapters 2 and 3 can be brought together
with recently developed theories from cognitive psychology to suggest an error theory
for sceptical paradoxes, and subsequently, a happy-face resolution of them in terms
of psychological considerations. Before then, my first step will be to examine in detail
recent approaches to providing happy-face resolutions to the sceptical paradoxes in
terms of a diagnosis of, and error-theory for, sceptical paradoxes in terms of semantic
considerations.
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CONTEXTUALISM AND SCEPTICISM.
4.1 Introduction.
In chapter 1, I set out the problem of sceptical paradoxes, and the constraints on any
fully satisfactory, or ‘happy-face’ resolution of them. I also argued that Pryor’s strategy,
understood as a theoretical diagnosis, for responding to the sceptical problem was not
a promising route to a happy-face resolution. Having developed my own diagnoses of
sceptical arguments, in chapters 2 and 3, I here return to consider the details of another
recent prominent approach to resolving sceptical paradoxes. Various forms of epistemic
contextualism have been developed as accounts of the term ‘knows’ based on the notion
of semantic context-dependence. A significant feature of epistemic contextualism is the
apparent solution to the problem of scepticism that it provides.
In this chapter, I outline, compare, and contrast the suggested resolutions of three
different proposed accounts of epistemic context-dependence. I begin, in section 4.2,
by outlining the general nature of epistemic contextualism, and relating it to both the
problem of sceptical paradoxes, and the conditions that should be met by a happy-face
resolution of them. Next, in section 4.3, I run through the general contextualist strategy
for resolving the paradox, and how this aims to meet the conditions on a satisfactory
resolution. Finally, in section 4.4, I compare and assess the details of three distinct
proposals for contextualist resolution of sceptical paradoxes. With respect to each version
of epistemic contextualism, I examine the details of the proposed resolution in terms of
the context-sensitivity of “knows”, and critically assess its prospects for representing a
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happy-face solution to sceptical paradoxes.
4.2 Epistemic Contextualism and Scepticism.
There are a variety of differing accounts of how knowledge claims exhibit semantic
context-dependence, many of which will be outlined below.1 Underlying each is the
core commitment to the view that the truth conditions of knowledge claims vary with
conversational context.2 In general it is maintained that ‘knows’ picks out a contextually
supplied standard for counting as knowing.3 The contextualist typically holds that
distinct token utterances of a knowledge sentence in distinct contexts may have distinct
truth conditions as a consequence of ‘knows’ picking out distinct epistemic standards.
These epistemic standards can vary across conversational context. This allows for the
divergent truth values of distinct utterances of the same sentence attributing or denying
knowledge in distinct contexts, even when made concurrently.4 For example, an utterance
of “I know that Harold Godwinson was killed by an arrow” may express a truth when
made in the context of a pub quiz team deliberation, owing to my meeting the low
standards for knowledge that might be operating in that context. An utterance of the
same sentence might express a falsehood, however, in the context of a scholarly conference
on High Medieval European history.5
Furthermore, the contextualist allows for an utterance of a knowledge sentence, and
an utterance of its negation, to have the same truth value in distinct contexts, even when
made concurrently.6 My utterance of “I know that Harold Godwinson was killed by an
arrow” may express a truth in the low-standards context of a pub quiz, even while my
admission that “I do not know that Harold Godwinson was killed by an arrow” might
express a truth in the distinct context of the academic conference. In this way, prior to any
detailed account of how knowledge claims are context-dependent, the core commitment
of contextualism can be understood as comprising both a negative and positive thesis.
1 See (Blome-Tillmann, 2009), (Cohen, 1999), (DeRose, 1992), (Lewis, 1996), and (Neta, 2003a).
2 See (Davis, 2007) and (Montminy, 2013).
3 Cf. (Williamson, 2005, 216).
4 See (Blome-Tillmann, 2008, 31-2), (Feldman, 2001, 61), (Greco, 2008, 417), (Montminy, 2009b, 342),
and (Brady and Pritchard, 2005, 161).
5 There is an important sense in which they would not be exactly the same attribution or denial
on the contextualist view, since ‘knows’ picks out distinct epistemic standards in the different contexts.
Consequently, on that view, each utterance will express a different content.
6 See (Baumann, 2010, 83), (Blome-Tillmann, 2008, 32), and (Rysiew, 2001, 478). On the contextualist
view, these utterances do not express contrary content because of the context-dependency of ‘knows’.
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The negative thesis of epistemic contextualism is that sentences attributing or deny-
ing knowledge have no context-independent truth conditions, and so have no context-
independent truth values.7 The positive thesis of epistemic contextualism is that sen-
tences attributing or denying knowledge can have different truth-conditions and truth
values, in distinct contexts of utterance. Both of these very closely related commitments
are implied by the context-dependence of the term ‘knows’, and are indispensable to
the proposed contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradoxes. Before detailing the
contextualist approach to resolving the sceptical paradoxes, and the subtle roles that
these commitments play in them, it will be instructive to briefly recap on the nature of
the sceptical paradoxes themselves, and the adequacy constraints on their resolution.
Consider, then, the following three independently and, apparently, individually plau-
sible, yet jointly inconsistent knowledge claims:8
(10) S knows that S has hands.
(11) S does not know that S is not a brain in a vat.
(12) If S knows that S has hands, then S knows that S is not a brain in a vat.
Here we have a set of claims representative of a sceptical paradox, and it will be
instructive to comment on how this presentation relates to the ENVATTED BRAIN argu-
ment from chapter 1. In essence, (11) is just another statement of the minor premise,
(7), of the ENVATTED BRAIN argument; likewise, (12) is simply another statement of
ENVATTED BRAIN’s major premise, (8). Crucially, (10) represents the negation of the scep-
tical argument ENVATTED BRAIN’s conclusion, (9). Sceptical paradoxes are represented
here, by means of (10)-(12), for the sake of ease in discussing the whether epistemic
contextualist approaches represent happy-face solutions to sceptical paradoxes. This is
because there are two central features of a sceptical paradox: the apparent truth and
mutual inconsistency of claims such as (10)-(12). As we saw in chapter 1, in order to
satisfactorily resolve the paradox, a contextualist must do two things: (a) account for
the falsity of at least one of the three claims such as (10)-(12), and (b) account for the
apparent truth of the three claims (10)-(12).9 Moreover, since identifying any one of (10),
7 Cf. (Schiffer, 1996, 318). On Schiffer’s way of putting things, since ‘knows’ picks out a contextual
factor, such a sentence fails to express a complete proposition independently of a context.
8 See (Cohen, 1999, 62) and (Davis, 2004, 257-8). Cf. (DeRose, 1995) and (Neta, 2003a, 4), where the
sceptical paradoxes are characterised in terms of our inconsistent ‘intuitions’ regarding the premises and
conclusion of a sceptical argument.
9 See (DeRose, 1995, 5) and (Schiffer, 1996) for discussions of this point.
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(11), or (12) as false may seem to engender some distinct unpalatable issues, it is a third
condition on a satisfactory resolution that it (c) accounts for either how any unpalatable
consequence of denying meeting (a) is avoided, or else why it is not, in fact, problematic.
In the rest of this chapter, I explore the manner in which the contextualist attempts
to meet these conditions, in terms of a critical evaluation of the details of a variety of
specific contextualist proposals for satisfying (a), (b), and (c).10.
4.3 General Framework of a Contextualist
Resolution.
We can set out the general contextualist framework for meeting the first two conditions on
satisfactorily resolving the sceptical paradoxes. The second condition (b) can be satisfied
by a contextualist resolution in virtue of the positive contextualist thesis. By allowing for
knowledge sentences to have different truth-conditions, and consequently truth values,
in distinct contexts of utterance, the contextualist can accommodate the truth of each
individual claim (10)-(12). This is because, the contextualist maintains, the term ‘knows’
picks out a contextually determined strength of epistemic position that the subject of an
attribution of knowledge must stand in with respect to a proposition p in order for an
utterance of the form “S knows that p” to express a truth in that context.11
4.3.1 Accounting for the Independent Plausibility of the
Individual Claims.
The contextualist can maintain that an utterance of the attribution (10) may express
a truth in many ordinary contexts, where S is well enough placed with respect to the
proposition that S has hands in order to meet the strength of epistemic position required
by the context to truly count as knowing. This contextualist move is often explained
by analogy to certain gradable adjectives, such as ‘tall’, or ‘old’.12 For example, in some
10 Whether the general contextualist resolution can coherently satisfy these conditions at all will be
addressed in chapter 5
11 See, for example, (Blome-Tillmann, 2008, 31) and (DeRose, 1995, 29).
12 See (Blaauw, 2005), (Brown, 2013, 5), (Cohen, 2000, 97), and (Feldman, 1999, 92-3). In chapter 5, I
critically examine attempts to model the context sensitivity of the term ‘knows’ on gradable adjectives,
or recognised indexicals. The discussion there focuses specifically on evaluating the semantic blindness
objection to epistemic contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes vis-a-vis happy-face solutions. My
focus in this chapter is assessing, in broader terms, the prospects for providing a happy-face contextualist
resolution.
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everyday contexts of utterance such as a discussion about the ages of professional
footballers, it may seem uncontroversial and correct to say “David is old” of the 37
year old. The player is advanced enough in age in order to meet the low standards of
age required to truly count as old in that context. In a similar way, the contextualist’s
positive thesis maintains that there is some ordinary context in which an utterance of
(10) will express a truth in virtue of S meeting the undemanding standards for counting
as knowing determined by that context.
The contextualist can maintain that an utterance of the knowledge denying sentence
(11) may express a truth in other distinct contexts, where S is not well enough placed with
respect to the proposition that S is not a brain in a vat in order to meet the strength of
epistemic position required, in that context, to truly count as knowing. This contextualist
move can too be explicated analogously in terms of certain gradable adjectives. For
example, in some particular contexts of utterance, such as a discussion of the average
British retirement age it may seem uncontroversial and correct to say “Ryan is not old”
of the 39 year old.13 The subject is not advanced enough in age in order to meet the
standards for truly counting as old in that context. In a similar way, contextualism’s
positive thesis maintains that there is some context in which an utterance of (11) will
express a truth in virtue of S not meeting the standards for knowledge determined by
that context.
The contextualist can maintain that an utterance of the conditional sentence (12)
will express a truth in any context of utterance. Since S has hands entails that S is
not a brain in a vat, whatever the strength of S’s epistemic position with respect to the
former proposition, it will be no stronger than the strength of S’s epistemic position with
respect to the latter proposition.14 So, for whatever the contextually supplied strength
of epistemic position picked out by ‘knows’, when S meets this standard for counting
as knowing with respect to the proposition that S has hands, they will also meet this
standard with respect to the proposition that S is not a brain in a vat.
Once again, this contextualist move can also be illustrated by analogy to gradable
adjectives. For example, since the 39 year old Ryan is two years more advanced in age
than 37 year old David, it will be uncontroversial and correct to say “If David is old,
then Ryan is old” in any context of utterance. Whatever minimum age the standard for
13 In this way, ‘David is old’ represents an analogue of (10), and ‘Ryan is not old’ represents an analogue
of (11). (10) is a positive categorical claim with respect to a subject s and the proposition that S has hands.
(11) is a negative categorical claim with respect to S and a distinct proposition. Analogously, ‘David is
old’ is a positive categorical claim, and ‘Ryan is not old’ is a negative categorical claim involving distinct
individuals.
14 See (DeRose, 1995, 30-7).
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counting as old is in the context, it cannot be the case that the younger subject meets this
standard and the older subject does not.15 In a similar way, the contextualist maintains
that in virtue of the proposition that S has hands entailing that S is not a brain in a vat,
when S meets the standards for counting as knowing the stronger proposition they will
necessarily meet those standards with respect to the weaker, regardless of how ‘stringent’
or ‘lax’ the standards for knowledge are within any given context.
4.3.2 Accounting for the Falsity of at least one Claim.
The contextualist’s positive thesis accounts for the independent plausibility and appar-
ent truth of each of the knowledge claims represented by (10)-(12) when considered
individually. Since these three claims are jointly inconsistent, however, the contextualist
resolution must also account for the falsity of one of (10)-(12). Let’s look now, then, at how
the second condition (b) might be met by contextualism in terms of its negative thesis.
The negative thesis of contextualism is that knowledge claims have no truth-conditions
and, subsequently, no truth-values independently of a context of utterance. The contex-
tualist can maintain then that which of the three knowledge claims constitutive of the
sceptical paradox is false cannot be decided independently of a specific context. As I
have noted, the contextualist maintains that (12) will express a truth in every context of
utterance, whilst (10) may express a truth in some contexts, and so too may (11) true in
some contexts. Since (12) always expresses a truth, it follows that (10) and (11) cannot
both express truths in a single context. Consequently, when (10) is true (11) will be false,
and vice versa.
Let C-LOW be a context with epistemic standards ‘lax’ enough that an utterance of
“I know that I have hands” will express a truth in C-LOW. The contextualist maintains
that some such context C-LOW exists, in which utterances of (10) and (12) would each
express truths in virtue of S meeting the ‘lax’ standards for knowledge in C-LOW with
respect to the proposition that S has hands. In this context, an utterance of (11) would
express a falsehood since it denies that S meets the ‘lax’ standards for knowing with
respect to the proposition that S is not a brain in a vat. This denial will be false since, as
(12) expresses, S is at least as well placed with respect to the former as they are to the
latter proposition.
15 DeRose has suggested that the truth of these conditionals is grounded in certain comparative facts:
e.g. the comparative fact that “Wilt is at least as tall as Mugsy has the result that the conditional If Wilt is
not tall, then Mugsy is not tall will be true regardless of how high or low the standards for tallness are set”
(DeRose, 1995, 33).
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Let C-HIGH be a context with stringent enough standards for truly counting as
knowing such that an utterance of “I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat” to
express a truth in C-HIGH. The contextualist maintains that some such context C-HIGH
exists, in which utterances of (11) and (12) would each express truths in virtue of S not
meeting the stringent standards for knowledge in C-HIGH with respect to the proposition
that S is not a brain in a vat. In this context, an utterance of (10) would express a
falsehood since it claims that S meets the stringent standards for knowing with respect
to the proposition that S has hands. This attribution is false since, again, S is no better
placed with respect to the latter, than they are to the former proposition.
In summary, with respect to the condition (a), the contextualist maintains that since
(12) expresses an unequivocal truth in every context of utterance, there is no single
context in which utterances of (10), (11) and (12) all express truths. Consequently, which
of (10) or (11) expresses a falsehood cannot be settled independently of a context of
utterance. In addressing condition (b), the contextualist maintains that due to ‘knows’
picking out a contextually varying standard for knowledge, utterances of (10) and (11)
may express truths in distinct contexts of utterance.
4.3.3 Accounting for the Unpalatable Consequences.
In this section, I outline how the general framework of the contextualist resolution of the
sceptical paradox addresses condition (c), i.e. accounting for either how the unpalatable
consequences of denying (10)-(12) are avoided, or why they are not problematic. Firstly,
the contextualist maintains that there is no context in which an utterance of (12)
expresses a falsehood. Consequently, the unpalatable consequence of allowing for a
subject to know that they have hands but not to know that they are not a handless brain
in a vat is avoided entirely.16
The contextualist maintains that in the context in which an utterance of (10) ex-
presses a falsehood, the unpalatable consequence of wholesale scepticism about knowl-
edge of the external world is avoided, or at least is unproblematic, because it merely
expresses that we fail to know these things only by very stringent standards for knowl-
edge. This does not contradict our claims to know these things by the ‘lax’ standards of
the ordinary contexts in which we may truthfully utter “I know I have hands”.17
16 For a discussion of this point, see (DeRose, 1995, pp. 27-33).
17 DeRose (1995, 32) explains: “on this account, the skeptic gets to truthfully state her conclusion only
by raising the standards for knowledge... [which] doesn’t threaten the truth of our ordinary claims to
know”. See also (Feldman, 2001, 61-2) and (Wright, 2005, 240-1).
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The contextualist maintains that in the context in which an utterance of (11) ex-
presses a falsehood, the unpalatable consequence of dogmatically claiming to know you
are not a brain in a vat is avoided because of the following considerations. The semantic
value of ‘knows’, and the truth-conditions of any knowledge claim, vary with a contex-
tually determined standard a subject must meet in order to truly count as knowing. If
this standard is set at a level, however low, in everyday contexts such that I meet it
with respect to the proposition p without being able to conclusively prove that p, then
it follows that an attribution in that context of the form “I know that p” will express a
truth.
There is an important sense in which, on the contextualist view, the charge of being
dogmatic in your claims to know that you are not a brain in a vat, only bites in a context
in which the standards for knowledge are stringent enough. The denial represented by
(11) will express a truth in exactly those contexts where the attribution represented by
(10) can only be falsely uttered. Since dogmatism is the consequence only of rejecting
(11) but problematic only when (11) is true, the contextualist accounts for how the
unpalatable consequence of the falsity of (11) is avoided.
For the most part, the general manner in which the contextualist proposes to resolve
the sceptical paradox in terms of the notion of semantic context-dependence has been ex-
plicated above. It remains here to examine exactly how the semantic context-dependence
of knowledge claims is accounted for. Numerous different versions of contextualism have
been proposed in the last two decades, each of which represents a different way to put
the flesh on the bones of the general contextualist resolution. In the next section, I
will outline and critically assess three of these contextualist positions in terms of the
conditions on a satisfactory resolution (a), (b) and (c).
4.4 Versions of Epistemic Contextualism and their
Resolutions.
In the account of the general contextualist strategy for resolving the sceptical paradox
detailed above, it has not been detailed how exactly it is claimed that knowledge sentences
exhibit their particular epistemic semantic context-dependence. A number of different
accounts of epistemic contextualism have been put forward and each proposes a unique
explanation of how the contextualist resolution should be best understood.
This section outlines and assesses three of the main accounts of epistemological
context-dependence: those of David Lewis, Keith DeRose, and Michael Blome-Tillmann.
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In considering each account, I outline initially how the context-dependence of knowledge
sentences is understood, and go on to show how this is supposed to provide a happy-face
resolution of sceptical paradoxes, in terms of the conditions (a), (b) and (c). I argue that,
whilst obvious progress is made in the intellectual development of the contextualist
approach to resolving scepticism, each account is, ultimately, found wanting.
4.4.1 Lewis’ Contextualism and its Resolution
In this section, I consider in detail the first of the three potentially happy-face resolution
purportedly provided by a contextualism about the term ‘knows’. This is the resolution
proffered by David Lewis in his paper ‘Elusive Knowledge’. In his paper, Lewis broadly
characterises the nature of the sceptical paradox as being that: plausibly; we know
various propositions about the external world, and knowledge is plausibly infallible, but
our knowledge of external world propositions cannot be infallible.18 I think that this
corresponds well enough with the characterisation of the sceptical paradox above, in
terms of (10)-(12). Below, I first set out the details of Lewis’ contextualist view and its
supposed resolution of the sceptical paradoxes. I turn, subsequently, to critically assess
whether Lewis’ contextualist approach to scepticism represents a happy-face solution to
sceptical paradoxes.
4.4.1.1 Lewis’ Account of the Context-Dependence of Knowledge Claims.
In Lewis’s account of the context-dependence of knowledge sentences, he begins with the
notion underlying our verdict that (12) is true. This he identifies as the infallibility of
knowledge. On this basis, he suggests a schema for knowledge sentences, such that:
(L1) “S knows that p” is true iff S’s evidence eliminates every possibility in which
not-p.19
In describing a subject’s evidence as eliminating a possibility, w, Lewis is claiming
that the subject’s total perceptual experience and memory in w is not the same as what
their total perceptual experience and memory is in actuality. According to Lewis, a
subject’s “perceptual experience E (or memory) eliminates a possibility w [just in case]...
w is a possibility in which the subject is not having experience E” (1996, 553). This can
18 See (Lewis, 1996, 550).
19 (Lewis, 1996, 551). I say suggested rather than proposes because Lewis famously did not phrase his
contextualism meta-linguistically.
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be understood as the claim that S’s evidence E eliminates a possibility w if and only if,
were w to actually obtain, then E would not.
In terms of the attribution (10) and (L1), then, Lewis can maintain that if an utterance
of this attribution is true of S, then S’s evidence eliminates any possibility in which it is
not the case that S has hands; for example, the possibility that S is a brain in a vat. If
valid, this schema would secure the notion of infallibility for knowledge, and hence yield
the intuitive truth of (12). However, the plausibility of the denial (11) appears to be a
counter-example to the schema.
Lewis addresses this issue by expanding on the occurrence of the quantifier ‘every’ in
the schema. The quantifier as it is used here should be subject to a domain restriction,
just as it is in its innumerable other usages.20 So, Lewis claims, this occurrence of ‘every’
should be taken to range over only the possibilities which are not irrelevant to the
attribution of knowledge.21 For Lewis, the notion of irrelevance is tied to the notion of
ignoring; in making claims about what people do and do not know, we ignore certain
possibilities that we take to be irrelevant to the truth of our claims. The amended schema
can now be stated:
(L2) “S knows that p” is true iff S’s evidence is incompatible with every not-p
possibility that is not ignored.
This amended schema provides a promising development for Lewis’ account in terms
of protecting the plausible truth of (10) in light of the plausible truth of (11). It could
be suggested that in attributing to S knowledge of their having hands we are simply
ignoring the possibility that they are a brain in a vat. Lewis points out, however, that
there are further restrictions that need to be made on what possibilities are capable of
being ignored or not. To illustrate the point, suppose I claim that I know where my car is,
on the evidential basis that I remember parking it at the marina yesterday. It might be
legitimate for me to ignore, in normal circumstances, the uneliminated possibility that it
has since been dragged to the bottom of the sea, but not if I have just heard authoritative
reports that a tsunami struck this morning.
20 If, for example, I claimed that “Everyone is having a good time” at an awesome party, the domain of
quantification might well be understood to be all and only those people who are at the party. Nonetheless, in
claiming at the same party “Everyone is drunk”, I may have covertly restricted the domain of quantification
to the attendees who are not teetotalers, etc.
21 (Lewis, 1996, 553).
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Accordingly, Lewis realises that his account should accommodate a distinction be-
tween when it is legitimate to ignore certain uneliminated possibilities and when it is
not.22 Consequently, we can restate the schema:
(L3) “S knows that p” is true iff S’s evidence is incompatible with every not-p
possibility that is not properly ignored.
With this schema in place for knowledge sentences, it is now possible to explicate
Lewis’ account of the semantic context-dependence of knowledge claims. The possibilities
that can be properly ignored, for the purposes of a given knowledge claim, will vary with
conversational context as a function of a set of rules governing what possibilities are
properly ignored or not. In other words, the semantic contribution of ‘knows’ is a relation
between a subject and a range of possibilities determined by a proposition, conversational
context, and a set of rules for proper ignoring.
To illustrate Lewis’ position: imagine that Brian has driven me to, and parked his
car at, the local marina. Brian goes to his office, and I go to the pub. Four hours later, I
have been reliably informed that a tsunami might have engulfed the local marina, but
Brian has not. Aside from this, our evidential positions regarding the location of his car
remain the same; we both remember that Brian parked his car at the marina. In the
pub, I judge that an utterance of “Brian knows that the car is parked in the harbour”
made by the pub landlord expresses a falsehood. Meanwhile, in his office, Brian judges
that an utterance of the same sentence made by his co-worker expresses a truth.
Lewis’ contextualism explains the divergence in our verdicts concerning the truth
values of utterances of the same sentence. On Lewis’ contextualist view, the truth-
conditions of an utterance of a knowledge attribution are determined by the context of
the attributor, not the subject of the attribution. According to Lewis’ view, neither Brian’s
(nor my evidence) eliminates the possibility w= Brian’s car has been washed away. Since,
if this possibility had obtained, our evidence would both still be the same as in the actual
scenario, i.e. our memories. So, w remains a possibility in which the proposition which
it is claimed Brian knows (that his car is parked at the harbour) is false.23 Now, in my
context of assessment, having heard what I have, it does not seem that the uneliminated
possibility w is one that can be properly ignored. Consequently, according to (L3), I am
22 See (Lewis, 1996, 554). Lewis does this in terms of the difference between when a subject is ‘properly’
ignoring uneliminated possibilities, and when they are not properly ignoring possibilities.
23 The possibility described by w (where Brian’s car has been washed away by a tsunami) is one in
which the proposition we attribute knowledge of (i.e. that the car is in parked in the harbour) is false. In
the possibility that actuality obtains, α, the proposition is true; his car is, in fact, parked in the harbour.
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correct to judge that an utterance of “Brian knows that his car is parked at the harbour”
expresses something false. After all, in the context in which I assess this attribution,
Brian’s evidence does not eliminate every possibility that is both one in which his car is
not parked in the harbour, and not properly ignored. In contrast, the context in which
Brian assesses an utterance of the same sentence, it seems as though the possibility w
is properly ignored. According to (L3), he may well satisfy the truth-conditions for the
assessed knowledge attribution.24
For the purpose of assessing the relative success of Lewis’ contextualist account
at satisfactorily resolving the sceptical paradox, let us concentrate on just one of his
stipulated rules governing what can be properly ignored in a context: the rule of attention.
This rule states that in any conversational context, any possibility, w, that is attended
to by conversational participants of the context, is not properly ignored.25 By being
attended to, w is not ignored at all. Consequently, if w is a possibility in which not-p, it
becomes one of the contextually determined possibilities that S’s evidence must eliminate
in order for an utterance in that context of the form “S knows that p” to be true.
The rule of attention is utilised by Lewis’ account to provide the details of the
contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox. By attending, in a context, to the
sceptical possibility that S could be a handless brain in a vat, this possibility becomes a
contextually relevant possibility. Since S’s being a handless brain in vat is a possibility
in which it is not the case that S has hands, when the former possibility is attended to
within a context, S’s evidence must eliminate this possibility in order for an utterance
of “S knows that S has hands”, made in that context, to express a truth. However, as
has been noted, S’s total evidence for the proposition that they have hands would be the
same regardless of whether S has hands, or is a brain in a vat. So, when attended to, this
possibility remains a salient and uneliminated possibility, in which it is not the case that
S has hands. Consequently, in any context in which this sceptical possibility is attended
to, an utterance of the form “S knows that S has hands” will express something false,
and an utterance of the form “S does not know that S is not a brain in a vat” will express
24 It could be suggested that the question of whether Brian can, or will properly ignore w on Lewis’
view depends on consideration of the latter’s rules of ignoring. I assume it is obvious that Brian will ignore
this possibility; implicit in the story is that Brian does not believe nor entertains that w does or might
obtain. The rules of belief, attention, and actuality do not prevent Brian from properly ignoring w. The
rule of resemblance is interestingly different; the only obvious way that w saliently resembles α is that
Brian’s evidence remains the same. Just as this makes w saliently resemble α for us, the fact that the
target proposition of the knowledge attribution is false in w, makes w saliently dissimilar to α for us. I
take Lewis to grant that the rule of resemblance does not prevent Brian from properly ignoring w in this
case; to do so, he claims “would be capitulation to scepticism” (Lewis, 1996, 556).
25 (Lewis, 1996, 559).
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something true.
4.4.1.2 Lewis’ Account and the Conditions on a Satisfactory Resolution.
Lewis’ contextualism seems to meet the first condition on a satisfactory resolution of
the sceptical paradox (a). It allows for the plausible truth of the claims (10)-(12) when
considered individually. In principle, Lewis’ account yields the plausible truth of (12) in
any context; according to (L3), in no context can both an utterance of the form “S doesn’t
know that S is not a brain in a vat” express something false, and yet an utterance of the
form “S knows that S has hands” express something true.26 The plausible truth of the
denial (11) is accounted for by Lewis’ contextualism, since any claim that S knows that it
is not the case that they are a brain in a vat will be false when assessed in any context in
which the possibility of S being a brain in a vat is attended to. The plausible truth of the
attribution (10), however, can also be accounted for by Lewis’ account. Although we fail
to know various external world propositions in contexts where the sceptical possibility is
being attended to, the rest of the time we do not attend to these uneliminable possibilities
of error, and, subsequently, we do properly ignore them. Consequently, in these ordinary
contexts utterances of attributions such as (10) will express true propositions.
Lewis’ account also appears to meet the second condition (b). It accounts for the falsity
of one of the three claims, albeit in a given context of utterance. Since an utterance of
(12) expresses a truth in any context, only one of (10) and (11) need be false. (10) can
only be falsely uttered in those contexts in which (11) expresses a truth because the
attended to possibility that S is a brain in a vat implies that S does not have hands. Since
an utterance of (10) expresses a truth in those contexts where this sceptical possibility
is properly ignored, an utterance of (11) will presumably express a falsehood. However,
Lewis implies, according to the rule of attention, that there is no context in which it can
be truly claimed that someone knows a sceptical possibility not to obtain: such a context
is immediately one in which that possibility is not properly ignored.27
Lewis’ account seems unable to predict that an utterance of (11) can ever express a
truth. Nonetheless, it might be argued that this alone does not prevent Lewis’ account
26 In principle, the truth of the attribution ensures there is no unignored possibility that S is a brain in
a vat uneliminated by S’s evidence. So, there is no impediment to S knowing that they are not a brain in a
vat. There is an obvious problem for Lewis’ account here. When (12) is asserted for some subject S, (10)
can only be false.
27 With respect to the possibility of being a brain in a vat, Lewis says “if in this context we are not
in fact ignoring it but attending to it, then for us now it is a relevant alternative.” (Lewis, 1996, 559).
Mentioning the possibility appears to be sufficient to attend to it, and subsequently not ignore it, let alone
properly.
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from meeting the condition (b). After all, this condition rightly states that in order to
satisfactorily resolve the paradox the falsity of at least one of the three claims needs to
be accounted for, but not more. The contextualist may point out that their positive and
negative theses concerning the context-dependence of knowledge claims allow them to
account for both the falsity of (10) when uttered in some contexts and its plausible truth
in others. Insofar as Lewis’ contextualism accounts for the independently plausible truth
of each claim considered individually in distinct contexts, and predicts the falsity of (10)
in some contexts, his resolution undeniably meets conditions (a) and (b).
An issue reoccurs in a slightly different form when considering whether Lewis’
contextualist resolution meets the condition (c), i.e. accounts for why the unpalatable
consequences of any of the claims being false are avoided. Here the contextualist’s
reliance on their account of the falsity only of (10) in some sceptical contexts generates
another issue. In order to account for why the undesirable consequence of this (i.e.
scepticism about our knowledge of the external world) is avoided, the contextualist will
point out that what a true utterance of the form “S doesn’t know S has hands” expresses
in the sceptical context doesn’t contradict with what is expressed by a true utterance of
“S knows S has hands” in another context.28
The consequence of scepticism is avoided on Lewis’ account then because when
(10) expresses a falsehood in sceptical contexts, it does so because we fail to meet the
unusually stringent standards for truly counting knowing determined by that context.
At the same time, we do meet the ‘lax’ standards determined by virtually every other
context. On Lewis’ view, however, an utterance of (11) expresses a truth in every context
in which it is considered. On Lewis’ view, an utterance of (10) will express a falsehood in
all those contexts in which (11) expresses a truth. So, according to Lewis, an utterance of
(10) will express a falsehood in every context in which the three claims (10), (11) and (12)
are considered. Lewis’ contextualist is unable to coherently claim when faced with the
sceptical paradox that an utterance of (10) expresses a truth.29 Lewis is committed in
28 Cf. (DeRose, 1995, 37), (Lewis, 1996, 561), and (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 246). See also (Feldman, 1999,
96-7).
29 It might be objected that this sells the contextualist resolution short. After all, the contextualist has
already pointed out that we do meet the ‘lax’ standards in ordinary contexts when (11) isn’t mentioned at
all, which is not contradicted by sceptical claims made in other contexts! Lewis was, after all, not framing
his account in the proper meta-linguistic manner, which lamentably gives rise to misunderstandings
such as the one suggested above. I argue, however, that the problem arises exactly from framing his
account in the proper meta-linguistic manner: moreover, it is only in virtue of illegitimately presenting
the contextualist resolution in the object level of knowledge that Lewis’ account seems to work. It is well
appreciated that when Lewis speaks of us having and then losing knowledge, it is strictly erroneous but
thought that the point is nonetheless grasped; we do know by low standards even if we do not by high
standards. But it is not within the contextualist’s remit to discuss what subjects do and do not know, over
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his answer to (c) to claiming that if, in a single context, an utterance of (10) expresses
a truth, then an utterance of (11) expresses a falsehood: his answer to (a) requires the
situation described by the antecedent can obtain for at least some context, but his answer
to (b) ensures that there is no context in which the situation described by the consequent
obtains.
Lewis’ account has only mixed success with its results in a couple of further ex-
planatory areas. Since it is highly plausibly that we do, in fact, know many things, a
satisfactory resolution of the sceptical paradox should (d) account for why sceptical
denials that involve bizarre and hard to eliminate possibilities such as the brain in a vat
scenarios are more troubling than those simple sceptic denials that merely suggest that
we do not know what we claim to.30 It has been pointed out that Lewis’ account fails
here since it predicts that a claim of the form “S doesn’t know that not-p” will ensure we
attend to, and subsequently are not properly ignoring the possibility that not-p, which,
as we saw in chapter 2 qua effective sceptical scenarios, it seems our evidence cannot
eliminate.31
Furthermore, it is a further condition on any resolution that it should (e) account for
our judgement that utterances of the forms “S knows that p” and “S does not know that
p” in a single conversational context are contradictory.32 This is met since the semantic
contribution of ‘knows’ to the sentence “S knows that p” is the same for every occurrence
in a single context. Consequently, S’s evidence eliminates every not-p possibility that is
not properly ignored. Nonetheless, there remain issues surrounding the ability of Lewis’
contextualism to meet each of the conditions on a satisfactory resolution of sceptical
paradoxes. In particular, I think that there are reasons to doubt whether this view is
able to meet adequately meet (c), and, consequently, constitute a happy-face solution to
sceptical paradoxes.
and above discussing what an utterance of the form “S knows that p” will express in a given context.
30 See (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 270), (DeRose, 1995, 9), and (Neta, 2003a, 14, 21).
31 See (DeRose, 1995, 10-12). For discussion of both Lewis and DeRose, see (Neta, 2003a, 13-14). I am
not convinced that this is a significant problem for Lewis’ account, let alone the most critical. After all,
there seems nothing to prevent Lewis from suggest that what prevents these ‘simple’ sceptical challenges
from being effective is the fact that they do not satisfy the widely accepted general condition on an effective
sceptical hypothesis, that they explain why you would falsely believe what you claim to know if they were
to obtain. For statements of this condition see (Beebe, 2010), (DeRose, 1995), and (Neta, 2003b).
32 See (DeRose, 2004a, 3).
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4.4.2 DeRose’s Contextualism and Resolution.
In this section, I set out and critically assess, the second potentially happy-face resolution
provided by a contextualism. This is the one put forward by Keith DeRose in his paper
‘Solving the Skeptical Problem’. Just like Lewis, DeRose attempts to provide a resolution
with an account of the context-dependence of knowledge sentences. This account, however,
develops the contextualist strategy for dealing with scepticism by giving a central role in
its resolution to the context-variant ‘strength of epistemic position’ a subject must have,
with respect to a proposition p in order for an utterance of “S knows that p” to express a
truth.33
4.4.2.1 DeRose’s Account of the Context-Dependence of Knowledge Claims.
The explanation for this contextual variation in the strength of epistemic position
required to truly count as knowing, utilises a form of subjunctive conditional concerning
beliefs. We have already encountered, in chapter 2, these doxastic considerations that
involved in DeRose’s contextualist position, and its supposed resolution of sceptical
paradoxes: Sensitivity.We are apparently inclined to judge that a subject S does not know
that some p if the following conditional is true:
(Sensitivity). If p were not the case, then S would not believe that p.34
To have a sensitive belief that p, the subject’s belief must match the fact of whether
or not-p in all the possible worlds as far out as the modally closest world in which it is
not the case that p. The further out in modal space one’s belief matches or tracks the
facts with respect to p, the stronger one’s epistemic position with respect p. To have a
sensitive belief that p, is to be in a relatively strong epistemic position with respect to
p.35
According to DeRose, in a given context, the strength of epistemic position (how far
in modal space the subject’s belief tracks the truth) required of a subject in order to be
truly attributed knowledge varies with conversational context in virtue of the rule of
sensitivity:
Rule of Sensitivity: when it is asserted that ‘S knows that p’, the strength
of epistemic position S must be in with respect to p for this attribution to be
33 (DeRose, 1995, 29).
34 See 2.2 and (DeRose, 1995, 18).
35 (DeRose, 1995, 34).
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true is raised, if necessary, to require S’s belief that p to be sensitive. (DeRose,
1995, 36).36
In other words, the extent to which S’s belief that p must correspond to the fact of whether
or not p in modal space, in order for S to truly count as knowing p can vary with context
as a function of what it is asserted that S does or does not know.37
In terms of the sceptical paradox, DeRose’s contextualist account explains the plau-
sibility of the sceptical denial (11) by pointing out that when uttered in a context the
strength of epistemic position that S must be in with respect to the proposition that
they are not a brain in a vat to truly count as knowing this proposition, can be raised to
require their belief that they are not a brain in a vat to be sensitive. Their belief must
correspond with the facts in the sphere of possible worlds centered on actuality that
comprises all possible worlds out to the nearest world in which they are a brain in a vat.
Since, as we have seen, S will still believe that they are not a brain in a vat even in a
world where they are one, S’s belief fails to be sensitive and consequently, an utterance of
the form “S knows not a brain in a vat” is false by the rule of sensitivity, and an utterance
of (11) will express a truth.
This account also accommodates the plausible truth of (10) and (12). To illustrate,
consider a context in which no one is attributing knowledge of modally far-fetched
propositions, but rather just claiming that “S knows that S has hands”. In this case S’s
belief in this proposition need only match the facts in all the nearby worlds in which it is
false, i.e. where they do not have hands. Since this will presumably be a world in which S
either lost, or was born without hands, S will not continue to believe this in these worlds,
and so, consequently, S’s belief is sensitive. In this way, the rule of sensitivity yields the
result that an utterance of (10) is true in this context. (12) will similarly express a truth
in all contexts of utterance; if S meets the contextually determined strength of epistemic
position required to count as knowing they have hands, then they will also count as
knowing that they are not a brain in a vat. In all the closest worlds in which they do not
have hands, S’s belief that they are not a brain in a vat matches the facts.
4.4.2.2 DeRose’s Account and the Conditions on a Resolution .
I now turn to discuss how DeRose’s attempt to resolve the sceptical paradoxes fares with
respect to meeting conditions (a), (b) and (c). To begin with, it is worth noting that it does
36 Cf. 2.2.
37 (DeRose, 1995, 37).
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so in virtually the same generally contextualist way as Lewis’ did. It does so in terms
of the rule of sensitivity rather than the rules for proper ignoring. Condition (a) is met
in the manner outlined above, whilst (c) is met in virtue of the proposed fact that in a
context in which (11) expresses and truth and (10) a falsehood, the “very high standards
[for knowledge] that we don’t live up to has no tendency to show that we don’t satisfy the
more re‘lax’ed standards [for knowledge] that are in place in ore ordinary conversations”
(DeRose, 1995, 38). So, when (10) is falsely uttered, scepticism about our ordinary claims
to know can be avoided.
It is not clear, however, that the consequence of dogmatism is avoided where an
utterance of (11) is false. In this context the truth expressed by an utterance of (10)
merely says that S’s belief that they have hands tracks the truth far enough to be
sensitive, and so can be truly counted as being known. The problem here is that it is in
every sense question begging against the sceptic to claim that S’s belief that they have
hands matches the facts at all, as this assumes that actuality is a situation in which
they are not a brain in a vat.38 I suggest this criticism, although valid, is of little specific
interest since it is central assumption of the general contextualist thesis that many of
our knowledge claims can be true.
Concerning (b), DeRose’s contextualism faces the same problem that confronted
Lewis’, which is that the difficulty in accounting for the falsity of (11). DeRose’s account
ties the truth expressed by an utterance of (11) with the idea that mentioning the
sceptical possibility of being a brain in a vat raises the standards for counting as knowing
by means of the rule of sensitivity. It is unclear whether (11) could ever be falsely uttered
in any context, and, consequently, the coherence of the accounts attempts to meet (a), (b)
and (c) is called into question in the manner described above.
In order to avoid this problem, DeRose claims that his account is not committed to
the idea that mentioning of the sceptical brain in a vat scenario is sufficient to determine
a more stringent strength of epistemic position required to count as knowing in that
context.39 The contextualist can maintain that the plausibility of (11) is due to the fact
that it would express a falsehood in a context in which the rule of sensitivity has been
utilised in the manner described above by the sceptic to “install unusually demanding
38 See (DeRose, 1995, 49-50); here it is conceded that this does indeed beg the question, but that this is
irrelevant to the significance of the proposed resolution. Cf. (Craig, 1989).
39 This is evident throughout DeRose (1995), where we find a host of hedging terms in his discussion of
how the rule of sensitivity plays the role of the mechanism by which the standards are raised (i.e. the most
central aspect of his resolution): “tend” (pp. 18, 21, 23), “tend... if need be” (p. 36), “if necessary” “needn’t
be exception-less” (p. 19), “general inclination” (p. 40), “general tendency” (p. 40), “stopped short of fully
endorsing it” (p. 44).
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epistemic standards... [but w]hether the skeptic actually succeeds in [doing so]... may be
a very unclear matter” (DeRose, 2006, 333). The idea here is that an utterance of (11)
could—but need not—trigger the standards raising mechanism, the rule of sensitivity,
resulting in both raised standards and truth of the denial.
In pursuing this line, DeRose’s contextualism owes an account of what situations
the mere mentioning of a sceptical possibility sh, in an utterance of the form “S doesn’t
know that not-sh” does result in raised standards for counting as knowing, and when
it does not. DeRose attempts, in a way, to address this issue in terms of Lewis’ notion
of a conversational score.40 For DeRose, the issue depends on considerations of a single
situation in which both a sceptical denial such as (11), and an ordinary attribution
such as (10) are made by interlocutors. I argue that his account of these situations goes
nowhere towards rescuing his resolution of the sceptical paradox.
Insofar as both claims are vehemently stuck to by the respective claimants, the
contextualist is confronted by a puzzle. This is: how to respect the sense in which both
claimants clearly indicate that their respective use of ‘knows’ is governed by divergent
standards, whilst also respecting the sense in which they indicate themselves to be
contradicting each-other.41 For current purposes, it will suffice to note that DeRose’s
proposal is what he calls the gap view of such situations: where S meets both sets of
divergent indicated standards, an attribution expresses a truth and a denial a falsehood,
where S meets neither set, the denial expresses a truth and the attribution a falsehood,
and where S meets one set but not the other, both claims lack a truth-value.42
I think that the suggestion that a knowledge claim can fail to have a truth value
is unhelpful for DeRose’s contextualist resolution. If S meets the standards indicated
by their opponent with respect to p, but does not meet the standards indicated by the
sceptic with respect to either the proposition that S has hands or S is not a brain in a
vat, then neither an utterance of “S knows that p” nor “S doesn’t know that S is not a
brain in a vat” will express a truth or falsehood. But I take it to be a plausible conceptual
truth that either S knows p, or S does not know that p. Recall the problem that beset
Lewis’ solution, namely, that the mechanism for a shift in standards is automatically
triggered by the mere mentioning of the sceptical denial. In attempting to rescue his
contextualism, DeRose faces some distinct issues. DeRose’s way of avoiding this issue
is—at best—to advocate a semantics for knowledge sentences that inadequately captures
conceptual principles about knowledge. Moreover, this account still maintains that so
40 (DeRose, 2004b).
41 (DeRose, 2004b, 5-6).
42 (DeRose, 2004b, 15).
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long as the sceptic does not back-down and retract their denial represented by (11), then
(10) will still not express a truth when uttered.
Finally, it is worth noting that DeRose’s account has the advantage of avoiding a
significant weakness exhibited by Lewis’ account. This concerns satisfying condition (d),
i.e. explaining why sceptical denials involving sceptical hypotheses are more worrisome
than their simpler counter-parts. The rule of sensitivity does not determine that latter
sorts of claims require a greater degree of truth-tracking from the subject’s epistemic
position, and so do not result in a change in the contextual feature which the truth-
conditions of knowledge claims refers to.
4.4.3 Blome-Tillmann’s Account and Resolution.
In this section, I consider and critically assess the details of a third potentially happy-face
contextualist resolution of sceptical paradoxes. This is the one put forward by Michael
Blome-Tillmann in his paper ‘Knowledge and Presuppositions’. In this paper, Blome-
Tillmann argues that the best account of the contextualist resolution of the sceptical
paradox is offered by some basic but important amendments to Lewis’ account. These
amendments are proposed with the specific intention of eliminating the serious weakness
of Lewis’ resolution of the sceptical paradox highlighted in section 4.4.1.2.43
4.4.3.1 Blome-Tillmann’s Account of the Context-dependence of Knowledge
Claims.
In response to this problem, Blome-Tillmann contends that merely attending to a possi-
bility in a context is not sufficient to render it impossible for any speaker in that context
to properly ignore that possibility.44 Rather, the rule of attention is replaced by a new
rule that also stipulates certain conditions under which a possibility may not be properly
ignored in a context. Blome-Tillmann’s substitute is the rule of presupposition:
(RP) If a possibility w is compatible with the speaker’s pragmatic presuppositions
in a context C, then w cannot be properly ignored C.
43 See (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 246). Specifically, it is the failure to coherently maintain that if an
utterance of (10) expresses a truth, then an utterance of (11) expresses a falsehood, and that if an utterance
of (11) expresses a truth, then an utterance of (10) expresses a falsehood. It hinges, then, on the account of
how (11) expresses a truth.
44 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 247). To ignore that possibility either properly or not. The former obviously
being the stronger; if you are properly ignoring p, then you are ignoring p. If attending to p is sufficient to
make it impossible to ignore p, then it is sufficient to make it impossible to properly ignore p.
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The notion of pragmatic presupposition is drawn from the work of Robert Stalnaker,
and explicated by Blome-Tillmann in terms of the subsequent principle:45
(PP) S pragmatically presupposes p in C iff S is disposed to behave, in their
language use, as though they believe p to be common ground in C.
Blome-Tillmann explains the phrase ‘believed to be common ground in C’, following
Stalnaker, by maintaining that a proposition p is common ground in C if and only if
all conversational participants in C accept that p, believe that all other conversational
participants accept that p, and so on, iterating this as far as necessary.46 It is an
important feature of (PP) that, in virtue of being linked to a subject’s own personal
linguistic behaviour, the notion of pragmatic presupposition is one that allows for a given
subject of attribution to determine, at least in part, whether or not they are presupposing
any given proposition.47
4.4.3.2 Blome-Tillmann’s Account and the Conditions on a Resolution.
The plausibility of the ordinary attribution (10) is easily accounted for by Blome-
Tillmann’s presupposition based contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox. In
ordinary contexts, conversational participants will clearly be disposed to behave in their
language use and other non-verbal actions as though they believe that the denials of
sceptical hypotheses are common ground, i.e. accepted by all, etc.48 These subjects can
be properly ignoring brain in a vat possibilities and, consequently, an utterance of (10) in
these contexts may express a truth, whilst an utterance of (11) would express a falsehood.
Similar considerations are employed on this view to account for the plausibility of
the sceptical denial (11). In some contexts, the negations of sceptical hypothesis such as
those describing brain in vat scenarios might not be believed by S to be common ground,
and, subsequently, neither presupposed nor properly ignored by S. In these contexts,
then, an utterance of (11) will express a truth, and an utterance of (10) will express a
falsehood.
The plausible truth of (12) is accounted for in the same general contextualist manner
outlined before; it is maintained to express a truth in every context of utterance. After
45 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 256).
46 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 250, 262).
47 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 254). This will be a significant point in terms of addressing some of the
issues seen to have afflicted DeRose’s contextualist account above. More on this and a potential problem
for Blome-Tillmann’s account below.
48 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 262, 267).
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all, to truly count as knowing you have hands in any context, you must presuppose that
you are not a brain in a vat (unless, of course, you can eliminate it). But, if you are
presupposing that you are not a brain in a vat, then you presuppose the falsity of all
uneliminated counter-possibilities to this one. As such, you can properly ignore them,
and thereby count as knowing that you are not a brain in a vat.
The condition (b) is apparently met by the presuppositional contextualist account
straightforwardly in virtue of how it satisfies (a). In contexts where an utterance of (10)
expresses a truth, an utterance of (11) expresses a falsehood, and vice versa. Condition
(c) is met on the presuppositional contextualist view too. When an utterance of (10)
would express a falsehood, we avoid wholesale scepticism about knowledge because we
appreciate that in other contexts, in which we presuppose sceptical possibilities, we do
truly count as knowing that we have hands. The problematic consequences of rejecting
(12) is obviously avoided by its universal endorsement.
When considering how Blome-Tillmann’s contextualism accounts for the unappealing
consequences of maintaining that an utterance of (11) could express a falsehood, the
view seems to run into a problem. It is not clear that suggesting that when we presup-
pose that we are not in bizarre uneliminable sceptical scenarios we avoid ‘begging the
question’ against the sceptic who says we do not know that these scenarios do not obtain.
Presupposing just seems to be a way of begging the question.49 The sceptic is plausibly
interpreted as pointing out that we have no good reason to presuppose the falsity of
sceptical hypotheses. The presuppositional contextualist could perhaps plausibly respond
to this challenge by maintaining that this diagnosis of the situation already grants too
much to the sceptic’s denial. On this suggestion, the sceptic’s challenge in uttering a
denial such as (11) might be more plausibly interpreted along the lines of (D1) as opposed
to (D2).
(D1) Consider that S might in fact be a brain in a vat.
(D2) S hasn’t considered that they might in fact be a brain in a vat.
In contexts where an utterance of (10) expresses a truth, and (11) a falsehood in
virtue of S presupposing that they are not a brain in a vat, if the sceptical challenge is un-
derstood along the lines of (D2) rather than (D1), the apparent problematic consequence
49 It is important to note that the objection is not that Blome-Tillmann does not specify when it is
proper or legitimate to presuppose the falsity sceptical hypotheses, and when it is not. Rather it is that
presupposing in this way, qua a resolution of the sceptical paradox just seems to amount to pretending the
problem does not exist.
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of ‘begging the question’ is avoided. S has considered that they might be a brain in a vat,
and believes it to be common ground, nonetheless, that this possibility does not obtain.
The presuppositional contextualist appears to have only mixed success when attempt-
ing to meet conditions (d) and (e). In the case of (e), the presuppositional contextualist can
maintain that the sense of intra-contextual disagreement between utterances of “S knows
that p” and “S does not know p” could be accounted for in the following way. An utterance
of the latter is true if and only if there is some not-p possibility left uneliminated by S’s
evidence, which S is not properly ignoring. The former is true just in case there is no
such possibility.
In the case of (d), Blome-Tillmann’s view does not offer any clear account of why it
is that simple sceptical denials of the form “S does not know that p” are less troubling
as challenges to the claim “S knows that p” than the sceptical denials involving hard to
eliminate scenarios such as the brain in a vat scenario. The explanation of the plausibility
of the denial (11) was that it would express a truth in a context in which S was not
presupposing (and cannot eliminate) the possibility they are a brain in a vat. It is
compatible with this that the claim “S does not know p” expresses a truth in a context in
which S is not presupposing (and can not eliminate) the possibility that not-p. There is
no difference in the explanation in either case.
Importantly, however, the presuppositional contextualist account does avoid a sig-
nificant problem faced by Lewis, and also, perhaps, by DeRose’s contextualist account.
Unlike the latter two versions of contextualism, Blome-Tillmann’s view gives an account
of how an utterance of (11) can be express a truth in some context, which does not
involve the utterance itself as a factor determining the claim’s truth-conditions. It is this
aspect of presuppositional contextualism that generates the apparent parity of both the
simple and sophisticated sceptic noted above. This also allows this account to coherently
maintain that central requirement of the general contextualist resolution, that there be
a context in which an utterance of (10) expresses a falsehood and an utterance of (11)
expresses a truth.
However, similarly to DeRose, in his attempt to avoid this problem by mere hedging,
Blome-Tillmann owes an account of the circumstances in which an utterance of (11)
would express a truth. In other words, his account needs to predict when a sophisticated
sceptical challenge is effective, and when it is not. In considering the effect of the men-
tioning of sceptical hypotheses on conversational contexts, Blome-Tillmann distinguishes
between three kinds of relevant conversational participants: ‘persistent’, ‘unsteady’, and
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‘indecisive’.50
The first consists of those who remain committed to their presupposing that sceptical
hypotheses do not obtain even when they attend to these possibilities. Since persistent
subjects continue to presuppose the falsity of sceptical hypotheses, Blome-Tillmann
maintains that these subjects will still count as knowing the ordinary propositions. When
S is a persistent subject then an utterance of (10) will express a truth and an utterance
of the sceptical denial (11) will be false.
The second consists of ‘unsteady’ subjects. These subjects are those who instantly
give up presupposing the falsity of sceptical hypotheses when these are brought to their
attention by their sceptical conversational partner. As a result, Blome-Tillmann claims
that these subjects now fail to count as knowing the ordinary proposition in the context.
This is because they are no longer presupposing a conversationally salient possibility of
error that is not eliminated by their evidence. When S is an unsteady subject, then, an
utterance of (10) will express a falsehood, and an utterance of the sceptical denial (11)
will express a true proposition.
The indecisive subjects are unable to decide whether to continue or stop presupposing
in the way required to properly ignored, and subsequently Blome-Tillmann argues, it
is unclear whether they satisfy either ‘knows p’ or ‘doesn’t know p’.51 When S is an
indecisive subject, then, utterances of (10) and (11) will neither express truths, nor
falsehoods.
These considerations suggest a way for the presuppositional contextualist to give an
account to satisfy (d). Sophisticated sceptical challenges involving far-fetched possibilities
of error are more troubling than simple sceptical challenges, they might argue, because
they are more likely than the simpler counterparts to make conversational participants
unsteady. Conversely, the simple sceptical challenges of the form ‘S does not know that p’
are more likely to incline conversational participants towards being persistent.52 This
explanation fails to be informative and is tantamount to stating that the simple sceptic
is less troublesome because people are less troubled by them.
So, what is it about the sophisticated sceptic that inclines people towards unsteadi-
ness in the way described by Blome-Tillmann’s account? If the account can not explain
50 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 264).
51 (Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 257, 265-ff.).
52 Blome-Tillmann tells us that it “should be obvious by now, persistent subjects are so-called because
they stick to their pragmatic presupposition that ¬sh when confronted with sceptical arguments, that is
they remain disposed to behave, in their use of language, as if they believed ¬sh to be common ground.”
(Blome-Tillmann, 2009, 265).
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this, then it fails to satisfy condition (d).53 Perhaps, though, this is not the best way to
think about the effects of persistence and unreadiness in subjects. Maybe, on this view,
it would be maintained that whether a sceptical challenge is effective depends just on
which sort of subjects dominate the conversational context. This route is certainly open
for the presuppositional contextualist to pursue but it remains unclear whether it would
bear scrutiny. At best, it seems to rest on an empirical claim that sceptical challenges will
be more effective in contexts which are dominated by so-called persistent participants.54
At worst, it is another uninformative restatement of the explanandum itself, namely
that some sceptical challenges are more effective than others. Before moving on to close
this section by setting out a final worry regarding the ability for Blome-Tillmann’s pre-
suppositional contextualism to satisfy condition (d), it is worth noting another familiar
issue that arises here.
In attempting to provide an explanation of how an utterance of (11) could express
a truth, without maintaining that the act of making such an utterance would secure
this truth-value, Blome-Tillmann’s account maintains that in some contexts (i.e. those
dominated by indecisive subjects) knowledge claims of the form “S knows that p” and “S
does not know that p” will fail to have any truth-conditions. This is the same explanatory
situation that DeRose found himself in whilst attempting to give an account of the
same thing, i.e. a viable resolution to the sceptical paradox based on semantic context-
dependence. I suggested, at the end of section 4.4.2, that the result of proposing a ‘gap
view’ of the semantics for knowledge sentences represents a failure to adequately capture
our concept of knowledge. If this is the case, then it seems to suggest that two of the most
developed contextualist resolutions of the sceptical paradox cannot satisfy conditions
(a)-(e) without a tendency to fail to adequately capture our concept of knowledge. The
tentative conclusion to be drawn here is, I think, that there are good reasons to think
that the contextualist will be unable to provide the desired happy-face solution that we
set out to find in chapter 1. According to the characterisation of happy-face solutions I
outlined there, it seems that the contextualist attempts to resolve the sceptical paradoxes
will, ultimately, amount to weakly unhappy-face solutions. This is because they appear
53 A suggestion might be made in support of the presuppositional contextualist here. Recall the earlier
mentioned constraint on an effective sceptical hypothesis that it explain why, if it were true, we would
nonetheless continue to (then) falsely believe what we do now. If Blome-Tillmann can help himself to this,
it might only take a little work to link this to the inclinations towards unreadiness rather than persistence
on the part of subjects.
54 This claim itself seems highly implausible, and I doubt Blome-Tillmann would endorse it. There is
no good independent reason to deny the obvious fact that the simple sceptic’s challenge are less persuasive,
or effective than the sophisticated counter-parts.
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to be committed, in trying to identify a false claim and give an error-theory, to an account
of knowledge ascriptions that is revisionary.
To be disposed to behave as if one believed that it is common ground in C that p,
amounts to a disposition to behave as if one believes that all conversational participants
in C accept that p, and believe that all other conversational participants accept that p,
etc. The sceptic, however, does not accept in C that the brain in a vat possibility does not
obtain, even if C is otherwise dominated by persistent subjects. Consequently, it seems
that no one in C can have a true belief that all conversational participants accept that
the brain in a vat possibility does not obtain. And, so, one could only falsely believe that
it is common ground in C that the brain in a vat possibility does not obtain.
I take it, then, that to be a persistent subject in the face of a sceptical challenge, on
Blome-Tillmann’s view, is to be disposed to behave as though one has a false belief (e.g.
that it is common ground in C that one is not a brain in a vat). Blome-Tillmann does not
give a detailed account of what sorts of things being ‘disposed to behave as though you
believe p’ involves but it is reasonable to suggest that having the disposition to say “I
believe that p” is a plausible candidate. Blome-Tillmann’s account allows for a persistent
subject to say “I believe that p” in a situation in which it is not the case that p, i.e. “I
believe it is common ground that q” when it is not the case that it is common ground that
q. The immediate issue, here, concerns the plausibility of the error theory this seems to
be proposing. If I am aware that it is not common ground that the sceptical hypothesis is
false, then, presumably I do not believe that it is common ground. As such, I will also
be fully aware of that an utterance, by me, of “I believe it is common ground that the
sceptical hypothesis is false” expresses a falsehood. Of course, if I am unaware that it is
not common ground, then I can make my claim innocently enough.
In the former case of an aware and persistent subject, Blome-Tillmann’s account
predicts that I will truly count as knowing I have hands just in case I am able to falsely
claim to believe something about my conversational context. In the latter case of an
unaware/persistent subject, Blome-Tillmann’s account predicts I will truly count as
knowing I have hands just in case I am ignorant of something about my conversational
context. Neither alternative is particularly appealing. The explanation of when (11)
expresses a falsehood will then amount to either a conversational participant’s ignorance
of their context, or else their ability to utter bare-faced falsehoods about what they
believe. Perhaps it could be maintained that the presuppositional contextualist account
is not committed to persistent subjects being disposed to utter falsehoods such as “I
believe that it is common ground that the sceptical hypothesis is false”. However, if a
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subject is not able to say “I believe that p” in these situations, then it is difficult to grasp
in what sense they are disposed to act as though they believe that p. In which case, on
Blome-Tillmann’s view, they would no longer be presupposing that p; rather they become
unsteady, or at best indecisive subjects. In either case, on this account, (10) could not
be truly uttered. And, consequently, I think there are good reasons to doubt whether
either of the contextualist resolutions discussed here, are capable of providing happy-face
resolutions of sceptical paradoxes.
4.5 Concluding remarks.
In this chapter, I considered another potential route by which to provide a happy-face
solution to sceptical paradoxes that outlined in chapter 1. I began by outlining the
general approach to resolving the sceptical paradoxes in terms of the semantic context-
dependence of the term ‘knows’, and discussed the manner in which the contextualist
might attempt to meet the constraints on a happy-face solution to the problem. After
setting out the general contextualist approach, I next detailed three distinct accounts of
the context-dependence of knowledge claims, and their respectively suggested resolutions
of the sceptical paradox in detail.
I assessed the potential for each contextualist position to provide a happy-face res-
olution of sceptical paradoxes. I argued that the first of these accounts, proposed by
Lewis, was not obviously capable of providing a happy-face resolution. I argued that two
other accounts, offered by DeRose and Blome-Tillmann, also face significant obstacles to
providing happy-face resolutions. My critiques of these contextualist positions drew on
considerations of how the details of these different accounts of the context-sensitivity of
‘knows’ impacts on how the constraints on a happy-face solution are met. I think that
the considerations raised, here, are suggestive of the inadequacy of these specific views
in providing happy-face resolutions of sceptical paradoxes.
In the next chapter, I move on to discuss a broader issue with epistemic contextualist
approaches to sceptical paradoxes: the semantic blindness objection.
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CONTEXTUALIST ERROR-THEORIES
5.1 Introduction.
Epistemic contextualism about knowledge claims has been argued to be a promising
theory in virtue of its apparent potential to resolve a number of epistemological problems
and, none more so than, the sceptical paradoxes. In this chapter, I focus on discussing
a single objection to the adequacy of contextualist approaches to resolving sceptical
paradoxes.
In chapters 1 and 4, I highlighted that in order to satisfactorily resolve the sceptical
paradox, the contextualist needs to give an account of why it is that sceptical arguments
generate paradoxes.1 An fully satisfactory, or happy-face, resolution of the sceptical
paradoxes needs to explain how we got confused about by sceptical arguments. In order
to be happy-face, then, a putative resolution of the sceptical paradox must in some sense
explain why we felt a pull towards a set of mutually incompatible knowledge claims. As I
noted in section 4.2, according to the contextualist semantics either the first premise of a
sceptical argument, or else its conclusion will express a false proposition, depending on
the context in which it is assessed. As a direct consequence, there is no “set of mutually
inconsistent propositions each of which enjoys some plausibility when considered on its
own”.2
If there is no genuine inconsistency, however, the contextualist is required in their
1 See (DeRose, 1995, 3), (Schiffer, 1996, 325).
2 (Schiffer, 1996, 324), emphasis added.
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error theory to address the fact that we nonetheless thought that there was one. After
all, according to contextualist, many of our patterns of knowledge ascriptions serve as
evidence for our appreciation of the context-sensitivity of the term ‘knows’. So, it seems,
that on this view we should recognise that there is no genuine inconsistency between the
plausible truth of sceptical conclusions and our ordinarily made claims to know various
empirical propositions; but yet, we clearly think there is one. The contextualist’s answer
to this is that in presenting the sceptical argument, its proponent can effect or induce a
rise in the standards for counting as knowing to such a level at which we no longer count
as knowing practically anything. Nonetheless, the contextualist can say, we realise that
the sentence expressing the conclusion of the sceptical argument would express a false
proposition in an ordinary low standards context. So, instead we assert its negation. We
do so precisely because in a low standards context the negation of the sceptic’s conclusion
expresses the true proposition that S knows by low standards that S has hands.3 In this
chapter, I focus on a single objection to this approach to resolving sceptical paradoxes.
I proceed as follows. In section 5.2, I introduce the semantic blindness objection
to epistemic contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes, and outline two different
ways in which the impact of this objection can be assessed. It can be assessed either
as a knockdown objection to contextualist resolutions, or as part of a comparative
disadvantage on scorecard approach. In section 5.3, I concentrate on discussing the
former ‘knockdown’ assessment; here, I critically evaluate a contextualist line of response,
on which semantic blindness is maintained to be an expected consequence of context-
sensitivity. Next, in section 5.4, I move on to consider the ‘scorecard’ assessment of the
objection, and, subsequently, a contextualist line of response to it. Ultimately, I argue,
the significance of the semantic blindness objection consists in the point that, insofar as
contextualists are committed to semantic blindness in their error-theories for sceptical
paradoxes, they are at a disadvantage compared to their invariantist opponents.
5.2 Contextualism and Semantic Blindness.
Schiffer (2004, 168-169) has noted that the contextualist explanation of why we assert
the negation of the sceptical conclusion despite assenting to their premises implies
a certain error theory. We erroneously assert the negation of the sceptical conclusion
because we mistakenly think that the truth it expresses in certain contexts contradicts
3 (Cohen, 1999, 62-65), (Cohen, 2004, 191); cf. (Schiffer, 1996, 325).
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our ordinary claims to know when made in low standards contexts.4 According to this
error theory, what we fail to recognise is the most significant feature of the contextualist’s
semantics. That is: the true proposition expressed by the sceptic’s conclusion in a high
standards context does not contradict the true proposition expressed by an utterance
of the same sentence in a low standards context. The contextualist’s error theory is,
then, apparently committed to the view that “people uttering knowledge sentences
systematically confound the propositions their utterances express with the propositions
they would express by uttering those sentences in certain other contexts” (Schiffer, 1996,
325).
This error theory amounts to the claim that ordinary speakers are ignorant of the
semantic context-sensitivity of the term ‘knows’.5 It implies that ordinary speakers
exhibit semantic blindness with respect to knowledge claims: “their linguistic patterns
fail to reflect the reality of the context-sensitivity” of knowledge claims.6 The sort of
failure being posited here, however, is not the comparatively uninteresting sort of error
that might arise if speakers fail to be aware of certain facts about the subject of the
knowledge claims. To illustrate, imagine that Joe is an otherwise competent speaker of
the English language, but he ascribes the property of being a US citizen to each and
every Canadian citizen he meets. Obviously, each time Joe ascribes being a U.S citizen
to a Canadian, he is in error. Moreover, Joe is clearly subject to a systematic sort of
error in this case; he systematically mistakes Canadians for their southern neighbours.
Nonetheless, this does not imply that Joe fails to understand the meaning of the terms
‘citizen of the U.S.A’. The sort of error Joe is making here is not plausibly of a semantic
nature. Rather, the sort of error Joe makes here is more plausibly explained in terms of
his ignorance of certain relevant facts. Specifically, that some of the people to which he
attributes the status of being citizens of the USA, are in fact citizens of Canada.
In contrast, however, the sort of speaker error implied by the contextualist’s resolution
does seem to be semantic in nature. The error being committed, here, according to this
view, does just seem to be the error of thinking that your utterance expresses one
proposition when in fact it expresses another.7
There is an important sense in which the contextualist’s resolution is committed to the
view that ordinary speakers are ignorant of the semantic context-sensitivity of the term
4 see also (DeRose, 1995, 5), (Neta, 2003a, 399), (Blome-Tillmann, 2008, 32).
5 (Montminy, 2009a, 649).
6 (Baker, 2012, 113). Cf. (DeRose, 2009, 159), (Hawthorne, 2004, 107), and (Schiffer, 1996, 325).
7 Neta (2003b, 400-4) suggests four different ways in which contextualists could explain a similar sort
of error. For current purposes, I am just concerned here with spelling out what the proposed error consists
in, rather than what explains/causes it.
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‘knows’. Their resolution of sceptical paradoxes is committed to the view that the false
claim amongst the inconsistent set cannot be determined independently of a fixed context
of assessment. This is, they hold, because ‘knows’ is semantically context-sensitive. But,
the objection goes, those who point to the context-sensitivity of epistemic terms such as
‘knows’ to resolve sceptical paradoxes in this way appear also to be committed to saying
that most otherwise competent users of these terms are blind to this semantic fact.8 This
is due to the sort of error theory the contextualist offers for why we mistakenly thought
that a sceptical argument’s premises, and the negation of its conclusion, were true in a
single context of assessment. Their explanation is that we got confused into thinking
that each expresses a truth, by a sort of recongition that they would express truths in
distinct contexts. But that error theory, the objection goes, amounts to maintaining that
we fail to recognise—or, are blind to—the semantic context-sensitivity of ‘knows’.
5.2.1 Semantic blindness: two dimensions of assessment.
Let us consider two ways in which the impact of semantic blindness objection to the
contextualist resolution from considerations of semantic blindness can be assessed.
The first is that that the objection can be understood as counting against the con-
textualist resolution of sceptical paradoxes on a scorecard of theoretical commitments.
The idea, here, is that a semantic theory for some term N that does not posit semantic
blindness concerning N on the part of competent users of the language in which N occurs,
is preferable to one that is committed to this semantic blindness (2004, 109). On this way
of assessing the objection, is that it is simply a mark against the contextualist resolution
of sceptical paradoxes that it is committed to semantic blindness in its error theory. Put
simply, a theory about knowledge claims should not, ceteris paribus, imply that people
who make these claims are liable to not understand what they mean.
Attempts to defend contextualism against this objection will typically consist in
arguing that whilst being committed to semantic blindness is a mark against contextu-
alist resolutions, this does not favour any alternative invariantism about ‘knows’ over
contextualism. This response concedes that the contextualist resolution is committed
to semantic blindness, and that this is an undesirable feature, but argues that it is an
unavoidable consequence of any rival semantics for knowledge claims. Some attempts to
provide responses of this sort will be critically assessed in section 5.4.1, and, in section
5.4.2, will be argued to provide no help for the contextualist.
8 (Hawthorne, 2004, 107).
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The second way of assessing the semantic blindness objection can be understood
as maintaining that the consequence of semantic blindness represents a knockdown
objection to contextualist resolutions. The idea, here, is that the consequence of semantic
blindness itself ‘refutes’ the contextualist’s semantics for knowledge claims, and its sub-
sequent resolution (1996, 325). On this reading, the consequence of semantic blindness
is simply evidence that knowledge claims are not semantically context-dependent in
the way needed for the contextualist’s resolution to work. This is because, it is argued,
the consequence of semantic blindness on the part of ordinary speakers is inherently
implausible for the kinds of context-sensitive terms that contextualists use to model the
context-sensitivity of ‘knows’.
This objection requires further explanation since there are multiple different ways for
the contextualist to model the context-sensitivity of knowledge claims. For example, in
order for this objection to bear any weight, it will need to be convincingly shown that none
of these options will plausibly generate semantic blindness. One possible line of response
in defence of contextualism is to argue that semantic blindness is to be expected given the
semantic context-sensitivity of the term ‘knows’. Again, this sort of response concedes that
the semantics employed in contextualist resolution is committed to semantic blindness.
However, the response denies that this is an implausible consequence of a contextualist
resolution of sceptical paradoxes. I critically examine attempts to provide responses of
this sort in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2. I argue, ultimately, that this is not a promising route
for a defence of contextualism.
5.3 Semantic Blindness: knockdown objection?
In this section, I assess the semantic blindness objection as a knockdown, or refutation
of the contextualist approach to resolving sceptical paradoxes. I focus on critically
evaluating a contextualist response to it, on which it is denied that semantic blindness
is implausible for context-sensitive terms. I consider two versions of this response,
which concern two popular models for semantic context-sensitivity: indexical terms
and gradable adjectives. I draw upon various diagnostic tests for both forms of context-
sensitive terms, and show that ‘knows’ is not plausibly modeled on either. I conclude,
consequently, that whilst this result does not demonstrate that the semantic blindness
objection is a knockdown one, it is good reason to doubt whether contextualism can
provide a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
The idea that the contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox implies that
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competent speakers of the English language are systematically prone to error, explicable
only by semantic blindness, has been argued to be a consequence that significantly
undermines the contextualist resolution itself. The consequence of widespread and
persistent error on the part of native speakers is, taken by some, to be so fundamentally
implausible for context-sensitive terms that the absence of it for a given term is held to
be just one aspect of a diagnostic for indexicality.9
However, it has also been argued that semantic blindness and the associated sort of
speaker error is not implausible for other paradigmatically context-sensitive terms, such
as indexical terms and gradable adjectives.10 So, taking the consequence of semantic
blindness to be evidence for a lack of context-sensitivity would be a little too quick as an
objection to the contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox. Instead, I think it will
be instructive to outline an argument to the effect that the theoretical consequence of se-
mantic blindness itself renders the contextualist resolution inconsistent, and, ultimately,
implausible.
The argument that the consequence of semantic blindness is a knockdown objection
to contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes can be understood as follows:
(B1). It is implausible that competent speakers of the English language would exhibit
semantic blindness concerning context-sensitive terms.
(B2). The contextualist resolution of sceptical paradox implies competent English speak-
ers exhibit semantic blindness concerning the term ‘knows’.
(B3). The contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox is implausible.11
I think Schiffer’s objection to contextualism can be understood as implicitly advancing
this sort of argument. The second premise (B2) is uncontroversial, as has been noted
above, and it is worth unpacking it in more detail now. To claim, as the contextualists
do, that we mistakenly assent to an utterance of a knowledge claim that expresses a
falsehood in one context because it expresses a truth in another, is according to Schiffer
“as though a fluent, sane and alert speaker who knows where she is, were actually to
assert the proposition that it is raining in London when she mistakenly thinks she’s
asserting the proposition that it is raining in Oxford” (Schiffer, 1996, 326). And this is
a sort of mistake, the idea goes, which is so implausible, that it would undermine the
plausibility of any theory that is committed to it as a consequence.
9 See, for example, (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 7-8).
10 See (DeRose, 2005), (DeRose, 2009), (Blome-Tillmann, 2008).
11 This is my formulation of what I take to be the main argument as expressed in (Schiffer, 1996).
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DeRose, however, who holds both that the term ‘knows’ is semantically context-
sensitive, and that the consequence of semantic blindness is to be expected given this
semantic context-sensitivity. In this way, it seems that DeRose accepts (B2), yet does not
accept (B1). This is evident from his claim, amongst others, that “you can fool a lot of the
speakers a lot of the time” (DeRose, 2006, 334).12 This indicates that DeRose does not
take semantic blindness concerning the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ to be implausible,
whilst Schiffer clearly does. They disagree about whether context-sensitive terms should
give rise to semantic blindness. A constructive way to avoid question-begging and stone-
walling on this issue, then, might be to investigate whether the context-sensitivity of the
term ‘knows’ can even be plausibly modelled on other obviously context-sensitive terms.
In exploring this, I consider two forms of context-sensitivity that contextualists
have used to model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’: indexical pronouns and gradable
adjectives. By examining whether the term ‘knows’ can be modelled on these terms, I
think we will be in a better position to adjudicate between Schiffer’s endorsement of (B1),
and DeRose’s rejection of it. To this end, in sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, I draw on recent
work by Schiffer and Szabo (2013) to critically assess whether ‘knows’ can be plausibly
modelled on either indexical terms, or gradable adjectives.
5.3.1 Denying the implausibility: the indexical model.
Concerning the alleged context-sensitivity of ‘knows’, DeRose has claimed that even
when the term appears in distinct utterances of either the same, different or surface-
contradictory sentences in distinct contexts, ‘knows’ “is being used with the same charac-
ter, it is not being used with the same content. Or so the contextualist will claim” (1992,
921). In this vein, DeRose proposes that we might understand the context-sensitivity of
‘knows’ as an indexical term; specifically, it could be modeled on the paradigmatically
indexical term ‘here’.13
DeRose takes there to be unavoidable semantic blindness implied by any semantic
account of the sceptical paradox as well as a similar situation in which two speakers in
different places respectively truly utter the sentences ‘It is snowing here’ and ‘It is not
snowing here’.14 As noted above, Schiffer contends that semantic blindness is implausible
in either situation. Nonetheless, I think that DeRose’s proposed modelling of ‘knows’ as
12 A similar point is also made at (DeRose, 2009, 179).
13 (DeRose, 2009, 152).
14 (DeRose, 2009, 159-ff).
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an indexical term could be undermined independently if ‘knows’ can be shown not to
behave linguistically in the way that other indexical terms do.
Schaffer and Szabo 2013 have suggested two main tests for indexical terms: smooth
tracking across contexts, and free shifting within a discourse. The former of these
consists of three diagnostics for indexical terms: adjustment for indirect speech reports,
the absence of cross-contextual disagreement verdicts, and the absence of widespread
or systematic error.15 The third and last of the diagnostics they put forward for smooth
tracking across contexts—the absence of widespread error—can be regarded as begging
the relevant question, here, as to whether semantic blindness is implausible for context-
sensitive terms. It is worth mentioning, however, that in the case of the indexical ‘I’, the
diagnostic tells against the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ in virtue of the indefatigable
implausibility of systematic speaker error regarding the meaning of ‘I’. 16
The first diagnostic for smooth tracking of indexical terms across contexts states that
when an indirect speech report of an utterance involving an indexical is being given in a
different context, it will require the indexical adjustment of the relevant term to produce
a true report.17 For example, in order for Bill to give a true report what Sally asserted
by her utterance of “I can’t wait”, his report must adjust the indexical from the first
person to the second, such that it truly says ‘Sally said she can’t wait’; where a lack of
adjustment yields the false report ‘Sally said I can’t wait’. The term ‘knows’ however fails
this diagnostic for indexicality: no adjustment is required to yield a true indirect speech
report of Jim’s utterance of “Bill knows that Sally is keen” in a distinct context, since an
utterance of “Jim said that Bill knows that Sally is keen” would still be felicitous in an
entirely distinct context.18
The term ‘knows’ performs badly on the second diagnostic for smooth tracking across
contexts: according to which, there should be no verdict of disagreement between any
two utterances involving an indexical that are made in distinct contexts. For example,
if Jim utters “It is raining here” in Seattle whilst Bill utters “It is not raining here” in
Madrid, there should be no judgement by anybody who is aware of where the utterances
were made that Jim and Bill disagree. The contextualist resolution itself, however,
maintains that inter-contextual disagreement verdicts such as this are possible. This
is, after all, how they purport to explain our inclinations to both reject the conclusions
of sceptical arguments, and to assent, instead, to their negations. Moreover, it is worth
15 (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 7-8).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 See (2004, 101-111) for a related point regarding the Disquotational Schema for ‘Knows’.
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mentioning that felicitous cross-contextual disagreement verdicts have been advocated
as a diagnostic for shared and invariant semantic content in numerous places.19
The second test for indexical terms is that their semantic value can freely shift within
a single discourse; in other words, if a term is an indexical, then “multiple occurrences of
that... [term] in a discourse should be able to take on differing values.” 20 For example, it
is clear that in an utterance of “Penguins live here but not here” by somebody pointing
first to the south pole on a map and then to the north pole, the content of the first
occurrence of “here” differs from that of the second. This is a test that ‘knows’ fails
miserably; it does so for reasons related to considerations that we have already seen, in
chapter 4: abominable conjunctions. Schaffer and Szabo have pointed out, for example,
that if the semantic import of ‘knows’ were able to shift within a discourse, it would
be possible for there to be felicitous readings of certain absurd conjunctions. One such
conjunction might be, for example, the highly infelicitous sentence “Brian knows that his
car is parked at the harbour, but does not know whether it has just been washed out to
sea”. This sentence could be licenced, given certain contextual shifts, if the content of
‘knows’ was able to shift freely (in a way that paradigmatic indexical terms can) within a
discourse.
Moreover, it is a central feature of the contextualist resolution that once the more
demanding standards, by which the sceptic’s first premises is true, are in place, we
could no longer truly say that “I know that I have hands”.21 The inability for ‘knows’
to shift in its semantic content in a single discourse is a significant point against the
contextualist resolution. This is because, if this shift were possible, then the contextualist
would not need to posit semantic blindness in order to explain why we reject the sceptic’s
conclusion. Instead they could maintain instead that the content of ‘knows’ shifts between
the premises of the sceptical argument and the speaker’s utterance “S knows that p”
such that, in the latter, ‘knows’ picks out a relation that does hold of S and p, whilst in
the former, it picked out a property that did not.
This move, however, not only leaves open the possibility of the absurd conjunctions
mentioned above, but would also generate a verdict of disagreement of sorts: the set of
claims comprising the sceptical paradox would still quite rightly strike us as inconsistent.
Indeed, the availability of such a disagreement verdict can be viewed as evidence of
shared, invariant semantic content. Perhaps one recourse open to the contextualist, to
account for this perceived disagreement, could be to suggest that we mistakenly take
19 See, for example, (Cappelen and Hawthorne, 2009, 54-67); (DeRose, 1992, 920-1).
20 (Stanley, 2005, 57); (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 8).
21 (Stanley, 2005, 66-8)); (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 8).
117
CHAPTER 5. CONTEXTUALIST ERROR-THEORIES
there to be invariant content when in fact there is none. I find it hard, however, to
see how this move would amount to more than a reaffirmation of the contextualist’s
error-theoretical commitment to the undesirable consequence of semantic blindness.
And, ultimately, it remains unclear what help this move would be in responding to the
semantic blindness objection.
In this section, I highlighted that the linguistic behaviour of the term ‘knows’ fails to
satisfy a number of proposed tests for indexical semantic context-sensitivity. I showed
that whilst paradigmatic indexical terms readily undergo the process of indexical ad-
justment for indirect speech reporting, knowledge claims resist this process. We saw,
too, that whilst indexical terms fail to generate inter-contextual disagreement verdicts,
knowledge claims infamously do generate these verdicts. Furthermore, I showed that
whilst indexical terms are capable of freely shifting their content across multiple occur-
rences within a discourse, knowledge claims do not. Moreover, the last result is supported
by the fact that if they were capable of this, then it would generate a strong verdict of
inter-contextual disagreement, which itself would be indicative of sameness of content.
Lastly, I showed that the ability to freely shift content within a discourse would be
an undesirable consequence for contextualism in virtue of licensing absurd conjunctions.
I end this section, then, by concluding that there are good reasons to think that the
contextualist cannot plausibly model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ on indexicals. As
such, there is no route via this form of modeling to maintaining that semantic blindness
is to be expected given the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’.
5.3.2 Denying the implausibility: Gradable adjectives model.
The alleged context-sensitivity of the term ‘knows’ cannot be plausibly modeled on
indexical terms, but another model with paradigmatic context-sensitive terms has also
been advocated by some contextualists. Another model for the context-sensitive of ‘knows’
would be gradable adjectives such as ‘tall’ and ‘flat’. 22
Whether the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ can be adequately modeled on gradable
adjective can be tested using the same methodology as was used above to argue that
indexical terms do not provide an adequate model: by comparing the linguistic behaviour
of ‘knows’ with that of paradigmatic gradable adjectives. If ‘knows’ were to behave
linguistically in the same way as gradable adjectives, then this would support the
22 See (Cohen, 1987, 16), (Cohen, 1999, 60), (DeRose, 2005, 191), (Feldman, 1999, 92), (Hawthorne,
2004, 54), (Lewis, 1996, 554), and (Stanley, 2005, 120).
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contextualist thesis, whilst a failure to do so would count heavily against any attempt to
model the context-sensitivity of knowledge claims on gradable adjectives.
Schaffer and Szabo (2013) have suggested that on the first test for indexical terms—
smooth tracking across contexts—‘knows’ behaves similarly to gradable adjectives.
Firstly, in terms of adjustment to indirect speech reports, both ‘knows’ and the paradig-
matic gradable adjective ‘tall’ resist this adjustment. Secondly, they suggest that it is
at least plausible that ‘knows’ and ‘tall’ admit of cross-contextual disagreement ver-
dicts. This is surprising in the case of purportedly gradable adjectives, since felicitous
cross-contextual disagreement reports are thought to be indicative of shared context-
invariant semantic content. Thirdly, however, Schaffer and Szabo do not comment on the
presence of widespread systematic speaker error regarding gradable adjectives. Nonethe-
less, as even they recognise, these were tests for indexical terms rather than gradable
adjectives.23
The second test employed for comparing ‘knows’ with indexical terms (free shifting
in content within discourse) is also applied to ‘knows’ in the comparison to gradable
adjectives. On this test, it is argued that ‘knows’ also fails, since ‘knows’ does not exhibit
the ability to freely shift in its semantic content between multiple occurrences within a
discourse but gradable adjectives do.24 Stanley uses the example of an utterance of “That
butterfly is small and that elephant is small” to demonstrate that gradable adjectives—in
this case, the term ‘small’—are able to appear more than once in felicitous claims despite
clearly taking different semantic values at each occurrence.25
As I noted above, the same feature is not exhibited by ‘knows’. Gradable adjectives
also appear to be an inadequate model for the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’, since the
free shifting of content within discourse is not only indicative of context-sensitivity, but
rather generated by it.26 Similarly to the comparison with indexical terms, Schaffer
and Szabo argue that the failure of ‘knows’ to take multiple contents within a discourse
precludes the ability to model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ that is required for the
contextualist resolution to work. This is because it both prevents the content of ‘knows’
from shifting to that content by which the sceptic can truly state their premise, and from
shifting, at a later stage in the discourse, to a content by which our ordinary claims to
know are true.27
23 (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 9).
24 Ibid.
25 (Stanley, 2005, 57).
26 See (Stanley, 2005, 58).
27 (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 9).
119
CHAPTER 5. CONTEXTUALIST ERROR-THEORIES
I consider, now, two other novel diagnostic tests for whether a term can be plausibly
modeled for context-sensitivity on gradable adjectives. The first test can be stated as
being that if a term does not allow for degree modifiers, then that term is not a gradable
adjective.28 For example, the gradable adjectives ‘tall’ and ‘flat’ clearly allow for degree
modification by the terms ‘really’ and ‘very’, as is shown by the acceptability of the
sentences ‘Ben is really/very tall’, or ‘England is really/very flat’. Likewise, the negation
of the degree modified adjective are able to conjoin with the unmodified phrase to produce
acceptable sentences: e.g. ‘Ben is tall, but not very tall’, ‘England is flat but not really
flat’.29 The term ‘knows’, however, fails to do this. For example, whilst the sentence
‘Ben really knows that it is summer’ sounds acceptable, it can only be interpreted as
saying that ‘Ben actually/in fact knows it is summer’, and not that he knows this to
a particularly high degree of knowledge. Likewise, the sentence ‘Ben knows that it is
summer but doesn’t really know it is summer’ can only plausibly be interpreted as saying
that ‘Ben doesn’t know it is summer’, and not that Ben knows that it is summer, just not
to a high degree.30
The second test for gradable adjectives is that they should be linked to a conceptually
related comparative construction: for example, ‘tall’ is linked to the construction ‘taller
than’, where for any object for which there is a true predication of ‘tall’, there will natural
true readings of ‘taller than’. For example, the sentence ‘The Eiffel tower is tall’ allows
for the acceptable natural comparative construction ‘The Eiffel tower is taller than
Ben’. However, ‘knows’ fails to allow for acceptable natural comparative constructions;
the putative suggestions of ‘very much’ and ‘very well’ clearly fail to illicit acceptable
sounding constructions with ‘knows’. For example, the comparative components of the
sentences ‘Ben knows very well that it is summer’ and ‘Ben very much knows that it is
summer’ are both more naturally interpreted non-semantically as imbuing the utterance
with a pragmatic element.31
Furthermore, it can also be seen that ‘knows’ fails to exhibit a further third linguistic
feature of gradable adjectives. This is that in the case of gradable adjectives, the compar-
ative and degree-modified constructions are semantically interpretable with respect to a
definite scale.32 For example, the sentence ‘Ben is very tall’ can be paraphrased about
the extent to which figures on the height scale as in ‘Ben’s height exceeds average by a
28 (Stanley, 2005, 36).
29 (Stanley, 2005, 36).
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 10).
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long way’. The term ‘knows’ fails to produce acceptable paraphrasing with respect to an
underlying scale in this way; for example, none of the following suggestions for the com-
pletion of the sentence to include a reference to an underlying scale for knowledge seem
natural or acceptable ‘Ben’s knowledge that it is summer is extraordinary/tough/hard to
obtain’.33
I take it that, on the picture given by these three tests for gradable adjectives, ‘knows’
fails to be able to be plausibly modelled on the context-sensitivity of gradable adjectives.
We have seen that ‘knows’ again is incapable of free shift in content within discourse, and
is also incapable of combining naturally with degree modifiers, or of being conceptually
linked to a natural comparison construction. Finally, I have shown that ‘knows’, likewise,
fails to allow for comparative constructions and degree modifications to be paraphrased
with reference to an underlying scale.34
I conclude this section, then, by suggesting that there are good reasons to think that
the contextualist cannot plausibly model the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ on gradable
adjectives. As such, I do not think that there is a route, via this form of modeling, to
maintaining that semantic blindness is to be expected for knowledge claims given the
context-sensitivity of ‘knows’.
So far, in this chapter, I have been considering the semantic blindness objection as
a knockdown objection to contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. Ultimately,
this assessment of the objection hinges on the question of whether semantic blindness
is to be expected for context-sensitive terms. I presented the argument, which I take
to be implicit in Schiffer, that semantic blindness is not to be expected from context-
sensitive terms. I considered the contextualist response to the contrary, that ‘knows’
is context-sensitive, and gives rise to semantic blindness (qua sceptical paradoxes). To
break the deadlock, I suggested that the onus lies on the contextualist to model the
context-sensitivity of ‘knows’. The bulk of this section was given over to showing that
‘knows’ is not plausibly modeled on either indexicals or gradable adjectives.
So, where does this leave us with the knockdown assessment of the semantic blind-
ness objection? The implausibility of modeling the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ in the
above ways does not imply that the semantic blindness objection can be taken to refute
contextualist resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. After all, it remains open to the contextu-
alist to suggest that the term ‘knows’ exhibits an entirely novel sort of context-sensitivity.
And, ultimately, I do not think that there is any plausible way in which to argue that
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
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semantic blindness for a term is necessarily incompatible with it exhibiting semantic
context-sensitivity. I conclude my discussion here by suggesting that, whilst not a knock-
down objection, semantic blindness presents an obstacle to happy-face contextualist
resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. Until the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’ is modeled, the
contextualist explanation of our error with respect to sceptical arguments—necessary for
a happy-face resolution—is incomplete.
5.4 Semantic blindness: scorecard approach.
In this section, I outline and evaluate the second of the two ways of assessing the
impact of the semantic blindness objection against contextualist resolutions. After briefly
setting out the scorecard approach to assessing semantic blindness, I move on, in section
5.4.1, to discuss what I take to be the most obvious contextualist response to this line
of assessing the of sceptical paradoxes. Next, in section 5.4.2, I critically assess and
reject the contextualist response to the scorecard objection. I argue that considerations
of semantic blindness put the contextualist at a dialectical disadvantage with respect
to sceptical paradoxes when compared with their invariantist opponents. I conclude
that this suggests a promising route to finally providing a properly happy-face, fully
satisfactory resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
5.4.1 Contextualist response: “you have it too”.
In defence of the contextualist resolution against the scorecard assessment of the seman-
tic blindness objection, it could be argued that even the rival semantic accounts of ‘knows’,
such as invariantism, will also have the consequence of positing semantic blindness on
the part of ordinary speakers. In which case, considerations of semantic blindness alone
would not count either against contextualism, or in favour of its invariantist rival.
This line of response proceeds by accepting the charge that the contextualist account
of how we came to be presented with the sceptical paradox does imply that ordinary
competent speakers of the English language will exhibit semantic blindness concerning
the term ‘knows’. 35 At this point, however, the contextualist response points out that
invariantism will need to posit semantic blindness in just the same explanatorily way
to account for the opposite phenomena. This is because semantic blindness is posited
35 See (Blome-Tillmann, 2008, 32), (Cohen, 2004, 191), and (DeRose, 2009, 159).
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by contextualism to explain the verdicts of contradiction between utterances in certain
cases where the contextualist thesis has committed an absence of any such contradiction.
However, the contextualist argues, semantic blindness will need to be posited by the
invariantist to conversely explain the contextualist’s verdicts of an absence of contra-
diction between utterances in certain cases where the invariantist thesis is committed
to there being such contradiction.36 The idea that a particular semantic contextualism
fails to account for something in a particular discourse is not a new one. Consider a basic
contextualist semantics for the predicate of subjective taste ‘hilarious’. Let’s imagine
that on this particular imagined contextualism for ‘hilarious’, sentences of the form ‘x is
hilarious’ are construed as containing “a hidden indexical parameter which picks out the
speaker’s standard [of funniness]” (Baker, 2012, 109). This basic contextualist seman-
tics for ‘hilarious’, suggests there is no contradiction between the certain utterances of
“Duck Soup is hilarious” and “Duck Soup isn’t hilarious” made in sufficiently different
contexts.37 This is obviously true when the utterances are made by distinct speakers.
However, there is an important sense in which ordinary competent English speakers
often are inclined to judge that these utterances are contradictory. In other words, they
judge that the two speakers are genuinely disagreeing, at least, about whether Duck
Soup is hilarious.38
In order to account for the presence of these verdicts of contradiction (or disagreement)
between the two non-contradictory utterances, the ‘hilarious’-contextualist will posit
semantic blindness. They will suggest that these agents fail to see that the term ‘hilarious’
is context-sensitive and the subsequent lack of contradiction. This is the same procedure
that leads the contextualist about knowledge claims to posit semantic blindness in the
case of the sceptical paradox. The judgement that the conclusion of the sceptical argument
contradicts our ordinary claims to know, which leads us to assert its negation, is similarly
explained by the contextualist in terms of semantic blindness. Moreover, the contextualist
can argue that this does not favour invariantist semantics over contextualist. The idea,
here, is that an invariantist will also be committed to semantic blindness to account for
the fact that sceptical arguments present us with paradoxes. Along these lines, DeRose
has argued that if invariantism is the correct semantics for knowledge sentences, then
some sort of semantic blindness will be predicted in this case.39
Following this line of thought, the contextualist will point out that many like them
36 See (DeRose, 2009, 159).
37 See (MacFarlane, 2007, 18). ‘Duck Soup’ (1933) is a Marx brothers film directed by Leo McCarey.
38 An interesting analysis of disagreement can be found in (MacFarlane, 2007).
39 See, for example, (DeRose, 2006, 334), and (DeRose, 2009, 159).
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are inclined to judge that the sceptic’s conclusion that ‘S does not know that p’ and our
everyday claims that ‘S knows that p’ do not contradict each other. The invariantist will
maintain that either the sceptic is speaking truly when they conclude that ‘S does not
know that p’, or else their conversational opponent is speaking truly when they say ‘S
knows that p’. So, the contextualist argument goes, in the former sceptical case, the in-
variantist will be committed to semantic blindness to explain why we mistakenly thought
that the conclusions of sceptical arguments were false. In the latter non-sceptical case,
the invariantist will be committed to semantic blindness to explain why we mistakenly
thought that the minor premises of sceptical arguments were false.40
In this way, DeRose has responded to the idea that the semantic blindness objection
counts as a mark against contextualism when compared with invariantism, by argu-
ing that “there simply is a good deal of ‘semantic blindness’ afflicting speakers here,
whichever... [semantic thesis] is correct” (2009, 160). In effect, DeRose’s response to
the scorecard assessment of the semantic blindness objection is to suggest to a rival
invariantist that ‘you have it too’. On this way of responding in support of contextualism,
the argument is that semantic blindness is ubiquitous to any account of the semantics of
‘knows’. Consequently, he thinks that we should simply get used to semantic blindness,
rather than take it to undermine either contextualism or invariantism about knowledge
claims.
5.4.2 Against the “you have it too” response.
In this section, I argue that the contextualist response to the scorecard assessment of
semantic blindness is flawed. The defense, typified by DeRose’s ‘you have it too’ line of
response does not succeed in rescuing the contextualist resolution against the charge
that the semantic blindness objection is a dialectical mark against contextualist copared
with their theoretical opponents.
Williamson (2005) has noted that there is a certain sort of parity between epistemic
invariantism and contextualism with respect to the sceptical paradoxes. The dialectic
situation, with respect to the scepticism, is such that, as Williamson notes, “all theorists
will be forced to postulate and explain systematic errors in our use of epistemic terms
at some point or other” (Williamson, 2005, 224-225). This does not, however, imply that
considerations of semantic blindness cannot be regarded as counting against either
40 On an invariantist view, if the conclusion of the sceptical argument is false, then necessarily, one of
the premises must be false given a commitment to the validity of the argument. It has already been noted
that both premises are generally thought to be individually plausible.
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contextualism or invariantism over the other. As Williamson explains, both theories
are equally committed to positing systematic speaker error merely means that the
comparative assessment of these theories should take place at the level of how each
explains the inevitable systematic error. When faced with sceptical arguments, it appears
that competent language users are subject to error, regardless of whether ‘knows’ is
semantically context-sensitive, or invariant. So, which of the competing explanations
for this error are the more plausible? And at this level contextualism is no longer on an
equal footing with invariantism.
According to the contextualist resolution of the sceptical paradox outlined above,
speakers systematically commit the error of asserting a false proposition (S knows by
high standards that they have hands) when confronted with an utterance of a true
proposition (S doesn’t know by high standards that they have hands). The explanation
for this error is that they are unaware of the semantic context-sensitivity of ‘knows’. The
invariantist, however, does not need to explain the error that speakers systematically
commit according to their view by positing that speakers are unaware of the semantic
context-insensitivity of the term ‘knows’.
On the most natural version of invariantism, which Williamson calls ‘anti-sceptical
insensitive’ invariantism, the attribution of knowledge represented by the negation of
the sceptic’s conclusion is true and the denial represented by the sceptic’s first premise is
false. What the anti-sceptical insensitive invariantist needs to explain is the ‘illusion of
ignorance’: that is, why speakers erroneously think that the latter falsehood is true.41
Importantly, the invariantist is not committed to claiming that this error is due to
ignorance of the semantic workings of knowledge claims. The invariantist maintains
that knowledge claims have context-invariant truth conditions such that any utterance
of the sceptic’s first premise will express a false proposition in any context whatsoever.
On this view, the speaker who assents to the sceptic’s premise will not be viewed as
having conflated the semantic content of the utterance with any other content it might
express in another context, since this does not vary. The invariantist, then, needs to
explain why the speaker mistakenly thinks that one and the same false proposition
is actually true, and this does not require semantic blindness. To illustrate this point,
imagine, for example, that I mistakenly believe that an utterance of “Canberra is not the
capital city of Australia” expresses a true proposition. This is clearly erroneous, and we
might expect some explanation to be available for my mistake. How might we explain my
error in this case? It might be sufficient to explain my error to point out that I mistakenly
41 Ibid.
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thought the seat of the Australian government was in Sydney rather than Canberra.
This is consistent with the claim that I am aware that the sentence is true just in case
a city other than Canberra is the capital city of Australia. In providing an explanation
for the error of thinking a falsehood is actually true, the invariantist is free to point to
non-semantic factors.
As Williamson notes, the invariantist can suggest that when faced with the sceptic’s
first premise and the far-fetched possibility of error that it raises, the ordinary speaker
“suffers an illusion of danger” (Williamson, 2005, 226) to the effect that possibilities of
error are erroneously taken to prevent us from truly claiming to know.42 In describing
the nature of the semantic problem for contextualism about knowledge claims, Schaffer
and Szabo have suggested that non-semantic factors may be taken to play a central part
in generating the pattern of variable truth-value judgements which contextualists take
as evidence of semantic context-sensitivity.43 The point, here, is that the epistemological
invariantist is prima facie able to explain systematic speaker error without positing
semantic blindness.
An attempt to provide exactly such an invariantist account of why it is that speakers
might take a literally false denial of knowledge to be true has been suggested that
utilises empirical psychological data regarding belief formation and attribution.44 Along
these lines, Nagel has pointed to empirical findings that suggest that in the process of
forming beliefs, the extent of cognitive effort and accuracy exhibited by subjects is directly
proportional to how much is perceived to be at stake for their success.45 A consequence of
this is that “high stakes subjects pay a price from their higher accuracy, slower, and less
confident belief” formation (Nagel, 2010, 283). Furthermore, empirical data reported by
Nagel suggests that a subject’s ‘need-for closure’ is broadly inversely proportional to how
much is at stake for the subject to continue without this closure, (where ‘closure’ names
the process in which a belief is fully formed). 46 Finally, the amount of evidence subjects
deemed sufficient for confident belief formation was shown to be inversely proportional to
the subjects’ need-for-closure.47 It could be suggested that we are less ready to attribute
knowledge to subjects if we perceive them to have gone to insufficient cognitive lengths
given their need-for-closure. We may find it plausible, for example, to deny that we know
we are not brains in vats for the reason that given the perceived (whether reasonably
42 See chapter 6, where I discuss this in more detail.
43 (Schaffer and Szabo, 2013, 5).
44 See (Nagel, 2010).
45 (Nagel, 2010, 281-282).
46 (Nagel, 2010, 286-8).
47 (Nagel, 2010, 288).
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or not) cost of being wrong about this, we regard ourselves as having an extremely low
need-for-closure, in light of which we may deem ourselves to have undergone insufficient
cognitive effort to confidently form a belief that we are not brains in vats.
This is, however, only a sketch of a way in which the invariantist may account for the
sort of systematic speaker error implied by an invariantist resolution of the sceptical
paradox. A discussion of the empirical data used by Nagel to account for the apparent
variability of knowledge ascriptions, as well as how—and whether—it should be utilised
by the invariantist to account for the generation of the sceptical paradox, will be taken
up in the next chapter. For the present purpose it suffices here to note that in the first
instance, an invariantist account of the sceptical paradox is not committed to positing
semantic blindness.
To summerise this section, I note that fact that invariantism is as equally committed
to positing systematic speaker error in resolving sceptical paradoxes as contextualism
does not itself place the theories on an equal explanatory footing. This is because, as I
have argued, it is at least possible for the invariantist to explain this error in a prima facie
more plausible way, through empirical data concerning belief formation and ascription,
than the contextualist.
5.5 Concluding remarks.
In this chapter, I outlined the semantic blindness objection to the contextualist resolution
of sceptical paradox. I considered two ways of assessing the objection. The first of these
involved assessing whether the semantic blindness implied by the contextualist reso-
lution of sceptical paradoxes amounted to a knockdown objection. I critically discussed
the contextualist response that semantic blindness is not an intrinsically implausible
consequence for context-sensitive terms. I drew on the work of Stanley, Schaffer and
Szabo, to argue that neither gradable adjectives nor indexical terms can serve as an
adequate basis on which to model the context-sensitivity of knowledge claims as required
by the contextualist resolution.
The second mode of assessing the semantic blindness objection centered on the notion
that, all other things being equal, it counted against contextualist resolutions of sceptical
paradoxes compared with those of rival invariantists. I considered a defence of contex-
tualism against the scorecard assessment of the semantic blindness objection, which
held that semantic blindness counts equally against both invariantist and contextualist
resolutions of sceptical paradoxes. I drew on the work of Williamson and Nagel, to reject
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this response. Instead, it was suggested that an invariantist need not be committed to
semantic blindness in their error-theories concerning sceptical paradoxes.
In the next and final chapter, I draw on the considerations above of the scorecard
assessment of the semantic blindness objection, to explore the potential to provide
an anti-sceptical invariantist happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes. I critically
discuss various approaches to describing epistemologically invariant error-theories for
certain patterns of knowledge ascriptions. My aim, here, will be to show how an anti-
sceptical invariantist error-theory happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes may be
found. I propose that a fully satisfactory resolution of sceptical paradoxes can be found by
means of an error-theory given in terms of recent psychological accounts of our cognitive
architecture.
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INVARIANTIST ERROR-THEORIES.
6.1 Introduction.
This chapter develops an approach to providing a non-sceptical invariantist happy-face
resolution of sceptical paradoxes. The general shape of this approach will involve using
some recently developed dual process theories of cognitive psychology to provide an error
theory concerning sceptical arguments.
I begin, in section 6.2, with stage setting. I outline the project to be undertaken in
terms of what is involved in providing a non-sceptical invariantist error theory concerning
sceptical paradoxes. Next, in section 6.3, I critically assess a recently discussed non-
sceptical invariantist error theory which draws upon the resources of psychology. In
section 6.4, I outline further resources of cognitive psychology that could be relevant
to a non-sceptical invariantist psychological error theory. In section 6.5, I outline how
the project of providing a non-sceptical invariantist error-theoretic account ‘sceptical
pressure’ cases might serve as a model for a non-sceptical invariantist error theory
concerning sceptical paradoxes. Lastly, I consider some potential reasons to think that
the sceptical pressure error theory described might not serve as a good model for the
non-sceptical invariantist to explain away sceptical paradoxes. Next, in 6.6, taking my
cue from Gerken (2012; 2013), I outline recently developed default-interventionist dual-
process theories of cognitive psychology. In section 6.7, I sketch a way in which the
default-interventionist framework could provide a non-sceptical invariantist error theory
concerning sceptical paradoxes. Finally, in 6.8, I comment on some the proposed error
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theory in terms of considerations raised in previous chapters.
6.2 Semantic versus Psychological Error Theories.
Recall that sceptical arguments represent paradoxes in the sense that they seem to
present us with a set of individually motivated but jointly inconsistent judgements about
knowledge. The following, for example, encapsulates just such a sceptical paradox:
(1) S does not know that S is not a brain in a vat.
(2) If S knows that S has hands, then S knows that S is not a brain in a vat.
(3) S does not know that S has hands.
We can distinguish between two sorts of invariantist positions with respect to scepti-
cal paradoxes. On the one hand, an invariantist may be sceptical if they maintain that,
for example, each of (1), (2), and (3) are true. In this way, a sceptical strict invariantist
endorses sceptical conclusions that no one knows any empirical propositions. On the
other hand, a non-sceptical strict invariantist maintains that (1) and (3) are false. As
such, a non-sceptical invariantist rejects the sceptical idea that no empirical propositions
are known. Sceptical paradoxes, then, present a problem for non-sceptical invariantists
in the sense that sceptical denials such as (1) seem to be plausible.
A condition on a fully satisfactory, or happy-face, non-sceptical invariantist resolu-
tion of sceptical paradoxes is that it identifies the false claim involved and provides a
corresponding error theory. As I noted above, on these views sceptical denials such as
(1) will be identified as the false claims. Furthermore, in order to adequately resolve the
paradoxes, the non-sceptical invariantist needs to explain how and why it is that we
might be inclined to mistakenly think that no one knows that sceptical hypotheses (that
they are a brain in a vat, for example) are true.
There are, however, constraints placed on the adequacy of non-sceptical invariantist
error-theories concerning sceptical paradoxes. In chapter 1, I argued that any attempt
to give an error theory just in terms of the epistemic principle underlying sceptical
arguments faces higher-order problems for constituting a fully satisfactory resolution.
The lesson drawn from this was that a non-sceptical invariantist needs to provide an
error theory that reaches beyond merely identifying principles which would motivate
sceptical premises. A potentially promising strategy for a non-sceptical invariantist
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in this respect would be to provide a psychological error theory concerning sceptical
arguments.
In chapters 4 and 5, I considered various epistemological contextualist strategies for
resolving sceptical paradoxes. These strategies involved putting forward error theories
that reached beyond epistemology in the way described. The error-theories of episte-
mological contextualists draw upon semantic considerations to explain our mistaken
judgements. On these proposals, we are led into error because we are unaware of the
semantic context sensitivity of the term ‘knows’ and its cognates. I argued that episte-
mological contextualist strategies for resolving sceptical paradoxes were not obviously
happy-face resolutions. The resolutions suggested by contextualism were not satisfactory
because the semantic error theories put forward failed to provide an explanation of why
the sceptical paradox arose in the first place. We do not obviously make the sorts of
semantic error that contextualists propose in order to account for sceptical paradoxes.
And suggesting that the sceptical paradox may be considered a special case of this sort of
error, leaves it an open question as to why scepticism gives rise to a paradox in this way.
The question remains whether, and how, a non-sceptical invariantist can do better
than the contextualist in terms of giving an adequate error theory. In this chapter, I argue
in support of the non-sceptical invariantist that an adequate error theory concerning
sceptical paradoxes can be had by drawing upon the resources of cognitive psychology.
6.3 Availability and Error.
Following a suggestion of Williamson (2005), it could be argued that thinking about
a sceptical hypothesis and the situation it describes, e.g. being a brain in vat, has a
similar effect on us as that of exposure to fictional violence. Just as exposure to fictional
violence causes viewers to over-estimate the likelihood of violent events occurring, maybe
the effect of imagining scenarios in which we are deceived might be to make us over-
estimate the likelihood of being so deceived. Perhaps then, the effect of considering
radical sceptical hypotheses, which are vivid descriptions of global ignorance, is an over-
estimation of the probability that these hypotheses are true. The suggestion here would
be that we might be brought to judge that we do not know that we are not in sceptical
scenarios because our knowing this would be incompatible with the probability which we
now ascribe to them obtaining.1 On this suggestion, the non-sceptical invariantist error
1 This sort of response to sceptical puzzles was first suggested in (Vogel, 1990). For a similar suggestion
see (Hawthorne, 2004). For a critical discussion of these approaches, see (Nagel, 2010).
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theory concerning sceptical paradoxes would involve explaining the plausibility of the
first premise of sceptical arguments in terms of the availability bias. Our assessments
of the likelihood of sceptical scenarios obtaining are elevated to a level that we feel is
incompatible with our knowing that they do not. The idea here is that the assessed
likelihood is raised as a function of the increased ease by which we imagine these
scenarios, which is a consequence of these scenarios’ novelty and vividness. In this way,
the non-sceptical invariantist might satisfactorily resolve the sceptical paradoxes by
first maintaining that we do know the negations of sceptical hypotheses, and then by
accounting for our tendency to judge that we do not in terms of the availability bias and
sceptical hypotheses themselves.
I think, however, that there are some issues with foregoing approach. The suggestion
that the availability heuristic—the idea that “in assessing the likelihood of an event we
rely on the ease with which events of that type can be remembered or imagined” (Nagel,
2010, 290)—can help the non-sceptical invariantist explain away sceptical error has been
called into question.2 The ability for the availability heuristic to provide an explanation
here is significantly challenged by empirical data. Recently conducted surveys, for
example, show that “when a given event is difficult to imagine, subjects who have been
actively encouraged to discuss or imagine it will assess it as less probable than subjects
who have not” (Nagel, 2010, 292). It should be noted, as Nagel does, that the cited study
found two distinct effects of the vivid imagining of a possibility on estimations of its
likelihood. Where the possibility being considered was ‘easy-to-imagine’, the effect of
imagining as opposed to merely reading the possibility was to increase the estimation of
its likelihood. Where the possibility under consideration was ‘hard-to-imagine’ the effect
of imagining as opposed to merely reading that possibility was to reduce the estimation
of its likelihood.
The idea that the availability bias accounts for our tendency to judge that we do
not know that we are not brains in vats, for example, involves maintaining that our
estimations of the likelihood that we are brains in vats are raised by the ease with which
we imagine this scenario. The empirical research suggests, however, that if sceptical
scenarios involving universal deception are difficult to imagine, then considering them
“in vivid and convincing detail” (Williamson, 2005, 226) would result in our lowering our
estimations of their likelihood. Given the empirical data, the suggestion that imagining
sceptical scenarios causes us to over-estimate their likelihood would imply that these
2 For more on the availability heuristic, see (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) and (Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1974)
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scenarios are ‘easy-to-imagine’ rather than ‘hard-to-imagine’. It is not clear, however,
what will serve as good evidence for the claim that sceptical scenarios—for example, that
one is a brain in a vat, or currently dreaming—can be considered easy to imagine rather
than hard to imagine. And in this way, it is difficult to assess the plausibility of this
suggestion in these terms alone.
There are, however, some other considerations which I think bear importantly on
whether the availability heuristic is a helpful way for a non-sceptical invariantist to
explain our error with respect to sceptical paradoxes. It has been noted that any account
of the plausibility of sceptical denials involving sceptical hypotheses should also account
for the corresponding lack of persuasiveness of the so-called simple sceptic who “simply
insists that you do not know that you have hands, offering no reasoning at all for this
skeptical assertion” (DeRose, 1995, 9). On the availability account, the ease of imagining
sceptical scenarios increases our estimations of their likelihood to a level that is deemed
incompatible with knowing they do not obtain. But we do not want to say that the ease
of imagining simple scenarios increase our estimations of their likelihood to a level that
is incompatible with knowing them not to obtain.
The proponent of the availability account needs to explain the apparent fact that our
estimations of the likelihood of the simple scenario’s obtaining are not raised in this way.
There appear to be two ways of going about this, but neither is without issues. On the
one hand, it could be maintained that ease of imagining results in a significantly greater
degree of over-estimation of the likelihood of sceptical scenarios, compared with that
of simple scenarios. On this picture, though the the estimated likelihood of the simple
scenario increases as a function of ease of imagining, it does not rise to a threshold deemed
incompatible with knowing it does not obtain. In the the absence of any explanation for
why this might be, however, this suggestion appears ad hoc.
On the other hand, the proponent of the availability account could maintain that
imagining simple scenarios does not result in an increase in our estimations of their
likelihood at all, but rather a decrease in the way described above. This would imply
that they are more difficult to imagine than the sceptical scenarios whose likelihood
we do over-estimate. It would be difficult to motivate the claim that simple hypotheses
are harder to imagine than the sceptical hypotheses. The claim that “exposure to lurid
stories about brains in vats, evil demons, painted mules, or gamblers who bet the farm”
generates an over-estimation of the likelihood of these scenarios obtaining, in virtue of
the availability heuristic, appears to be committed to the implausible claim that simple
descriptions of error generate an even greater sense of “epistemic danger” (Williamson,
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2005, 226). In which case, an availability heuristic account of our negative epistemic
judgements concerning the negations of a sceptical hypotheses does not seem to account
for the lack of any corresponding negative epistemic judgements concerning the negations
of simple alternatives.
Additional empirical data also presents issues for the suggestion that the availability
heuristic can help a non-sceptical invariantist explain our error with respect to sceptical
paradoxes. Nagel discusses studies that appear to show that “spontaneous discounting”—
an “automatic tendency to discount the significance of availability whenever an offsetting
explanation of increased availability” (Nagel, 2010, 295)— can be expected to cancel the
effect of the availability heuristic. One cited study, for example, revealed that participants
who had not been primed to consider the initial letters of words over-estimated the
frequency of the first letters of their names in a given English language text; this
result demonstrates the availability heuristic. In contrast, this study also found that
participants who had been primed to consider initial letters, by being asked to write
their initials and read a passage that concerned the significance of initial letters, under-
estimated the frequency of their own name’s initial letters (Nagel, 2010, 297). This result
shows that the over-estimation effect of the availability heuristic is cancellable. Moreover,
the effect of availabilty is significantly lessened when the factors generating availability
are made more overt to the participants.
If the availability suggestion were correct, then this data suggests that entertaining
a more explicit, or ‘lurid’ sceptical hypothesis will result in a greater discounting effect.
The availability suggestion holds that consideration of sceptical hypotheses, such as the
brain in a vat hypothesis, induced over-estimations of epistemic danger through ease
of imagining. The empirical studies cited by Nagel, however, suggest that this effect
will be offset by the discounting effect. That is, “some alternative causal hypotheses for
availability might be so salient as to alert people to the potential bias of using availability
in judgment. Such circumstances not only might invoke discounting automatically, but
also might cause participants to overcorrect for potential bias, leading to bias in the other
direction” (Oppenheimer, 2004, 101). The point here is that if the novelty and strangeness
of sceptical hypotheses were responsible for any availability effect, then empirical data
predicts that the salience of these factors would also result in our adjusting for, or
‘discounting’, the availability effect. Consequently, the availability suggestion is at odds
with what we would predict on the basis of empirical data. We would not expect, for
example, to come to mistakenly judge that we do not know we are not brains in vats on
the basis of this possibility being made salient.
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To provide a happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes, the non-sceptical invari-
antist needs to provide a better explanation for the error we might make in judging that
we do not know that sceptical hypotheses are false. Williamson’s suggestion that such
an explanation could be given in terms of the availability heuristic has been argued to
face significant difficulties. In the rest of this chapter, I explore the possibility that a
more plausible explanation of our erroneous judgement may be found by investigating
the architecture of the cognitive processes that generate our epistemic judgements. In
the next section, I briefly outline some of the main aspects of work within psychology
concerning cognitive processes underlying our judgements about knowledge ascriptions.
I then move on, in section 6.5, to survey work by Nagel, who draws on insights from
cognitive psychology to provide a non-sceptical invariantist error theory concerning a
related pattern of judgements about knowledge ascriptions.
6.4 ‘Mindreading’ and Dual Process Theories.
In this section, I outline some of the resources from cognitive psychology that can be
brought to bear on the sketch of a non-sceptical invariantist error theory concerning the
sceptical paradox. My aim in this chapter is to draw upon these resources to put forward
a non-sceptical invariantist error theory which may be offered as an explanation for why
sceptical arguments can be paradoxical. I offer a brief account of the main aspects of this
work which I take to be relevant to the project of providing a non-sceptical invariantist
error theory. I begin by introducing the ‘mindreading’ capacity, then move to the ‘dual
process theory’ of judgement, and, ultimately, the more specific ‘default-intervention’
model of dual process theory.
The capacity to attribute mental states to individuals has become broadly referred
to as the ‘mindreading’ capacity in the recent literature in psychology and philosophy.3
The importance of this capacity in our everyday lives is hard to understate. As Peter
Carruthers puts it, we “are inveterate mindreaders. We routinely (and for the most part
unconsciously) represent the mental states to [sic] the people around us... We attribute
to them perceptions, feelings, goals, intentions, knowledge, and beliefs, and we form our
expectations accordingly” (Carruthers, 2009, 121).4
3 For comprehensive discussions of mindreading, see (Nichols and Stich, 2003) and (Goldman, 2006).
4 It is worth noting that theorists distinguish two levels of mindreading. The attribution of propositional
attitudes such as belief and knowledge are considered to be ‘high-level’, whilst those of perceptions, feelings
and desires are ‘low-level’. See chapters 6 and 7 of (Goldman, 2006).
135
CHAPTER 6. INVARIANTIST ERROR-THEORIES.
The relevance of the mindreading capacity to the problem of sceptical paradoxes
for a non-sceptical invariantist is readily appreciable. The non-sceptical invariantist
needs an account of why we might mistakenly judge that we do not know that we are
not in sceptical scenarios (for example, where we are dreaming, or brains in vats). What
needs to be explained is why we are systematically misled with respect to a certain
class of knowledge attributions, viz. those involving sceptical hypotheses. Insofar as
knowledge attributions are attributions of mental states, then it is reasonable to view
these erroneous judgements as products of the mindreading capacity. In seeking to
explain why we are systematically mistaken, I think a non-sceptical invariantist will do
well to appeal, in presenting their error theory, to facts about our mindreading capacities.
Here, I want to briefly outline some aspects of the mindreading capacity that might be
relevant to the project of explaining why our judgements about knowledge go awry with
respect to sceptical scenarios.
The mindreading capacity is a cognitive capacity, since, as Alvin Goldman explains,
“[a]ttributing mental states is forming beliefs about their tokenings” (2006, 9). I take it
then that an account of the cognitive basis underpinning this capacity will be directly
relevant to the task of explaining how and why we might come to form an erroneous
belief via this capacity (e.g. that we do not know that sceptical hypotheses are false). The
simple point to be stressed here is that an explanation for the error here will involve a
description of how an attributor’s cognitive processes function to produce an erroneous
output given the relevant input of sceptical hypotheses.
There is widespread support for the view that the architecture of human cognition
in general, and subsequently, the cognitive bases of our judgements about knowledge
are captured by so-called dual process theories.5 All dual process theories distinguish
between at least two distinct types of cognitive processes which underlie our judgements.
Following Evans (2014), I will use the labels ‘Type 1’ and ‘Type 2’ processes; Type
1 processes may also referred to as ‘intuitive’, whilst Type 2 processes can be called
‘reflective’. Type 1 and Type 2 processes are distinguished by sets of typical features. On
the one hand, Type 1 processes are typically correlated with being fast, non-conscious,
and automatic. In contrast, Type 2 processes are typically correlated with being slow,
conscious, and deliberate.6
5 For example, (Evans, 2009), and (Tversky and Kahneman, 1996). See (Frankish, 2010) for a compre-
hensive overview of the development of dual process theories. For opposition to dual process theories of
cognition, see (Erana, 2012). For discussion of the most prominent alternative to dual process theories of
mindreading, see (Herschbach, 2015).
6 For a detailed discussion of these features see (Evans and Stanovich, 2013; Evans, 2014), and
(Stanovich and Toplak, 2012).
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Above I suggested that dual process theories could help illuminate an explanation for
our mindreading capacity to err in delivering the judgement that we do not know that
sceptical hypotheses are false. An important aspect of my account will be to acknowledge
the sense in which internal conflicts can arise when making knowledge judgements.
“Dual-process approaches do not simply account for why we reason effec-
tively on some problems and poorly on others; they also capture the internal
conflicts that arise in judgement and reasoning tasks, when people’s analytic
processes clash with their heuristically based intuition” (Stupple et al., 2013,
55, my emphasis).
The relevance of so-called dual-process theories of mindreading to the sceptical prob-
lem can be made more explicit. The working hypothesis of this thesis is that sceptical
paradoxes are precisely such ‘internal conflicts’ between our reflective, philosophical
judgements, and our intuitive, ‘ordinary’ judgments about what we know. Sceptical argu-
ments are paradoxical, in the sense that they elicit seemingly inconsistent judgements
from us. In order to satisfactorily resolve these paradoxes, we need to explain why we are
led to make these systematic errors in our judgements by sceptical arguments. We have
already analysed sceptical arguments in detail, and we know that the paradoxes are a
function of these arguments, and how we think about knowledge. The only thing missing
from our error theory is then a description of how the cognitive processes underlying
our judgements about knowledge work, which sheds light on how we end up in these
paradoxical situations. And this is what dual-process theories of mindreading can provide
us with. Before outlining my preferred account of how a non-sceptical invariantist can
provide an error theory to account of sceptical paradoxes, I move on in the next section
to critically assess a potentially promising approach.
6.5 Invariantism, Error and ‘Sceptical pressure’
In this section, I describe a model for a non-sceptical invariantist error theory with
respect to sceptical paradoxes. And I begin, now, by describing Nagel’s project concerning
a pattern of judgements about knowledge ascriptions involving ‘sceptical pressure’ cases.
Sceptical pressure cases are vignettes which typically elicit a denial that an agent knows
a proposition. They differ from vignettes which typically elicit knowledge attributions
to the same agent and proposition only in terms that strict invariantists’ maintain are
irrelevant to the truth of the attribution. My hypothesis here is that a strict invariantist
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account of these cases will be directly related to sceptical paradoxes, and I motivate
the use of Nagel’s account of sceptical pressure cases as a model for a non-sceptical
invariantist account of sceptical paradoxes. Next, I outline the general shape of the error
theory described by Nagel with respect to sceptical pressure cases. Finally, I describe
a putative account of how a non-sceptical invariantist might apply the framework of
Nagel’s sceptical pressure case error theory to sceptical paradoxes.
6.5.1 ‘Sceptical Pressure’ Puzzle.
Jennifer Nagel has conducted experiments in which some participants responded to—
amongst other things— one of the following three cases that describe the same subject in
relatively similar environments who is presented as making a judgement about the time:
“(A) Wanda is out for a weekend afternoon walk. She lives in a large new
condominium tower down-town, and her suite is fairly small and does not
have any windows that open, so she really likes to get out for some fresh air.
Passing near the train station, Wanda wonders what time it is. She glances
up at the clock on the train station wall and sees that it says 4:15 pm. It is in
fact 4:15 pm at that moment.
(B) Wanda is out for a weekend afternoon walk near the train station and
wonders what time it is. She glances up at the clock on the train station wall
and sees that it says 4:15 pm.It is in fact 4:15 pm at that moment. The station
clock is in fact working, but it has no second hand, and Wanda only looks at
it for a moment, so she would not be able to tell if the clock were stopped.”7
The second of these cases (B) is a sceptical pressure variant of (A), and differs from
the latter only in that it “raises the possibility that the clock is stopped, underscoring
the fact that nothing in the protagonist’s evidence specifically excludes that possibility”
(Nagel, 2012, 174). Only 58 percent of participants responding to (B) judged that Wanda
knows that it is 4:15 pm. Across the total eight versions tested, the subjects of the
sceptical pressure cases were judged to be cases of knowledge only 39.8 percent of the
time (Nagel, 2012, p.175). A much higher percentage (72.0) of participants judged that
7 (Nagel, 2012, 174). These are three variants of the Wanda story. In the experiment, each participant
responded to a series of different stories, which included only one variant of the Wanda story, i.e. only one
of (A) or (B).
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the subject of the ‘ordinary’ cases, including (A) and its variant story counterparts, knew
that it is 4:15.8
Given this data, it remains to be explained what it is about the sceptical pressure
case that generates a negative epistemic judgement concerning the subject. How does the
difference between the cases (A) and (B) generate the divergence in subjects’ willingness
to ascribe knowledge in the two cases? My interest will be in assessing whether the
approach Nagel takes to accounting for this seemingly inconsistent pattern of knowl-
edge ascriptions for an invariantist could serve as a model to explain the seemingly
inconsistent pattern of knowledge ascriptions constituting sceptical paradoxes.
6.5.2 Explaining the Error.
How might a non-sceptical invariantist explain the problematic pattern of judgements
about knowledge ascriptions with respect to sceptical pressure cases? Nagel maintains
that an implausible explanation would be that participants judged that “a momentary
look at a clock cannot be a way to know the time... [since] case (A) also stipulated that
Wanda just “glances up at the clock” and yet 86 percent of participants who responded to
(A) judged that Wanda did know the same proposition (Nagel, 2012, 175-6).9
To begin providing an alternative non-sceptical explanation of the propensity for
negative epistemic assessments of subjects in sceptical pressure cases, Nagel highlights
an important psychological fact. This is that, when we are attempting settle some
question “we have various more and less elaborate ways of making up our minds” and
these “various more or less elaborate ways of thinking about a problem are known as
‘cognitive strategies’ in the literature on variations in cognitive effort” (Nagel, 2012, 178).
These can be broadly classed into two distinct types: “...‘low’ strategies are quick and
heuristic in character; ‘high’ strategies demand greater effort and deliberate sequential
consideration of various alternatives” (ibid.). Nagel explains that a crucial aspect of both
story variants (A) and (B) is that none of these cases describe or provide information
concerning the cognitive strategy Wanda is employing in her attempt to find out what
time it is.
This is a significant omission since Wanda’s judgement as to what time it is will be
a result of both her cognitive processes and her evidence. Yet our ability to correctly
8 There were no reported p-values for the study.
9 Of course, a sceptical invariantist could argue that this is the right explanation. They could maintain
the 86 percent of participants attributing knowledge to Wanda in (A), and the 42 percent that did so in the
case of (B) are mistaken.
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represent the mental states of others—our mindreading capacity—is limited by the fact
that “we cannot simultaneously execute two strategies, or resolve a problem in two ways
at once” (ibid). The point here is that only one of at least two (broadly construed) possible
cognitive strategies can be employed at any one time. So, if the cognitive strategies that
we are using to think about a particular question diverge from those of an agent whose
judgement we are assessing, then we will be unable to accurately represent the strategy
which they employ in our assessment of their judgement.
The reason for this, Nagel explains, is that our capacity to ascribe mental states
to others takes as inputs only those “outwardly detectable features of their evidential
position” (Nagel, 2012, 179), and not any information concerning what cognitive strat-
egy they are in fact employing. When taken together with the thought that “Wanda’s
thinking should be construed the same way” in each of the two cases (A) and (B), Nagel
suggests that the divergence in our epistemic assessment of her beliefs in each case is
a consequence of the fact that we may not “intuitively see Wanda as thinking the same
way when we read each [vignette]” (Nagel, 2012, 180, added emphasis). The question
is, then, how do the two cases generate different ways of seeing the cognitive strategy
Wanda employs in the forming her judgement about the time?
Nagel explains that a central area of agreement in the literature on mindreading
includes the idea that “our mindreading system works on the assumption that given
the same inputs, people will tend to think in the same way”, which is to say that “a
person’s cognitive strategy is intuitively represented or replicated just on the basis of an
appreciation of her inputs” (Nagel, 2012, 181). The point here is that since the subject’s
inputs are identical in both (A) and (B), the subject will intuitively be seen to be pursuing
the same cognitive strategy in each. Nagel’s suggestion is that our divergent epistemic
assessments between the two cases may reflect the fact that features of the cases lead
to the employment of different cognitive strategies “as a standard or benchmark for
the performance of the observed agent” (Nagel, 2012, 183). The point here is that if a
subject’s judgement is assessed against the standard of the cognitive strategy employed
by the attributer, then if the subject’s epistemic behaviour is seen to fall short of that
expected of a subject pursuing the attributer’s cognitive strategy, then the subject will be
seen as having a problematic basis for their judgement.
How might an attributer responding to cases come to employ a different cognitive
strategy from the subject of the cases? Nagel points out that an important feature
typical of sceptical pressure cases is that they “invite us to contemplate merely potential
inputs—evidence that could have been collected [by the subject] but was not” (ibid). In
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case (B), for example, the reader of is informed that had the clocked been stopped, Wanda
would not have been able to tell that this was the case. Nagel explains that an important
consequence of this counter-factual information is that in order to “understand the last
negated clause” the reader of the case needs to think about the “possibility in which
Wanda is able to tell whether the clock is stopped” (Nagel, 2012, 183-4). Thinking about
this possibility involves thinking about the subject doing more than they actually do, in
coming to form their judgement. The subject in (B), for example, could be thought of as
spending more time looking at the clock—presumably 60 seconds would be sufficient—
since this is what we might expect it would take for them to be able to tell that the clock
had stopped. In order to appreciate that Wanda would not be able to tell whether the
clock had stopped, we need to appreciate the extent to which her epistemic behaviour
falls short of what it would take for her to do so.
The most significant point here is that the counterfactual information involved in
understanding the sceptical pressure cases draws our “attention to evidence that might
have been collected but was not” (ibid). It allows us to appreciate a gap between what it is
that the subject in fact does and what they could do further in forming an accurate belief
about what time it is. Importantly, thinking about “the hypothetical collection of surplus
information” by the subject of the case “requires the representation or replication of a
more elaborate cognitive strategy” by the reader than actually employed by the subject
(ibid). Our consideration of the possibility of error in reading the case has the effect of
pushing us “into a higher cognitive strategy for the problem the subject faces: we move
from making an automatic judgement to reasoning explicitly or sequentially about the
reliability of our source” (Nagel, 2012, 186). Importantly, in this explanation, Nagel is
alluding to the dual-process theory distinction between automatic, effortless, fast Type 1
or ‘intuitive’ judgements, and conscious, effortful, slow Type 2, or ‘reflective’ judgements.
This parallels my suggestion above that an adequate non-sceptical invariantist treatment
of sceptical paradoxes ought to draw explicitly on this distinction.
Nagel suggests that since we evaluate the fit between their thinking and their
objective environment when we assess whether a subject has knowledge, then the
standard by which we assess their thinking about their environment may plausibly be
our own way of thinking about their environment. Since the consideration of possibilities
of error induce the adoption of a more complex, effortful strategy by the attributer than
that understood to be pursued by the subject, Nagel suggests an explanation for the
general reluctance of attributers to ascribe knowledge to subjects in sceptical pressure
cases. The suggestion is that this reluctance to attribute knowledge represents our
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censuring of their “failure to adopt either our cognitive strategy or the range of evidence
we now find intuitively necessary [to form a reliable judgement], given the strategy we
have adopted” (ibid). The subject’s epistemic behaviour in the sceptical pressure case
(B) is the same as in the ordinary cases such as (A), in which knowledge is generally
attributed. An invariantist will maintain that if this epistemic behaviour is sufficient for
the subject to form a reliable belief, and subsequently to know the relevant proposition
in the latter case, then it is similarly sufficient in the former case.
Now, a sceptical invariantist could maintain, conversely, that the subject does not
know the relevant proposition in either the sceptical pressure cases, or the ordinary
cases. Yet an invariantist need not be sceptical in this way, and it is clear that Nagel
does not think that our reluctance to attribute knowledge in sceptical pressure cases
motivates sceptical invariantism. This reluctance, on her account, is simply the result of
the attributor representing the subject as failing to employ a more cautious belief forming
method than the one they really employ. But that does not mean that it would be correct
to deny that the subject knows, since, as Nagel puts it “[u]nless we have already been
persuaded by the skeptic, we do not ordinarily think that people should only ever form
their beliefs cautiously and inferentially” (Nagel, 2012, 187). A sceptical invariantist
could maintain that a denial that the subject knows in the sceptical pressure case is
correctly responding to the failure of the subject to respond to genuinely problematic
basis for their judgement. They could also maintain that an incorrect attribution of
knowledge, in the ordinary case, is simply the result of failing to respond to the same
problematic basis of the subject’s judgement. Nagel’s account of our intuitive epistemic
assessments of the two cases leaves it open whether subjects of ordinary cases “fail to
try as hard as we [recognise they] should” in order to know, or whether the subjects of
sceptical pressure cases are erroneously expected by us to expend “extra effort [in order
to know] needlessly” (Nagel, 2012, 187).
To summarise this section, it will be useful to bring together some of the most impor-
tant takeaway points from the discussion of Nagel’s work on sceptical pressure. Central
to Nagel’s work described here was the attempt to provide a non-sceptical invariantist
error theory, or an account for a seemingly problematic pattern of epistemic judgements.
Specifically, those elicited in response to both sceptical pressure cases, and their ‘ordinary’
variants. In line with the concluding remarks of section 6.3, my interest here has been
in the fact that this error theory is given in terms of the underlying cognitive processes
generating our epistemic judgements. The distinction between reflective and intuitive
judgements was seen to be central to the account of the erroneous epistemic judgement
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in response to sceptical pressure cases. Can the same account be used to explain the
erroneous epistemic judgement in response to sceptical arguments? In what follows,
I assess the extent to which the dual process error theory Nagel offers for sceptical
pressure cases is applicable to the sceptical paradoxes.
6.5.3 Dual Processes, Error and Sceptical Paradoxes
In this section, I offer a putative account of how the error theory proposed by Nagel
for sceptical pressure cases might apply to sceptical paradoxes. Central to Nagel’s
error theory was the effect of counter-factual information on the reader’s cognitive
processes. Specifically, the effect of considering the counter-factual information presented
in the sceptical pressure case was to require the reader to engage in reflective, Type 2
processing. On Nagel’s account, the erroneous judgement that the subject does not know
the target proposition in response to the sceptical pressure case, in which counter-factual
information is made salient, is a direct effect of this shift in how the reader thinks. To
reiterate, the effect of the counter-factual information on the reader is to get them to
think reflectively about epistemic behaviour bearing on the target proposition which the
subject has not pursued. This subsequently generates the reader’s judgement that the
subject does not know the target proposition.
Perhaps a promising way for a non-sceptical invariantist to account for our erroneous
judgment in the case of sceptical paradoxes would be in similar way to how they account
for the sceptical pressure cases. The latter sort of explanation is that when we think
about the counter-factual claim in a sceptical pressure case, we represent the counter-
factual scenario in which the subject’s epistemic behaviour falls short of what it would
take to count as knowing some proposition. Yet in order to represent the subject in this
way, we must also represent the sort of epistemic behaviour that it would take for the
subject to count as knowing in that counter-factual scenario. And for us to represent what
it would take is precisely to engage in a more complex cognitive strategy than the subject
is themselves employing in thinking about the question at hand—reasoning about the
quality of evidence, for example. Given our more complex cognitive strategy, we will
expect more in terms of accrued evidence before making a judgement on the question
than the subject we are assessing. Since we cannot represent more than one cognitive
strategy at a time, the subject’s judgment will be assessed relative to our standards for
evidence. Consequently, we will deem the subject’s evidential basis for their judgement
inadequate, and deny that they know.
Might the mechanisms responsible for our negative epistemic judgements in response
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to sceptical pressure cases be the same as those which generate the plausibility of scepti-
cal denials? To explore this suggestion, a promising place to start might be in highlighting
the strikingly prominent role of counter-factuals in both sceptical pressure cases and
sceptical arguments. On the non-sceptical invariantist account of sceptical pressure
cases outlined, our denials that the agent knows are the erroneous reflective Type 2
outputs of the dual-process mindreading capacity given the input of counter-factual
information. This parallels my working hypothesis concerning sceptical paradoxes: the
illusory plausibility of denying we know that sceptical hypotheses are false represents
an erroneous reflective Type 2 output of our dual-process mindreading capacity given
the input of a sceptical hypothesis. On this basis, I think it is worth exploring whether
the non-sceptical invariantist can give an error theory for sceptical paradoxes in terms
of dual-process mindreading, in which sceptical hypotheses play the same role as the
counter-factual information in sceptical pressure cases.
Many epistemologists think that our appreciation of counter-factual information lies
at the heart of the problem posed by sceptical arguments. For example, Michael Williams
suggests that an important feature of sceptical hypotheses is that:
the entire course of my experience could be just what it has been even if the
world were very different from the way I take it to be, or even if there were
no external world at all. (Williams, 1991, 52, my emphasis.).
As we saw in 1, Pryor too identifies counter-factual considerations as explaining the
effectiveness of another form of traditionally threatening sceptical hypothesis:
(1) You are not in a position to know you’re not being deceived by an evil
demon right now. ... premise (1) is motivated by the thought that no amount
of perceptual experience could enable you to determine whether or not you’re
being deceived by an evil demon, since you’d be having exactly the same
experiences even if you were being so deceived. (Pryor, 2000, 522, my em-
phasis.).
As we saw in both 2, and again in 4, DeRose diagnoses the coerciveness of the brain
in a vat hypothesis in terms similar counter-factual considerations:
[T]he problem with my belief that I’m not a BIV... is that I would have this
belief (that I‘m not a BIV) even if it were false (even if I were one). It is this
that makes it hard to claim to know that I‘m not a BIV... For example, and in
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particular, if I were a BIV, I would believe every bit as firmly as I actually
do that I was not one. (DeRose, 1995, 18-9, my emphasis.).
Finally, we can see the same considerations at play in Pritchard’s comments on the
same sceptical hypothesis:
I believe that I am not a BIV and that this belief is true. The problem with
this kind of belief, however, is that if it were false—if I were a BIV—then I
would, by hypothesis, continue to believe that it was true[.] (Pritchard, 2005,
49, my emphasis.).
I think it is clear, from these comments, that the appreciation of counter-factual
information concerning sceptical hypotheses plays some role in explaining what is about
them that presents us with paradoxes. This lends credence to the idea that the erroneous
plausibility of sceptical denials might be explicable in terms of the mechanism giving rise
to those erroneous responses to sceptical pressure cases. Our consideration of sceptical
hypotheses is often attended by certain counter-factual information. Such counter-factual
information requires us to engage in hypothetical thinking, and consequently induces
us to more effortful, reflective ways of thinking than we might have otherwise been
engaged in. There are certainly clear parallels between sceptical pressure cases and
the problematic hypotheses involved in sceptical paradoxes. I think this is a reason to
explore my suggestion at the beginning of the section that the sceptical pressure error
theory might serve as a good model for an invariantist error theory concerning sceptical
paradoxes. In the next section, however, I will review some reasons for thinking that the
analogy is not quite as close as it might have seemed.
6.5.4 Dissimilarity of sceptical pressure cases and paradoxes.
In this section, I consider some potential reasons to think that the sceptical pressure error
theory described in section 6.5.3 might not serve as a good model for the non-sceptical
invariantist to use in explaining away sceptical paradoxes.
The first observation that might raise doubts about this suggestion involves a dis-
similarity between sceptical paradoxes and sceptical pressure cases in terms of how
the attributer and the subject of the erroneous knowledge judgement are related. The
puzzle regarding sceptical pressure cases was that people had apparently inconsistent
judgements about what another individual knows between certain cases, which an in-
variantist maintains do not differ in any way relevant to the truth of the attribution.
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People typically judge that an agent knows some proposition p in response to one case,
but may also judge that the agent does not know in response to another case which
differs only in terms of additional counter-factual information given to the attributer.
In contrast, sceptical paradoxes typically involve an apparently inconsistent set of
judgements about what the attributer knows. People typically judge both that they know
some contingent proposition p, and that if they know that p, then they know that they
are not a brain in a vat, for example, whilst at the same time they may judge that they
do not know that they are not a brain in a vat. This creates a problem for thinking that
the error theory discussed in the previous section can be recruited to adequately explain
why we might mistakenly judge that we do not know we are not brains in a vat. This is
because the explanation for the erroneous judgement that the subject does not know in
response to the sceptical pressure case relies explicitly on the fact that the attributer
and subject of attribution are not the same person. Nagel sums up the origins of our
mistaken epistemic judgement by pointing out that when “one’s own way of thinking
about a problem really is more elaborate than that of the subject one is observing, one’s
intuitive mindreading of this more naive subject may be compromised” (Nagel, 2012,
182). But in case of first-person sceptical paradoxes, it is not clear that the attributer’s
way of thinking about the problem can be more elaborate than the subject of attribution.
This is for the simple reason that they are one and the same person. And for this reason
it seems that the error involved in sceptical paradoxes may not be adequately explained
in the same way as the error involved in sceptical pressure cases.
The second observation that might raise doubts about the suggestion involves a
dissimilarity between sceptical paradoxes and sceptical pressure cases in terms of the
content of the apparently conflicting epistemic judgements. The puzzle of sceptical
pressure cases, for a non-sceptical invariantist, is that attributers tend to judge that
a subject knows that p in one case, and does not know that p in another case. The
invariantist’s task is to account for this potentially problematic pattern of judgements.
In contrast, sceptical paradoxes are not usually understood as being comprised of a set of
judgements that a single subject does and does not know a single proposition. Rather, the
potentially problematic pattern of epistemic judgements comprising sceptical paradoxes
are those made under a single set of circumstances with respect to a single subject and
distinct propositions, such as I know that I have hands, if I know that I have hands, then
I know I am not a brain in a vat, and I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat.
The crucial dissimilarity here between the puzzles of sceptical pressure cases and
sceptical paradoxes concerns the role played by salient ignorance possibilities. These
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are possibilities in which some subject S is ignorant of some given empirical proposition
p. In the sceptical pressure puzzle, the possibility that the clock has stopped, and that,
subsequently, Wanda does not know that it is 4:15, is made salient in case (B). Typically,
sceptical paradoxes involves a sceptical possibility in which a subject S is ignorant of
every empirical proposition (that they are a brain in a vat, or dreaming, for example) is
made salient in the arguments’ first premises. The disanalogy consists in the different
ways in which these ignorance possibilities feature in accounting for the puzzles. In the
case of sceptical paradoxes, what is to be explained by a non-sceptical invariantist are
our judgements about S’s epistemic position regarding the salient possibility of their
ignorance with respect to every p. In contrast, with respect to the sceptical pressure
puzzle, what is to be explained are our judgements about S’s epistemic position regarding
an empirical proposition p, given a salient possibility of their ignorance of it.
In the sceptical pressure error theory, the ignorance possibility in which the clock
has stopped, was directly implicated in generating the erroneous judgement that the
subject did not know the target proposition (ie. what time is is). Even if there is a clear
link between hypotheses in sceptical paradoxes and the counter-factual antecedents in
sceptical pressure cases, it is also clear that their role in the respective error-theories will
not be the same. Simply put, sceptical arguments present us with paradoxes precisely
because we normally continue to judge that we know various empirical propositions, even
if considerations of sceptical hypotheses compel us to judge that we do not know we are
not brains in vats. And for this reason too it seems that the error involved in sceptical
paradoxes may not be adequately explained in the same way as the error involved in
sceptical pressure cases.
There is one final observation that I think may cast doubt on any close analogy
between the error theory described above with respect to sceptical pressure cases, and
one applicable to sceptical paradoxes. This concerns a significant difference between
the sorts of counter-factual considerations involved. Central to the explanation of the
erroneous judgements that the subject did not know in sceptical pressure cases was
the fact that the counter-factuals required us to envisage the subject of attribution
collecting more evidence than they in fact do. But this is not true of the counter-factual
considerations that usually accompany radical sceptical hypotheses. For example, in
order to understand the counter-factual ‘if I were a brain in a vat, then I would not be
able to tell that I was not one’, I may have to envisage being a brain in a vat. But at
no point in doing so, do I plausibly envisage any further evidence that I can acquire,
whether in actuality, or in the counter-factual scenario. Rather, it is characteristic of
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radical sceptical hypotheses such as this one that there simply is no more evidence I can
acquire in actuality with respect to any contingent proposition, and especially not in the
scenario described by the hypothesis. Nagel’s account of the erroneous judgements, that
the subject in sceptical pressure cases did not know the target proposition, was based on
the idea that “understanding the road not taken—the hypothetical collection of surplus
information—requires the representation or replication of a more elaborate cognitive
strategy” (Nagel, 2012, 184) than the subject of attribution actually employs. With radical
sceptical hypotheses and their related counter-factual considerations, however, there is
no hypothetical collection of surplus information. And for this reason, again, it seems
that the sort of error involved in sceptical paradoxes may not be adequately explained in
the same way as that in sceptical pressure cases.
I have outlined some reasons for thinking that Nagel’s approach to explaining away
the pattern of judgements about knowledge ascriptions concerning sceptical pressure
cases might not serve as an analogous model for providing a non-sceptical invariantist
error theory for sceptical paradoxes. The question of whether these points count decisively
against the idea that the erroneous judgements involved in sceptical paradoxes are
explicable in the same way as those in sceptical pressure cases would be a subject for
further work. In the remainder of this chapter, I will move on to consider a promising
model for a non-sceptical invariantist error theory, that further develops my driving
thought that it is a kind of ‘internal conflict’ that gives rise to sceptical paradoxes.
6.6 Dual Processes and Default-Interventionism.
I have surveyed two potential routes for an invariantist to provide an adequate error
theory with respect to sceptical paradoxes. The first proposed that the availability
heuristic could explain why we might mistakenly judge that we do not know sceptical
hypotheses are false, and it was argued to face significant issues. The second proposed
that an account of why we might mistakenly judge that a subject does not know a
proposition in response to sceptical pressure cases might serve as a potential model for
the apparent plausibility of sceptical arguments’ first premises. I suggested that this
model too faces some significant issues if it is applied to sceptical paradoxes. In what
follows, I put forward third potential model for an invariantist error theory concerning
sceptical paradoxes. This model is inspired by another way which cognitive psychology
has been used to provide an invariantist account of some potentially problematic patterns
of epistemic judgement.
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Gerken (2012, 2013) has presented “an account of the cognitive processes involved in
the formation of judgements about knowledge ascriptions [that] may provide a unified
explanation of” (2013, 2) certain data concerning knowledge ascription which may
motivate rivals to non-sceptical strict invariantism. Gerken’s work informs my aims,
and specifically, it will be worth explaining the bearing of the following comments on my
work:
“My working assumption that judgements about knowledge ascriptions
do not differ radically from other judgements involves the assumption that
such judgements are also constrained by our cognitive capacities. They may,
therefore, be biased. I have applied this general idea to patterns of judge-
ments about knowledge ascriptions in a manner that is compatible with
non-skeptical strict invariantism.” (Gerken, 2012, 162)
Like Gerken, my aim here is to give an non-sceptical strict invariantist account of a
potentially problematic pattern of judgements about knowledge, in terms of the dual
process theories of the cognitive capacities underlying these judgements. Specifically,
I aim to describe a non-sceptical strict invariantist error theory concerning sceptical
paradoxes, in terms of the dual process theories of judgement. In developing this error
theory I draw upon the default-interventionist version of dual-process theory defended
by Evans (2007; 2013; 2011; 2014). In the next and final section, I draw upon the default-
interventionist framework, as well as the results from chapters 2 and 3, in order to
present a new and promising error theory for non-sceptical invariantists. First, in the
remainder of this section, I outline the default-interventionist account of dual process
theory.
Default-interventionism is a refinement of dual process theory of higher cognition
which describes the way in which Type 1 and Type 2 processes are employed and
interact in cognitive tasks.10 The most basic claim of default-interventionism is that
the processing involved in a given cognitive task proceeds in the following way: “Type 1
processing produces a rapid and intuitive default response, which may or may not be
intervened upon by subsequent Type 2 reasoning which is slower and deliberative in
nature” (Evans, 2011, 93). Or, in more detail:
Type 2 processing requires extremely limited and precious working mem-
ory resources, according to the definitions we are putting forward. These
10 However, there are dual process theories that are not default-interventionist in their account of how
processes interact in cognitive tasks. See, for example, (Sloman, 1996), and (Smith and DeCoster, 2000).
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must be selectively allocated to the most important task at hand. Default
interventionism allows that most of our behavior is controlled by Type 1
processes running in the background. Thus, most behavior will accord with
defaults, and intervention will occur only when difficulty, novelty, and moti-
vation combine to command the resources of working memory. (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013, 238)
Perhaps the most fundamental aspect of default-interventionist versions of dual-
process theory is, as the above quote clearly states, that humans—being the finite beings
they are—are simply not capable of engaging in reflective thought to undertake every
cognitive task that might come our way. Most of the time, Type 1 processes carry the
majority of the cognitive load, with Type 2 processes only being called upon to do only as
much as is absolutely necessary. Importantly, and in contrast to more classical accounts,
Type 1 and Type 2 processes do not occur in isolation, but rather interact with each other
frequently. And it is this interaction that default-interventionism purports to explain.
To see how it does, consider Figure 1 below, which models the interaction of Type 1 and
Type 2 processes on a recently developed default-interventionist account of dual process
theory.
The diagram in Figure 1 illustrates the default-interventionist model of higher
cognition. As noted, each cognitive task prompts an autonomous Type 1 process which
generates a response, here labelled ‘A1’. In explaining this aspect of the model, Evans
states that “A1 simply represents the default intuitive response that will be made unless
Type 2 processing intervenes with rethinking the problem” (Evans, 2011, 95). The box
labelled ‘Reflective processing (Type 2)’ in the diagram represents the engagement
of Type 2 processing. On default-interventionist theories, such reflective processing
always occurs subsequently to Type 1 processing to take up and assess the intuitive
responses generated by it.11 The actual Type 2 assessment of the intuitive response
A1 is represented by the decision box in the diagram labelled ‘A1 justified?’. On the
default-interventionist theory there are two possible outcomes when this reflective
“attempt is made to verify the initial intuition A1” (Evans, 2011, 94): either the Type
2 process accepts the Type 1 response A1, or else it rejects it. The former possibility
results in the reflective endorsement of A1; it becomes the ‘default’ response. The latter
possibility results in an attempt to rethink the problem reflectively; this is what is
termed ‘intervention’, or ‘override’.
11 See (Evans, 2007) and (Faghihi et al., 2015).
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Figure 1: Default-Interventionist model of Dual Process Theory.12
The propensity to accept or reject an initial intuitive Type 1 response is determined
by a degree of critical effort “which is itself a function of the motivational and cognitive
factors” (Evans, 2011, 96). The motivational factors include the Feeling of Rightness
(or FOR), any instructions accompanying the task (or instructional set), and thinking
dispositions. The Feeling of Rightness is the term for a meta-cognitive judgement of a
varying strength determined by “the fluency with which Type 1 processes produce an
initial answer” and “that in turn mediates the extent of Type 2 engagement” (Thompson
et al., 2013, 238).13 An instructional set is basically the set of instructions that an
individual is given for completing a specific task.14 Thinking dispositions refer to the
dispositions different individuals may have for thinking about problems, for example,
some people may tend to approach problems with analytic thinking, whilst others may
tend to use more intuitive approaches. The cognitive factors include time constraints
on a task, competing tasks include additional tasks that involve working memory use,
12 From (Evans, 2011).
13 See also (Thompson et al., 2011; Thompson and Johnson, 2014).
14 See also (Macpherson and Stanovich, 2007), Cf. (Auf, 2009) and (Set, 2009).
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whilst working memory capacity is self-explanatory. Finally, ‘mindware’ refers to the
“rules, procedures, and strategies that can be retrieved by the algorithmic and reflective
minds” and is crucial for “the construction of an alternative response to substitute during
the override of Type 1 processing” (Stanovich et al., 2011, 107).
The resources of default-interventionism capture the notion of an internal conflict,
and can be drawn upon to further develop my idea for a general strategy involved in
resolving sceptical paradoxes in terms of a psychological error theory. This strategy
views the internal conflict involved in sceptical paradoxes as instances of what are
called cognitive illusions. In the most basic sense, cognitive illusions are systematically
generated false beliefs, which are “just the by-products of a cognitive system which is
responsible for extracting knowledge about the world” (Yarritu et al., 2015, 2). Cognitive
illusions have been described as being “analogous to optical illusions in leading to errors
we commit without knowing we are doing so, except they arise from our difficulties in
quantifying and dealing with probabilities, uncertainty, and risk” (Nicholls, 1999, 1386).
Cognitive illusions can be seen in the responses to various problems which form the
Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT).15 In particular, the item known as the ‘bat and the
ball’ problem has become a well-known case of a cognitive illusion, and serves as an
instructive example of how default-interventionism accounts for certain internal conflict.
In the bat and the ball item of the CRT, participants are tasked with solving the following
problem:16
Bat and ball: A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the
ball. How much does the ball cost?
The bat and ball problem presents a cognitive illusion since the intuitive answer to
the problem is normally judged to be $0.10. This answer is incorrect (it is $0.05), but
yet it is a mistaken response that was given more than half of the time by participants
from Ivy league universities (Evans, 2011). The felt plausibility of the erroneous answer
“$0.10” is the cognitive illusion here. When faced with the problem, a Type 1 process
generates an initial answer cued by contextual features of the problem. The intuitive
answer ‘$0.10’, for example, may be cued by the salience of the information that the
bat costs $1 more than the ball, and that together they cost $1.10, which may prompt
a Type 1 process to preconsciously subtract $1.00 from $1.10. This erroneous answer
then may be the default response to the problem if either Type 2 processes are not
15 See (Frederick, 2005).
16 From (Toplak et al., 2014).
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engaged in critical assessment of it, or if reasons are not found for this Type 1 output to
be overridden and replaced by Type 2 response.
The notion of a cognitive illusion can be related to the explanandum of a non-sceptical
invariantist error theory concerning sceptical paradoxes, viz. that we find it plausible to
judge that we don’t know that sceptical hypotheses are false. The non-sceptical invari-
antist can explain our tendency to be systematically misled by sceptical arguments in
this way as an example of a cognitive illusion. In providing their error theory concerning
our judgements with respect to sceptical premises, they can maintain that these are the
result of facts about our cognitive architecture. In the example of the bat and the ball
problem, the felt plausibility of the erroneous answer ‘$0.10’ may be accounted for on
a dual-process theory picture as the result of our cognitive architecture in terms of the
interaction of Type 1 and Type 2 processes. In the case of sceptical paradoxes, perhaps
the non-sceptical invariantist can now use dual-process theories to account for the felt
plausibility of erroneously denying that we know that we are not in sceptical scenarios.
On this proposal, the internal conflict of sceptical paradoxes is accounted for a cognitive
illusion. Specifically, the felt plausibility of the first premises of sceptical arguments
is viewed as the erroneous result of Type 2 processes. On this picture, the sceptical
paradoxes represent cognitive illusions, in the same sense that the Bat and the Ball item,
but which differ in that the illusory judgement is a Type 2, rather than a Type 1 output.
Before further developing this account, it will be useful to use another example to
draw out the idea of a cognitive illusion in which it is a Type 2 judgment that is erroneous.
To do this, let’s explore how the default-interventionism picture could be used to account
for the erroneous knowledge ascriptions made in response to the sceptical pressure case
discussed by Nagel. To recap, the non-sceptical strict invariantist maintains that an
attribution of knowledge to Wanda in case (A) represents a true positive. In contrast, they
will maintain that a denial that Wanda knows in case (B) represents a false negative.
In the case of (A), following the default-interventionist picture, the invariantist
can account for the judgement that Wanda knows in terms of the default aspect of
our cognitive architecture. On this account, the task facing the reader of the vignette
prompts a Type 1 process to generate an answer. An intuitive answer that Wanda knows
in this case is strongly cued by contextual features of the vignette, such as the subject’s
behaviour and their environment. Intuitively, we regard Wanda as knowing that it is
4:15 on the basis of her coming to belief this having checked a clock which displays the
actual time of 4:15. Now, using the default-interventionist picture, the invariantist can
suggest that in the absence of any obvious reason to reflect on the output of the Type 1
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process with costly Type 2 processing, the intuitive answer that Wanda knows that it
is 4:15 will be given by default.17 A non-sceptical invariantist typically maintain that
Wanda does know in (A), and so can regard this intuitive answer as a true positive.
In the case of (B) the invariantist can drawn on the default-interventionist picture to
account for the judgement that Wanda does not know in terms of both the intervention,
and subsequent override aspects of our cognitive architecture. Here, the account proceeds
initially in the same manner as with case (A). Reading the vignette (B) prompts a Type
1 process to generate an answer cued by contextual features of the case. In contrast to
(A), however, the counter-factual content involved in (B) prompts a Type 2 process to
intervene upon the output of the initial Type 1 process. This occurs because, as noted
above, Type 2 processing “is involved whenever we engage in hypothetical thinking,
supposition, or mental simulation” (Evans, 2007, 110). The intervention of a Type 2
process involves the subsequent critical examination of the intuitively generated answer.
On the default-interventionist picture, if the product of an initial Type 1 process is
reflectively deemed unsatisfactory, it will be overridden and the reflective answer that
Wanda does not know is given instead. A non-sceptical invariantist typically maintains
that Wanda does know in (B), and so will regard this reflective answer as a false negative.
We have seen that the resources of default-interventionist theories provide a way
of characterising internal conflicts as cognitive illusions. In this way, the non-sceptical
invariantist can draw on these resources to account for the internal conflict of sceptical
paradoxes as cognitive illusions. In contrast to the cognitive illusions discussed in the
psychology literature, however, my proposal is that the erroneous judgment in sceptical
paradoxes represents the output of a Type 2 process. To explore this idea, I applied the
resources of default-interventionism to the example of sceptical pressure cases discussed
by Nagel. I suggested that it provides a promising account of sceptical pressure cases
as examples of cognitive illusions involving erroneous Type 2 judgements. Ultimately,
however, I think that various salient dissimilarities between sceptical paradoxes and
sceptical pressure cases, put a limit on how closely an invariantist can adequately model
an error-theory for the former upon the latter.
To summerise this section, and the chapter so far, I think that two important points
have been made concerning the prospects of providing a happy-face non-sceptical in-
variantist resolution of sceptical paradoxes. Firstly, internal conflicts such as sceptical
paradoxes, can be account for as cognitive illusions arising from our cognitive architec-
17 What is significant here is that, in this case, is that a Type 1 response is given to the case without
the intervention of a Type 2 process. It is an important feature of the default-interventionist picture that
Type 2 processes do not necessarily have to be involved in judgement making.
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ture involving Type 1 and Type 2 processes. Second, some cognitive illusions can be
attributed to Type 2 processes being responsible for generating erroneous judgements—as
in the case of sceptical pressure cases. Interestingly, this is a commitment of default-
interventionist dual-process theory that is commonly over-looked:
Perhaps the most persistent fallacy in the perception of dual-process theories
is the idea that Type 1 processes (intuitive, heuristic) are responsible for all
bad thinking and that Type 2 processes (reflective, analytic) necessarily lead
to correct responses. (Evans and Stanovich, 2013, 229)
This point is, I think, especially significant in that it raises the interesting and novel pos-
sibility that sceptical paradoxes arise because of an error attributable to reflective Type
2 thinking. In the next section, I take on this idea, and apply the default-interventionist
picture to the case of sceptical arguments to describe a more detailed non-sceptical
invariantist account of sceptical paradoxes as Type 2 cognitive illusions.
6.7 Default-interventionism, Sceptical Illusions, and
Invariantism.
In this section, I present a non-sceptical strict invariantist error theory concerning
sceptical paradoxes by drawing together the results of two earlier chapters with the
default-interventionist model of dual process theory. I begin by briefly recapping the
main points of the chapter concerning what was identified as required of an invariantist
solution to sceptical paradoxes, and what was found. Next, I set out some general ways
in which the default-interventionist model of dual-process theory can be utilised by an
invariantist in an error theory to resolve the sceptical paradox. Finally, I draw on the
findings of chapters 2 and 3 concerning, respectively, sceptical hypotheses and sceptical
arguments, together with the default-interventionist framework to provide the details of
the proposed invariantist error theory.
At the beginning of this chapter, I described what was required of an invariantist
to satisfactorily resolve the sceptical paradoxes. This amounts to doing two things. The
first is to identify the false claim amongst the set of the two premises, and the negated
conclusion of a sceptical argument. The second is to provide an adequate error theory
concerning the claim that was identified as false, viz. a plausible account of why we might
have mistakenly judged it to be true. A non-sceptical strict invariantist will maintain that
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we do know the negations of sceptical hypotheses, and so identify the minor premise of a
sceptical argument as false. I have suggested that a promising route for an invariantist
would be to provide a psychological, rather than a semantic error theory. So let me offer
such an account in whats follows drawing on my favoured default-interventionist picture.
Having set out the default-interventionist framework in the previous section, it now
remains for me to apply it to sceptical paradoxes, and begin to describe my proposal
for an adequate psychological error theory. I set out this proposal in two stages. First,
I set out some ways in which the invariantist can directly apply the framework to the
sceptical problem to give a psychological error theory. Here, the main work involves
characterising the internal conflict of sceptical paradoxes as a cognitive illusion, in terms
of the default-interventionist resources. In the second stage, I draw upon my account of
sceptical hypotheses, and epistemic principles to suggest an account of the mechanism
responsible for the hypothesised intervention, and subsequent override.
As I have already noted, a non-sceptical strict invariantist will maintain that the
first premise of a sceptical argument is false. They need to explain why we might judge
it to be true. On my account, the invariantist can use the default-interventionist picture
to characterise a judgement that we do not know sceptical hypotheses to be false as an
erroneous output of our cognitive processes. The first step on my account is to identify the
erroneous judgement—I do not know I am not a brain in a vat, for example—as the output
of a reflective Type 2 process, rather than an intuitive Type 1 process. In other words, on
my non-sceptical invariantist account, sceptical paradoxes arise because our reflective
judgments concerning minor sceptical premises conflict with our intuitive knowledge
ascriptions. When confronted with sceptical arguments, we may feel a reflective pull
towards denying we know that we are not brains in vats, for example, even whilst we
intuitively think we know we have hands. The internal conflict lies between the outputs
of our Type 1 and Type 2 cognition, just as it did in the Bat and the Ball example of a
cognitive illusion. The difference is that in the latter case, the illusion was the intuitive
plausibility of the erroneous Type 1 response ‘$0.10’. In the case of sceptical paradoxes, on
my account, the illusion is the reflective plausibility of the Type 2 judgements concerning
sceptical minor premises, such as ‘I do not know I am not a brain in a vat’.
It is worth pointing out that the assumption that our erroneous sceptical judgements
as reflective Type 2 judgements finds support in the literature on sceptical paradoxes.
Epistemologists commonly recognise that finding the minor premises of sceptical ar-
guments to be plausible is something that can happen only on reflection. Williams, for
example, thinks this, even if he confusingly uses his own distinct technical sense of the
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term ‘intuitive’, as can be seen in the following comments:
However damaging the sceptic’s conclusions may be, they will amount to
a threat only if we suspect that we are committed to them. Thus the sceptic’s
arguments must at least appear to be compelling because intuitive. By calling
them “intuitive”, I mean that the sceptic must derive his conclusions from
what anyone one can see, on reflection... (Williams, 2012, 354, my emphasis)
skepticism is not a stable, long-term option, it can be attained, or at
least approached, in the context of sustained philosophical reflection, which
detaches us from the perceptual and practical factors that ordinarily influence
belief. (Williams, 2013, 40)
This plausible assumption, that our erroneous judgements with respect to the minor
premises of sceptical arguments are the outputs of Type 2 reflective processes, has
some further implications for the proposed account. The default-interventionist model of
dual-process theory holds that, in forming a judgement “fast Type 1 processing generates
intuitive default responses on which subsequent reflective Type 2 processing may or
may not intervene” (Evans, 2011, 213). The next step in presenting my non-sceptical
invariantist account, then, is to suggest that sceptical paradoxes arise because of override.
On my view, an erroneous categorical judgement that a sceptical hypothesis is not
known to be false is the result of Type 2 processes overriding a default Type 1 intuitive
judgement, and replacing it with a Type 2 reflective judgement.
I have argued that default interventionist dual-process theories of judgement can
help a non-sceptical invariantist account for the erroneous plausibility of minor scep-
tical premises. This is the result of a Type 2 reflective process intervening upon, and
overriding an initial Type 1 process. To complete the proposed invariantist psychologi-
cal error theory concerning sceptical paradoxes, it remains to give an account of what
triggers this reflective intervention, and why it results override. In the remainder of
this section, I set out an account of both the mechanism for Type 2 intervention, and
of the subsequent override. Here, I draw on the further resources of epistemology, and
specifically my accounts of sceptical hypotheses and sceptical arguments from chapters 2
and 3, respectively. I combine these accounts with default-interventionist resources to
suggest how sceptical paradoxes arise as the result of reflective override.
What mechanism triggers the intervention of Type 2 processes when considering
sceptical arguments? Following the suggestion earlier, I suggest that the negation in-
volved in the minor sceptical premise prompts a Type 2 process to intervene. Recall that
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these premises deny that we know that sceptical hypotheses do not obtain. Drawing
on the above discussion of sceptical pressure cases, I propose that this negation can be
identified the mechanism triggering Type 2 intervention. In order to think about the
negated possibility (that I am a brain in a vat, for example), it is necessary to sustain a
decoupled representation, and this requires Type 2 processing:
[I]n order to reason hypothetically, we must be able to prevent our repre-
sentations of the real world from becoming confused with representations
of imaginary situations. The so-called cognitive decoupling operations are
the central feature of Type 2 processing that makes this possible. (Evans and
Stanovich, 2013, 236)
The first part of the account, then, maintains that when we are confronted with
sceptical arguments, the negation of sceptical hypotheses triggers Type 2 processes to
intervene, and, subsequently, generate our reflective judgements about the arguments’
premises.
The next thing to spell out, on this account, is why the Type 2 process intervention
triggered by minor sceptical premises results in override. In other words, why might our
Type 2 processes generate the reflective plausibility of premises such as ‘I do not know I
am not a brain in a vat’? My suggestion is that this override occurs because a reflectively
available adequacy constraint on responses to sceptical arguments’ first premises can
never be satisfied. On my view, the epistemic principles underwriting arguments from
ignorance combine with the characteristic generality of sceptical hypotheses to create an
unsatisfiable constraint on rejecting minor sceptical premises. In short, any counter a
claim of the form ‘S knows that not-sh’, when sh is a sceptical hypothesis with the widest
scope, will always seem to beg the question.
This aspect of my proposed account can be now described in more detail. It will be
instructive to focus on the example of a paradoxical sceptical argument, and so I will use
the argument presented in section 6.2—essentially ENVATTED BRAIN—as a toy model
here. How does this argument generate a cognitive illusion in the sense outlined above.
In proceeding, I assume that when someone is presented with the first premise of a
sceptical argument (for example, I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat), the
negation of the brain in a vat hypothesis prompts a Type 2 process that intervenes upon
any Type 1 process. Now, my hypothesis is that my Type 2 process will critically assess
the plausibility of the sceptical premise in terms of the principle of epistemic possibility
that I argued for in chapter 3:
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Epistemic Possibility.
For all S, p, S knows that p only if it is not epistemically possible for S that ¬p.
Here, then, is a suggestive sketch of what sort of processes might give rise to the
illusory, reflective judgement that (1) is plausible. Suppose I encounter the sceptical
argument presented in 6.3. With the Epistemic Possibility principle in mind, I might
reflect that I know I am not a brain in a vat only if it is not epistemically possible for
me that I am a brain in a vat. I might also reflectively recognise, given the analysis of
epistemic possibility that I favour, that it is not epistemically possible for me that I am a
brain in a vat only if my being a brain in a vat is inconsistent with me knowing what
I know. When reflecting on the sceptical premise that ‘I do not know that I am not a
brain in a vat’, I may realise, then, that this premise is false only if, given what I know,
it cannot be the case that I am a brain in a vat. On my view, the reflective plausibility of
the sceptical premise that ‘I do not know I am not a brain in a vat’ is the illusory product
of Type 2 intervention and override. My suggestion is that, insofar as I feel a reflective
pull towards assenting to this premise, this is merely the result of Type 2 override. What
I propose proposal is that, when reflecting, I may be led inexorably to judge that I do not
know I am a brain in a vat, given my appreciation of the Epistemic possibility principle,
and my inability to satisfactorily counter the claim that it is epistemically possible for
me that I am a brain in a vat. In the remainder of this section, I set out this proposal in
more detail.
It is worth stressing, however, that I do not take that the view that Epistemic
Possibility ought to be rejected by a non-sceptical invariantist. The role played by this
principle in my account of Type 2 override in sceptical paradoxes is subtle. On my
account, it is not that I infer that I do not know I am not a brain in a vat, from Epistemic
Possibility and the de facto recognition that it is epistemically possible for me that I
am one. Rather, the pull I feel, on reflection, towards the sceptic’s minor premise arises
because of two things: my recognition that Epistemic Possibility holds, and the de facto
impossibility of satisfactorily maintaining that it is not epistemically possible for me that
I am a brain in a vat.
Why might that be? After all, various examples of propositions I know, such that
it could not be the case that I am a brain in a vat and know these propositions might
come to my mind readily. I could think, for example, “I have stood for many hours in my
office, I know that, and so I cannot be a brain in vat.” This is clearly a valid counter to
the claim that it is epistemically possible for me that I am a brain in a vat, for example.
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This is obviously not, however, a satisfactory way to counter this claim in the context of
a sceptical argument. This is because my counter-example to the claim that the sceptical
hypothesis is epistemically possible for me contravenes the readily appreciable injunction
not to beg the question against the argument that I am considering. But this sceptical
argument I am considering threatens to challenge all my putative empirical knowledge
at once, and my presumed knowledge of having stood for many hours in my office is, of
course, a piece of empirical knowledge. I clearly beg the question against the sceptical
argument, then, if I attempt to reject the premise that I do not know that I am not a
brain in a vat by citing my putative knowledge that I have stood for many hours in my
office.
Worse still, as I reflect further, I realise that I can never be in a position to satisfacto-
rily deny that it is epistemically possible for me that I am a brain in a vat. Any attempt I
might make to do this is determined to fail. This is because, in order to do so I would
have to consider myself to have ruled out that I am a brain in a vat, without begging the
question against the sceptical argument. I can rule out that I am a brain in a vat only if
this hypothesis is incompatible with what I know. And that, in turn, would require me
to know some empirical proposition. Yet, as I argued in chapter 2, sceptical arguments
threaten to challenge all empirical knowledge in virtue of sceptical hypotheses being
possibilities of global empirical ignorance. Consequently, I beg the question against the
sceptical argument by relying on any putative empirical knowledge of mine.
At this point, the result of my reflections in considering the sceptical argument
might be that I have no way to adequately reject the premise that I do not know that
I am not a brain in a vat. I may find myself reflecting along the following lines: I feel
like I really do know that I am not a brain in a vat, but, on reflection, there is just no
way to deny that I do not know that, so what can I do? In this way, it might be that I
begin to feel that the sceptical premise, that I do not know that I am not a brain in a
vat, has a sort of reflective, albeit peculiar and illusory plausibility. On this picture, the
illusory plausibility of sceptical premises represents a sort of cognitive attrition—a feeling
of “if you can’t beat them, join them”—and can be characterised by the non-sceptical
invariantist as an example of override, and a cognitive illusion. And this, I think, neatly
captures the sense in which sceptical paradoxes represent an internal conflict; we do not
really accept that we do not know that we are not brains in vats, but we also recognise
that we are not able to reflectively reject this claim, given the natural considerations of
epistemic possibility involved.
According to default-interventionist theories, costly Type 2 processing cannot continue
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indefinitely, and must end at some point. On my account, the intervention of Type 2
processes terminates in override. This is because the injunction not to beg the question,
and the characteristic generality of sceptical hypotheses together imply that I cannot
counter the claim that it is epistemically possible for me that I am a brain in a vat.
My intervening Type 2 process must inevitably end, and it will do so without having
satisfactorily modeled the falsity of the sceptical premise that I do not know that I am
not a brain in a vat. In the context of considering sceptical arguments, the impossibility
of adequately rejecting a sceptical premise reflectively results in override, and gives rise
to an illusory reflective judgement that it is true.
In this way, I suggest, the non-sceptical invariantist can account for the erroneous
plausibility of sceptical premises, and, subsequently, why sceptical paradoxes emerge.
The plausibility of a sceptical argument’s minor premise is illusory, and a sceptical
paradox is a cognitive illusion.
6.8 Assessing my proposal.
In the previous section, I outlined a non-sceptical invariantist error theory concerning
sceptical paradoxes based on a default-interventionist model of dual-process theory of
cognition. I turn now, in this final section, to comment on how this error theory relates to
the residual issues of previous chapters. In chapter 1, I considered various constraints on
a fully satisfactory, happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes. The most important of
these was that a solution must provide an error theory concerning the set of judgments
comprising the paradoxes. I further argued that an important constraint on the adequacy
of these error-theories is that the explanation for the erroneous judgement must be given
in terms that are not purely epistemological.
On my account, the explanation for the erroneous pull of sceptical premises is given
in terms of dual-process theories of cognition. Our systematic error when presented
with sceptical arguments can be described as the result of our cognitive architecture. A
mistaken judgement that we don’t know that sceptical hypotheses are false amounts
to a Type 2 process output given the cognitive task of assessing sceptical arguments.
This happens because Type 2 processes are triggered and override our initial automatic
attempts to generate a Type 1 judgement about sceptical premises. Yet Type 2 processes
will tend to generate negative judgements that sceptical hypotheses are not known to be
false. This happens, on my view, as a result of the reflective appreciation of the Epistemic
Possibility principle, and the impossibility of generating a non-question-begging counter
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to the claim that the sceptical hypothesis is epistemically possible. Type 2 processing
can not continue indefinitely, and must stop somewhere. The result is that our cognitive
efforts end with effective override by Type 2 processes, and we feel a reflective pull
towards denying we know that sceptical hypotheses are false.
In this way, I think that I have succeeded in sketching an error-theory for a happy-
face resolution of sceptical paradoxes that is broadly confusion-therapeutic. I did not, in
presenting my error theory, make any obvious conceptually concessive, or revisionary,
moves to resolve the sceptical paradoxes. The epistemic principle I argued to underwrite
sceptical arguments in 3 need not be conceded to the sceptic, or given up because of its
roll in the explanation for how sceptical arguments work. Rather, the essential point
of the cognitive error theory that I have put forward is that Epistemic Possibility is a
bona fide and powerful part of our ordinary ways of thinking about knowledge. The fact
that sceptical arguments can confuse us, and are best understood as underwritten by
Epistemic Possibility, neither implies that this principle is extraneous to our concept, nor
that it should be given up. On the account of sceptical paradoxes as cognitive illusions
that I have proposed, there is no ‘glitch’ (to use Schiffer’s phrase) in our concept of
knowledge. Rather, a glitch in our cognitive architecture, given inputs such as sceptical
hypotheses, gives rise to illusion that the minor premises of sceptical arguments—let
alone their conclusions!—have any genuine plausibility based on Epistemic Possibility at
all.
Another residual worry about this default-interventionist dual-process account is
whether or not it is equally compatible with both sceptical and non-sceptical invari-
antism. Again, here, I draw on an insight from (Nagel, 2011) to suggest that this is not
the case. She has pointed out that dual-process accounts of certain patterns of epistemic
judgements cannot be considered to be equally friendly to the sceptical invariantist who
denies we know any empirical propositions. In particular, if the default-interventionist
account of sceptical paradoxes that I have outlined here is correct, then, “the skeptic can-
not claim support from this pattern of [judgements]...without an independent argument
to establish that skeptical controlled [ie. reflective Type 2] judgments are epistemically
superior to non-sceptical controlled and to automatic [ie. intuitive Type 1] judgments”
(Nagel, 2011, 22). The point here is that the best—and perhaps, only— motivation for
scepticism is precisely the undeniably felt plausibility of their premises. Insofar as the
default-interventionist account identifies this plausibility as merely illusory, then the
“motivation for skepticism is undercut” (ibid) by this non-sceptical invariantist error-
theory. An error-theory for sceptical paradoxes, that offers “a properly detailed diagnosis
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and expose of its power to seduce” (Wright, 1991, 89). And that, I take it, is just what a
happy-face resolution to sceptical paradoxes should do.
In the previous chapter, I argued that the semantic blindness objection counted
against various proposed contextualist resolutions to sceptical paradoxes. The question
remained, however, whether this meant that a non-sceptical invariantist could fare any
better on this scorecard by providing an error theory that had any advantages to the
succumb to similar problems. I think that the non-sceptical invariantist psychological
error theory I have outlined does have significant advantages over the contextualist’s
semantic error theory. The main problem that afflicted the semantic error theory was
that semantic blindness is implausible for recognised context-sensitive terms. Though
not a knock-down objection—the contextualist is free to suggest that ‘knows’ exhibits
a novel sort of context-sensitivity—this raises some significant issues with respect to
error theory. This semantic error theory purportedly explains our mistaken judgement
regarding sceptical arguments only in terms of a further mystery: why does the context-
sensitivity of ‘knows’ give rise to semantic blindness at all. An error theory that tries to
explains some phenomenon only by pointing to something that itself is mysterious, does
not really explain much at all.
In contrast, the invariantist psychology error theory I have described does not suf-
fer from the same secondary explanatory issues as the contextualist’s semantic error
theory. On this view, the sort of error we make when faced with sceptical arguments is
ubiquitous in human reasoning. Unlike semantic blindness, there is no obvious mystery
involved in the proposed psychological error theory. It explained the mistaken judgement
partly comprising the sceptical paradox, in terms of independently motivated epistemo-
logical analyses of sceptical arguments, and independently motivated theories about
the architecture of human cognition. In this way, the invariantist enjoys an advantage
over the contextualist on the scorecard when it comes to providing an error theory to
satisfactorily resolve sceptical paradoxes. Moreover, it is not clear that the contextualist
can help themselves to the psychological error theory. Contextualists typically take the
plausibility of sceptical premises as evidence for the context-sensitivity of ‘knows’; we
find them plausible because we recognise that in some contexts they express truths. Yet
the psychological error theory I propose maintains that this plausibility is a cognitive
illusion. So adopting this account would undermine the motivation for contextualism
that sceptical paradoxes might offer.
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6.9 Concluding remarks.
In this chapter, I considered various potential ways of utilising the resources of cognitive
psychology to provide a non-sceptical invariantist error theory concerning sceptical para-
doxes have been critically assessed. I argued that explanations for the why the sceptical
paradox arises by accounting for our erroneous judgement in terms of the availability
heuristic failed to be adequately explanatory. Next, I considered a suggested explanation
that appealed to a dual-process theory of the mindreading capacity, and argued that it too
failed to be adequately explanatory. Finally, I proposed a new invariantist error theory
based on the framework of a default-interventionist dual process theory of judgement,
and the findings of earlier chapters concerning sceptical hypotheses and arguments. I
conclude that the cognitive error theory that I have described here could indeed represent
a invariantist happy-face resolution of sceptical paradoxes.
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